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Abstract 
 
My thesis explicates and defends what I term an implicit Goetheanism present in the 
philosophy of Walter Benjamin. It begins by examining Benjamin’s early critique of the 
Kantian and neo-Kantian concept of experience and argues that a Goethean theory of the 
primal phenomenon provides the phenomenological model for Benjamin’s radical 
transformation of the neo-Kantian Idea. I analyse the importance of Goethe’s aesthetics of 
science for Benjamin’s critical development of Early German Romanticism and suggest 
that Goethe’s tender empiricism provides the intellectual backdrop to Benjamin’s later 
materialism. The chromatic-linguistic model of experience which informs Benjamin’s 
earliest writings is shown to develop into a dialectics of refractive expression, one that 
has import consequences for his concept of history and his unorthodox version of cultural 
materialism. My final chapter examines the influence of Goethe upon what it argues is 
Benjamin’s quasi-Jungian criticism of Marxism, defending the importance of Jung’s 
semiotic critique of Freud’s theory of dream symbolism and its relevance for a materialist 
interpretation of ideology. The relationship between the Goethean and Jungian concepts 
of synthesis explains Benjamin’s proximity to a Jungian concept of the unconscious, it is 
argued, which is justified on the condition that a critique of Jung distinguishes the archaic 
image from Benjamin’s dialectical image. This is performed in the final chapter through a 
consideration of the allegorical and the technological in Jung and Benjamin’s differing 
receptions of Goethe’s Faust. The existential component of Goethe’s speculative concept 
of experience provides Benjamin with the resources for thinking of a dialectic of 
historical completion and incompletion, it is concluded, which is necessary for a 
philosophical informed cultural materialism.  
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Preface: Metacritique of the Purism of Historical Reason 
 
  – A visit to Goethe’s house. 
 – Walter Benjamin, ‘No. 113’, One-Way Street 
 
This work is orientated by the belief that the condition of any properly critical cultural, 
sociological or historical investigation of the recent past is an adequate philosophy of 
history; that the central problem for the philosophy of history is theorizing a speculative 
concept of historical experience; and that Walter Benjamin’s philosophy continues to 
provide the best resource for articulating such a concept. The precipitating problem is one 
– familiar from a postmodern ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ predicated on ‘the 
crisis of metaphysical philosophy’ – of grounding any totalizing narrative of a universal 
history from the standpoint of the present.1 Karl Marx, for example, inhabits this problem 
when he depicts communism as the world-historical consummation of the dialectic of 
productive forces in the Communist Manifesto. For in his analysis of actual historical 
events, such as the coup d’état of Napoleon III in the Eighteenth Brumaire, the historical 
significance of the role of class interests is permitted as a non-ideological and ‘real 
depiction – of our historical material’ only on the basis of the assumption that history is 
always the universal history of class struggle.2 The circularity of this relationship 
becomes apparent the more its Marxist-Hegelianism is exposed to a materialist version of 
the objection which Paul Ricoeur has directed at Hegel: ‘It now seems to us as though 
Hegel, seizing a favourable moment, a kairos, which has been revealed for what it was to 
our perspective and our experience, only totalized a few leading aspects of the spiritual 
history of Europe and of its geographical and historical environment, ones that, since that 
time, have come undone’.3 
 The contention here is that the answer to this question supposes a theoretical 
approach capable of mediating between two senses of history (a philosophy of history 
and a mode of historical analysis) and the possibility of doing so hinges on the 
justification of a metaphysical concept of historical experience. Marx, following Hegel, 
neglected to address this problem because historical experience appeared a self-evident 
category from the immanent perspective of the bourgeois revolutions of the late-
eighteenth century and an anticipated epoch of proletarian uprisings sweeping across 
                                                       
1 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington & Brian Massumi, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984), p.xxiv. 
2 Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, trans. 
Terrell Carver, (London, Pluto Press, 2002), p.6; Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German 
Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur, (New York, International Publishers, 2004), p.48; cf. Karl Marx & 
Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London, Penguin, 1985), p.79. 
3 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blamey & David Pellauer, (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), Vol. 3, pp.204-205. 
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Europe in the late-nineteenth century. The resulting foreshortening of the historical 
perspective rendered the problem of historical experience – including its attendant 
problems of historical significance, value, or meaning – redundant for Hegel and Marx. 
As Peter Osborne has argued, ‘Hegelian philosophy must always eternalize its own 
present, if it is to offer the possibility of an absolute knowing’ through which ‘the future 
is treated as wholly immanent to the rationality of the present, the present of the 
interpretation’.4  
 It is only with the perceived limitations of historicist versions of Hegelianism and 
Marxism towards the end of the nineteenth century that this question in the philosophy of 
history could first appear as a problem, and it did so within the context of Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s and the neo-Kantian’s analyses of the epistemological status of the social 
sciences and in particular that of history. The merit of George Simmel’s implicitly neo-
Kantian essay The Problems of the Philosophy of History, written and revised in various 
editions between 1892 and 1916, lies in sharpening our focus upon the philosophical 
relationship between historical materialism and communism. Whilst the work’s 
transcendental deduction of the possibility of historical enquiry in general is problematic, 
not least because it reiterates the unreflective ahistoricism of Kant’s own critical project, 
it remains valuable for posing the question of historical significance in relation to the 
conditions of possibility for experience.5 Simmel’s early epistemological studies – in 
common with neo-Kantianism – may be characterised as a generalization of Kant’s 
transcendental methodology into the realm of social sciences: 
 
The initial result of these studies – set out in the book The Problems of the Philosophy of 
History – was the following basic idea. In exactly the sense that the categories of the 
understanding constitute the perceptually given material of the world as the concept of 
nature, so the a priori categories of the intellect constitute the events that are objects of 
immediate experience as the concept of history.6  
 
The possible condition of particular historical experiences, according to Simmel, is the 
capacity to ascribe a meaningful value to the whole of history, in accordance with which 
facts are able to assume a status of historical significance. Historical knowledge therefore 
requires a critical ‘metaphysics of history’ which transcendentally grasps ‘historical 
reality as a whole’.7 According to Simmel this “explanans”, or Idea of the totality of 
history, is supplied for Marx by the concept of communism as a ‘unified entity that we 
cannot grasp directly…[but] prevents our construct of history from collapsing into 
                                                       
4 Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, (London, Verso, 1995), 
p.42. 
5 George Simmel, The Problems of the Philosophy of History: An Epistemological Essay, trans. 
Guy Oakes, (New York, The Free Press, 1977), pp.151-202. 
6 Ibid., p.3. 
7 Ibid., pp.177 & 151. 
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incoherent splinters and fragments’.8 Communism as a pure a priori but merely regulative 
Idea of reason therefore supplies a correlating historical form (the masses organised into 
classes according to economic interests) for the empirical experience of the chaotic and 
manifold content of life. Simmel therefore justifies historical materialism as an 
“epistemological idealism” in order to avoid the sceptical problem faced by “historical 
realism”. It is only when it misconstrues itself as dogmatically speculative metaphysics of 
history that historical materialism enacts a ‘premature and dogmatic foreshortening of our 
ontological perspective’, which ascribes a sole, unique and eternal significance to the 
forces of production.9   
 Gillian Rose has rightly pointed out the enormous influence of Simmel’s ‘unique 
version of neo-Kantian Geltungslogik [logic of validity]’ upon the ‘development of 
critical, Marxist sociology’.10 She has also pointedly criticised how the form/content 
dichotomy which this neo-Kantian paradigm asserts severs the ideal from the real and, in 
seeking to discover the conditions of possibility of an object whose existence is 
presupposed, remains blind to the ahistorical character of its judgement.11 Significantly, 
by regarding communism as a merely regulative Idea, Simmel’s neo-Kantianism 
responds to the eternalization of the present in Hegelian philosophy by turning the 
rationality of the future into an infinitely deferred ideal, purified of all empirical and 
historical content. The value of such an endeavour is in highlighting the necessity of an 
adequate concept of historical experience for the philosophy of history (one absent from 
Kant’s own essays on history). Yet Rose’s attempt to retrieve a Hegelian concept of 
speculative experience for social theory only rehearses the converse problematic 
assumption of the identity of the real and the rational within history, whose empirical 
falsification had helped expose to neo-Kantianism the tautological logic of Hegel’s 
speculative philosophy. With each failure of the world to rationally transform itself, the 
problem of scepticism therefore resurfaces. 
 In this context, the denigration of metaphysics and the institutional ‘crisis of 
narratives’ diagnosed by Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition represents 
a retreat to a neo-Humean scepticism.12 Its objection towards any project of historical 
                                                       
8 Ibid., p.187. 
9 Ibid., p.188. 
10 Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, (London, Althone, 1981), p.25. 
11 Ibid., p.1. 
12 Kojin Karatani’s Transcritique: On Kant and Marx characterises the critical formalism of 
postmodernism as a return to the scepticism of Humean empiricism, which relinquishes the 
positive moral force contained in the communist project to religious fundamentalism. Whether 
Karatani’s proposal to ‘reconstruct the metaphysics called communism’ through Kant succeeds 
in avoiding the perceived feebleness of neo-Kantian “ethical socialism” from which he 
distances his work remains open to question (Kojin Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and 
Marx, trans. Sabu Kohso, (Cambridge, MA & London, MIT Press, 2005), p.xi.  
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totalization collapses, however, not only with the awareness of its complicity with the 
totalizing conditions of capitalist modernity against which it abandons any perspective for 
critical scrutiny, but also with the internal contradictions of its own status as a meta-
“metanarrative”. Against this, the recent recovery of a mathematical-scientific grounding 
of metaphysics only repeats the route by which neo-Kantianism first flourished in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century and then dissipated in the first half of the twentieth 
century.13 What is necessary is the formulation of a speculative concept of historical 
experience, one which permits a consideration of the significance of the recent past in 
relation to the totality of history without drawing on either a Hegelian eternalization of 
the conditions of the present or the Kantian purification of reality through an endlessly 
deferred future. 
 The philosophical interest which Walter Benjamin’s concept of experience has 
received in the last two decades indicates the extent to which his work permits an opening 
up of this perspective. His thought presents a sustained philosophical engagement with 
the problem outlined above, to the extent that the disciplinarity of philosophy itself 
becomes transformed through the speculative imperative of his engagement with the 
ephemerality of the historical present. Two essays which emerge simultaneously from 
Benjamin’s stay in Moscow over the winter of 1926-7 are paradigmatic of a practical 
engagement with this theoretical problem of historical experience and with a 
hermeneutics of historical significance characterised in terms of experienceability. These 
works – ‘Moscow’ and ‘Goethe’ – will therefore provide a useful opening into this 
project, as well as specifying the perspective through which Benjamin’s philosophy will 
be considered in what follows. In particular, they speak of a phenomenological 
experience of the historical in terms of a physiognomic language of the everyday, one that 
that will be utilised to construct a “metacritique of the purism of historical reason”, 
inspired in part by George Hamann’s own metacritique of Kant’s philosophy of nature. 
Such metacritique seeks to transform the concept of historical experience from its rational 
preoccupation with knowledge to a theory of truth grounded in a speculative metaphysics 
of history. In doing so it counters the “idealist” tendency – prevalent in Kant and Hegel 
and still implicit in Marx’s concept of history – to perceive historical reality as in some 
                                                       
13 The turn to Kant in political theory from both sides of the analytic/continental divide in the 
1970s and 1980s (Rawls, Arendt, Habermas, and Lyotard himself) would seem to reflect a set 
of complex responses to Stalinism (as well as the rehabilitation of Kantian epistemology by the 
analytical readings of the 1960s onwards). Karatani’s anarchism fits in with this political 
response, placing a value on the primacy of ethics in Kant’s philosophy which is proximate to 
(but not identical with) a Levinasian strand of “neo-Kantianism” continued by Simon 
Critchley. On the other hand, Alain Badiou’s mathematical ontology recovers a scientific 
impulse which dominates the neo-Kantianism of the nineteenth century, although he distances 
himself from this. 
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sense ultimately knowable. Benjamin’s general turn to materialism will be read in the 
chapters that follow as an outcome of his rejection of the optimism of this “idealist” 
perspective, one that articulates in its place a materialist transformation of historical 
significance for experience. 
 Commissioned to depict everyday life under the mixed socialism of the New 
Economic Policy, in his two month stay in Moscow Benjamin experienced the political 
and cultural upheaval of the great “laboratory table” of the Soviet Union under Stalin.14 
He speaks of a city in which: 
 
In schematic form, Moscow, as it appears at this very moment, reveals the full range of 
possibilities: above all, the possibility of the revolution’s utter failure and of its success. 
In both instances, however, there will be something unforeseeable whose appearance 
will be vastly different from any programmatic painting of the future. The outline of this 
today is brutally and clearly present in the people and their environment.15  
 
Benjamin’s rejection of any “programmatic painting” of the future and his emphasis upon 
its unpredictability testify to a radically speculative concept of experience attuned to the  
multiplicity of virtual futures which contingently impinge upon the present, not as 
progressive outgrowths of its inherent tendencies but as monstrous interruptions of all 
expectations. These have their basis, Benjamin insists, in economic facts whose imprints 
are ‘brutally and distinctly visible’ in the phenomenological transformations of the 
architectural, chromatic, and temporal configurations of everyday life. He confesses, 
however, that ‘few people, even in Russia, have a significantly broad grasp’ of such facts 
to permit any straightforward interpretation. Extolled in the Arcades Project as ‘the 
expression of the economy in its culture’ (and modelled on a psycho-physical relationship 
of signification which is likened to that of a nightmare to a bad stomach), such 
expressionism is described here as a ‘new and disorienting language’.16  
 Importantly for the study that follows, Benjamin speaks of portraying such a 
language according to a methodology which implicitly draws on the scientific writings of 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. To capture the utter contingency of this language, 
Benjamin proposes a presentational form in which ‘“all factuality is already theory” and 
therefore it refrains from any deductive abstraction, any prognostication, and, within 
                                                       
14 ‘Each thought, each day, each life lies here as on a laboratory table. And as if it were a metal 
from which an unknown substance is by means to be extracted, it must endure experimentation 
to the point of exhaustion. No organism, no organization, can escape this process’ (Walter 
Benjamin, ‘Moscow’, Selected Writings [hereafter SW], Volume 1, (Cambridge, MA. & 
London, Harvard University Press, 1991), p.23. 
15 Walter Benjamin, Letter to Martin Buber (dated February 23rd 1927), The Correspondence of 
Walter Benjamin: 1910-1940, eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. Adorno, (Chicago & 
London, University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.313. 
16 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project [hereafter AP], trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin 
McLaughlin, (Cambridge, MA. & London, Belknap Press, 1999), K2,5; Walter Benjamin, 
Letter to Martin Buber (dated February 23rd 1927), op. cit., p.313. 
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certain bounds, even any judgement’.17 The source of Benjamin’s comment is Goethe’s 
injunction, in Maxims and Reflections, ‘not seek for something behind the phenomena’ 
because ‘everything in the realm of fact is already theory’, and the phenomena 
‘themselves are the theory’.18 The tender empiricism [Zarte Empirie] which underlies this 
methodology concerns itself with an experimental experience of the “archetypal”, 
“primal” or “original” phenomenon [Urphänomen] which is conceived not merely as 
empirical facts but as the concrete convergence of truth with the real.19  
 Whilst Benjamin was engaged in such an “experiment” he was simultaneously 
preparing a biography of Goethe for the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia which filtered 
bourgeois Weimar through the lens of historical materialism.20 Deemed ‘too radical’ for 
the Marxist orthodoxy of the encyclopaedia’s editors, Benjamin’s article introduces the 
“greatness” of Goethe according to a materialist theory of temporal after-life, arguing that 
Goethe managed to found a ‘great literature’ among the bourgeoisie precisely because 
‘his whole work abounds in reservations about them’.21 Goethe gave ‘the contents that 
fulfilled him the form which has enabled them to resist their dissolution at the hands of 
the bourgeoisie – a resistance made possible because they remained without effect and 
not because they could be deformed or trivialized’. Tender empiricism as a dialectical  
materialism. A materialist theory of historical afterlife. The chapters that follow seek to 
elaborate the genealogy of these positions within Benjamin’s thought and evaluate the 
coherence of their relationship. Underlying them, it will be suggested, is a speculative 
concept of historical experience as a material medium of refraction and a theory of 
historical significance as metaphysical truth which circumvents the theoretical problems 
of both a Hegelian and neo-Kantian philosophy of history.  
 That the poet, scientist and statesman Johann Wolfgang von Goethe is the other 
pivotal figure behind the concept of historical experience which underlies this project is 
perhaps surprising, since Goethe’s thought is typically associated with a spiritual holism 
and conservative cheerfulness that runs counter to the destructive melancholy of 
Benjamin’s thought and the radicalism of the political project which this sustains. Yet the 
chapters that follow seek to demonstrate the presence of a powerful and sustained 
                                                       
17 Ibid. 
18 J. W. von Goethe, Maxims and Reflections [hereafter MR], trans. Elisabeth Stopp, (London, 
Penguin Books, 1998), #430. 
19 Walter Benjamin, ‘Moscow’, SW2 p.22. Throughout this work, Goethe’s phrase ‘Zarte 
Empirie’ has been translated according to the standard English rendering of zarte as “tender”, 
which is preferential to ‘delicate’ but nonetheless fails to fully capture the sensitivity inherent 
to this Goethean sensibility.   
20 ‘Goethe’ was commissioned but rejected by the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia and subsequently 
published in condensed form in Die literarische Welt in December 1928. ‘Moscow’ was 
published in Martin Buber’s journal Die Kreatur in 1927.  
21 Walter Benjamin, ‘Goethe’, SW2 p.187. 
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Goetheanism across the whole of Benjamin’s writings. Preceding both the early study of 
Early German Romanticism and the subsequent engagement with Marxism – aspects 
according to which his work is frequently categorized – this Goetheanism provides the 
standpoint for his critical and often unorthodox appropriations of these positions. Whilst 
Benjamin’s earliest writings uncritically draw on Goethe’s reading of George Hamann to 
articulate a theory of cultural and spiritual fragmentation – one which comes to be 
replaced by a historical materialist account of capitalist estrangement – Benjamin retains 
a number of key ideas extracted from Goethe’s philosophy of nature and reformulated 
within the context of a materialist philosophy of history. If, as will be argued, such a 
Goetheanism is a central part of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, the viability of the 
concept of historical experience which it produces is dependent upon the extent to which 
it can be philosophically theorised without contradicting the historical materialism of 
Benjamin’s mature politics.  
 It is technology – specifically the photographic and later cinematographic image – 
which comes to mediate between Goethe’s natural philosophy and a materialist theory of 
culture in Benjamin’s later thought. In this respect, the argument developed through the 
course of this work is that Goethe’s tender empiricism should be conceived as proto-
constructivist, on the model of avant-garde art practice. This will be tested in the final 
chapter through a consideration of Benjamin’s appropriation of Jungian psychology in the 
early notes of the Arcades Project. It is here that the stakes of Benjamin’s Goetheanism 
differentiate him most clearly from the predominantly Freudian cultural critique of 
Adorno and the Frankfurt School. But this also draws him into the problematic orbit of 
fascist ideology, from which he would only be able to emerge through a sustained 
critique of the undialectical naturalism of Jung’s own deployment of Goethe. Since this 
critique was never completed, the coherence and legacy of Benjamin’s Goetheanism 
stands in need of an evaluation which occupies the conclusion of this investigation. 
 The Jungian motifs in Benjamin’s work from the late 1920s and early 1930s have 
been subject to – mainly dismissive – scrutiny in a number of recent commentaries. Sarah 
Ley Roff offers a survey of this recent literature upon Benjamin’s relation to 
psychoanalysis and to Jungian psychology in ‘Benjamin and Psychoanalysis’, and Sigrid 
Weigel’s “re-reading” of Benjamin in ‘Body- and Image-Space’ in particular emphasises 
the former, whilst bluntly insisting that ‘Benjamin’s talk of the “unconscious of the 
collective” has nothing to do’ with ‘Jung’s model of the “collective unconscious”’.22 
                                                       
22 Sarah Ley Roff, ‘Benjamin and Psychoanalysis’, The Cambridge Companion to Walter 
Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.115-132; 
cf. Sigrid Weigel, Body- and Image-Space: Re-Reading Walter Benjamin, (London & New 
York, Routledge, 1996), pp.120-127.  
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Similarly, both Ned Lukacher’s presentation of Benjamin as a theorist of “chthonic 
revolution” and more recently Michael Hollington’s interest in the chthonic roots which 
situate Benjamin “between Marx and Fourier” play down the importance of Jung to this 
project. 23 Most commentators consent with Lukacher’s evaluation, that ‘Benjamin was 
never terribly interested in Jung’s work’ and that ‘he was genuinely convinced by 
Adorno’s celebration of Freud’.24 However, Benjamin’s critical relationship to Jung can 
only be properly situated within the context of his similarly critical appropriation of 
Goethe’s thought. When this is understood, it is less surprising that Benjamin’s socio-
psychological model for the interpretation of collective dreams – itself a critique of 
vulgar Marxist determinism – drew him into the proximity of Jung’s own critique of 
Freudian psychoanalysis, if we recognize the importance of Goethe within an alternative 
and esoteric tradition of the unconscious represented by Jung and more recently Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari.25 
 Given the divergence in the current intellectual standing of both thinkers, it is to be 
expected that Jungians are more enthusiastic about Benjamin’s cultural theory than 
critical theorists are about analytical psychology (although the recent emergence of “post-
Jungian” psychology represents a critical re-engagement with the substance of Jung’s 
thought, echoed in recent philosophical publications on Jung and, variously,  Deleuze, 
Irigaray, Kant, Nietzsche, and postmodernity).26 Terence Dawson, co-editor of the 
                                                       
23 Michael Hollington, ‘Benjamin, Fourier, Barthes’, With The Sharpened Axe of Reason: 
Approaches to Walter Benjamin, ed. Gerhard Fischer, (Oxford & Herndon, Va., Berg, 1994), 
p.119; Ned Lukacher, ‘Walter Benjamin's Chthonian Revolution’, boundary 2, Vol. 11, No. 
1/2, Engagements: Postmodernism, Marxism, Politics, (Autumn, 1982/Winter, 1983), pp.49-
50.  
24 Ibid., p.49. 
25 cf. the discussion of Jung’s Goetheanism in Chapter 4. This reading of Benjamin’s quasi-
Jungian cultural materialism might therefore be critically compared to the literary theory of the 
British Marxist Christopher Cauldwell, whose pre-emptive constellation of psychoanalysis, 
Jung and Marx is described by one commentator as the ‘Ghost of Marxism’s Future’ (Edwin 
A. Roberts, The Anglo-Marxists: A Study in Ideology and Culture, (Maryland & Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp.95-6. For a more critical appraisal of Cauldwell’s 
theoretical accomplishments cf. Francis Mulhern, ‘The Marxist Aesthetics of Christopher 
Caudwell’, New Left Review, 1, 85 (May-June, 1974). Roberts mistakenly attributes this 
article to “Francis Mulber” in his short coda (Edwin A. Roberts, op. cit., p.102). 
Christian Kerslake’s Deleuze and the Unconscious examines Deleuze’s critical opposition 
to Freudian psychoanalysis (most notably in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus with Felix 
Guattari) and his relationship to this alternative tradition of the unconscious. Whilst Kerslake 
places both Deleuze’s and Jung’s “differential” theory of the unconscious within ‘a tradition of 
thought about the unconscious which is older than Freud’s and rooted in the philosophical 
tradition’, his work does not discuss Goethe’s relation to this tradition or Deleuze’s 
philosophical relation to Goethe (Christian Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconscious, (London & 
New York, Continuum, 2007), p.3). One of the undeveloped suppositions of my own project is 
that Goethe might prove to be a mediating figure in a staged encounter between Benjamin and 
Deleuze’s philosophies. 
26 cf. Christian Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconscious, op. cit.; Frances Gray, Jung, Irigaray, 
Individuation: Philosophy, Analytical Psychology, and the Question of the Feminine, (Hove & 
New York, Routledge, 2007); Paul Bishop, Synchronicity Intuition in Kant, Swedenborg, and 
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Cambridge Companion to Jung, suggests Jung’s analysis of the cultural reception of 
Joyce’s Ulysses ‘anticipates some of the work of Walter Benjamin and other members of 
the Frankfurt School’, because Jung recognised ‘the ambivalent face of modernity that 
both challenges and changes us’ and how ‘we cannot wrestle with the contemporary 
without wrestling with all the conflicting tensions that make up the past, because all the 
different tensions of the past are still with us’.27 One of the ideas developed in the final 
chapter is that this aspect of Jung’s thought derives from an emphasis upon “nature” as a 
congealed, material substrate of the historical which is shared with Goethe’s concept of 
experience and which resonates with the unorthodox materialism of Benjamin’s later 
thought. As already suggested, however, this materialism needs to be historicized and 
brought into a relation with historical materialism through a mediating concept of 
technology. This is performed across the chapters that follow through a discussion of a 
radicalized understanding of genius that draws upon Kant, Goethe, Plato, Jung and 
Benjamin, and aspects of the artistic practices of Russian Constructivism and early 
modern cinema. 
 Benjamin’s philosophical relationship to Goethe is less contentious and frequently 
remarked upon, but has to my knowledge not received any specific and full-length 
investigation in English. Bernd Witte, Uwe Steiner (in German), Joanna Hodge, John 
Pizer, Esther Leslie and Andrew Benjamin (in English) have, however, devoted sections 
of their work to exploring this relationship.28 One of the themes which  arises out of a 
number of these reflections is how the presence of a Goethean metaphysics of experience 
in Benjamin’s work distances his messianism from the messianicity of Derrida’s 
deconstructive philosophy. Joanna Hodge, for example, introduces a distinction between 
the weak messianism of Benjamin’s interpretation of Early German Romanticism and the 
strong aesthetics of his reading of Goethe, arguing that the ‘key to his admiration for 
Goethe’ lies in the possibility of recasting the ‘constitutive categories’ of the former 
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‘independently from any endorsement of one true religion, Christianity’.29 This, she 
claims, counterpoises Benjamin’s messianic theology without religion to the 
‘messianicity without messianism’ of what she terms Derrida’s ‘religion with theology’. 
30 It is unclear whether Hodge intends to evoke Benjamin’s own use of this phrase as a 
description of the mythic temporality of capitalism in order to criticise Derrida, but the 
argument developed across the following chapters is that Benjamin introduces the 
mortuary aspect of Goethe’s theory of judgement into the positivity of Romantic criticism 
in order to theorize a speculative metaphysical experience of completed totality and this 
implies that the omission of such an aspect risks rehearsing the problematic temporality 
of novelty that is inherent to capitalism. This idea – which suggests what is at stake in 
Benjamin’s Goethean reception for the debates between postmodernity and modernity 
mentioned above, as well as what is to be demanded of any contemporary recuperation of 
Romanticism within Marxist and post-Marxist philosophy – is explored in my last two 
chapters.  
 The chapters that follow therefore intend to explain Benjamin’s recourse to this 
implicit Goetheanism and to the kind of cognition and presentation involved in such a 
practice. Part of the argument to be developed in such consideration is that Goethe’s work 
permits Benjamin to re-conceive his transformed Kantianism as a transcendental 
empiricism of the pure material content of experience. In Chapter 1, the philosophical 
basis and historical genealogy of Benjamin’s project is explored via his early metacritique 
of the Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy of history and the scientifically impoverished 
concept of experience which he seeks to overcome. Hermann Cohen’s recognition of a 
scientific theory of experience underlying Kant’s system is important in this respect, 
although Benjamin does not follow Cohen’s legitimation of such experience by endorsing 
a logical idealism of pure cognition.  
 The transcendental theory of experience which supports Benjamin’s overcoming of 
Kant’s limitations is developed, Chapter 2 argues, through a consideration of Early 
German Romanticism but also Goethe’s tender empiricism. The latter, it will be argued, 
provides a more coherent resource for Benjamin’s development of a materialist theory of 
Ideas, since Goethe’s concept of experience – in contrast to Romantic self-reflection – 
involves an “objective” thinking in which the object is absorbed into thought, leaving 
traces of material residue or “after-images”. This is explored in the concluding section of 
the chapter in relation to the specific material ontology of the photographic image, a 
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theme that is picked up again in Chapter 3 in relation to the moving- or cinematographic 
[kinesis] image.  
 Chapter 3 examines the dialectical structure of Goethe’s concept of experience in 
relation to the philosophy of history, exploring its characteristically refractive medium in 
relation to colour, phantasy and language. The relation between the hermeneutic 
incompletion of the lived moment and the existential completion intimated by death that 
arises from this structure is then examined in relation to Benjamin’s messianic 
understanding of history by considering the question of historical judgement.  
 Having examined the resources for a materialist and a dialectical philosophy of 
experience in Benjamin’s Goetheanism, the final chapter critically examines their 
conjunction in the dialectical materialism which Benjamin’s develops as a critique of 
Marxism. The development of an “expressive materialism” offers a criticism of vulgar 
historical materialism, it is argued, by drawing upon a Jungian theory of dream 
symbolism which transposes the existential crisis within psychosis into a collective 
ideology of historical catastrophe. Despite the inherent problems of its theory of 
collective archetypes, Jung’s psychological critique of Freudian dream symbolism 
provides a legitimate intellectual resource for Benjamin’s concept of the phantasmagoria 
because Benjamin’s appropriation of Jung takes place within the context of a Goethean 
dialectic of semblance. The chapter concludes with a critique of Jung’s archaic image, 
missing from Benjamin’s own writings, by way of an interpretation of the role of 
technology in Goethe’s Faust.
1. The Neo-Kantian Problematic: 
Walter Benjamin and the Metaphysics of Experience 
 
We know of primitive peoples of the so-called pre-animistic stage who identify themselves with 
sacred animals and plants and name themselves after them; we know of insane people who 
likewise identify themselves in part with objects of their perception, which are thus no longer 
objecta, “placed before” them… 
   – Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’  
 
1.1 Speculative Experience and the Possibility of Metaphysics in Kant 
Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘The Life of Students’, published in Der neue Merkur in 1915, 
encapsulates what is at stake for the philosophy of history in the attempt to formulate a 
more radical concept of experience, an awareness of which accompanies all of his 
subsequent thought. Opposing his position to a ‘view of history that puts its faith in the 
infinite extent of time and thus concerns itself only with the speed, or lack of it, with 
which people and epochs advance along the path of progress’, the essay implies that such 
a perspective produces a conception of the present as always necessarily incomplete and 
of the future as the inevitable extension of its implicit but ‘formless progressive 
tendencies’.1 It is a view of history which produces that “grim” and “overwhelming” 
concept of experience as ‘expressionless, impenetrable, and ever the same’.2 Written in 
the context of Benjamin’s involvement in the “Free Students’ Association” of the German 
Youth Movement, this concept of experience is opposed for endorsing a form of cultural 
conservatism which is at best cynically patronising and at worst the prop of a reactionary 
philistinism.  
 Despite the political necessity for opposing this view, however, Benjamin’s 
writings up to 1916 are only able to formulate an alternative through recourse to a 
concept of spiritual experience drawn mainly from the poetry of Schiller, Hölderlin and 
Stefan George. The idea of “youth” and its “dreams” is allied with a uncritically 
metaphysical notion of spiritual experience in Benjamin’s earliest texts which is 
problematically nostalgic (‘We were [once] accustomed to spirit [Geist] just as we are 
accustomed to the heartbeat that enables us to lift loads and digest our food’) and 
idealistically utopian.3 From the perspective of the critical philosophy which shortly 
                                                       
1 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Life of Students’ [hereafter LS], SW1 p.37. 
2 Walter Benjamin, ‘Experience’, SW1 p.3. 
3 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, SW1 p.6. Benjamin’s conclusion to ‘The 
Metaphysics of Youth’ appeals to a paradisiacal time and space of the Ball which appears 
capable of seeping into the grim realities of the outside world: ‘We know that all the merciless 
realities that have been expelled still flutter around this house...From time to time, music 
penetrates to the outside world and submerges them’. It is the blend of Taoist mysticism and 
German humanism promoted by Martin Buber’s writings that seem to underlie this idea of a 
spiritual utopia. An earlier quotation from the Lao Tzu invokes the famous utopian image of a 
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comes to preoccupy Benjamin’s writings, this metaphysical concept of experience is 
problematically dogmatic in its invocation of spiritual ‘values – inexperienceable – which 
we serve’.4 For this reason, it is important to articulate the possibility of such a 
speculative concept of experience through a philosophical engagement with the 
metaphysics of history from within Kant’s critical system, one that begins with a 
consideration of the problem of metaphysics in general.  
 The Critique of Pure Reason which inaugurated transcendental idealism in 1781 
establishes the critical limitations of epistemology by cautioning against the inherent 
tendency of idealism since Plato for metaphysical flights of speculation. Kant warns how 
‘Plato left the world of sense because it sets such narrow limits to our understanding; on 
the wings of the ideas, he ventured beyond that world and into the empty space of pure 
understanding. He did not notice that with all his efforts he made no headway’.5 For, ‘it is 
human reason’s usual fate, in speculation, to finish its edifice as soon as possible, and not 
to inquire until afterwards whether a good foundation has in fact been laid for it’. 
Benjamin will, like much of neo-Kantianism before him, attempt to overcome the 
limitations imposed within Kant’s system through a partial return to the speculative 
metaphysics of Plato. He regards Kant’s resistance to such a metaphysics as serving two 
central purposes: ‘to guarantee the certainty of our knowledge of nature and above all to 
secure the integrity of ethics’.6 That is, Kant sought to recover the possibility of scientific 
knowledge and of ethical experience through the discovery of pure a priori concepts, and 
this was achieved through the separation of a theoretical and a practical reason. In doing 
so, the certainty of a theoretical knowledge could be guaranteed precisely through its 
separation from speculative experience, and the recuperation of ethics secured through its 
independence from the empirical. This allowed Kant to produce a valid ‘metaphysics of 
nature’ in which he ‘described that part of the natural sciences which is pure – that is, 
proceeds not from experience but simply from reason a priori’ (P 93). The ‘Copernican 
revolution’ of the transcendental method therefore accounts for what in our experience of 
nature is necessary, by attributing its necessity to theoretical reason itself.  
 But having secured a metaphysics of nature on the basis of the structure of 
knowledge itself, Kant’s epistemology now risks turning into the very speculative 
                                                                                                                                                     
land where, ‘The next place might be so near at hand/ That one could hear the cocks crowing in 
it.../ But the people would grow old and die/ Without ever having been there’ (Walter 
Benjamin, ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, SW1 p.10). Benjamin inverts this scene in the final 
section: the utopian music of the Ball drowns out the sounds of the outside world which lies so 
near at hand. 
4 Walter Benjamin, ‘Experience’, SW1 p.4. 
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis, Hackett, 
1996), Ak.  A5/B9. 
6 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Perception’ [hereafter P], SW1 p.93. 
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rationalism that it positioned itself against. The continuity established between thought 
and experience entailed that ‘the metaphysics of nature could easily collapse into the 
concept of experience’ (ibid.). That is, the structure of reality itself might be deducible 
from certain necessary principles of knowledge possessed by a subject implicated in 
actively producing such a world. Benjamin maintains that, ‘Kant feared nothing so much 
as this abyss,’ and that the systematic development of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
structured around the avoidance of this metaphysical problem. ‘His method,’ Benjamin 
argues, ‘was not only to relate all knowledge to nature, as well as the metaphysics of 
nature, to space and time as constitutive concepts, but to distinguish these concepts 
absolutely from the categories’. Kant deliberately separated the a priori intuitions of 
sensibility from the categories of understanding in response to this metaphysical problem: 
‘This meant that from the outset he avoided a unified epistemological centre whose all-
too-powerful gravitational force might have sucked all experience into itself’ (P 93-4).  
 Kant posits the faculty of the understanding as providing the formal pure a priori 
concepts – the categories – through which the content of “experience” is schematised, 
distinct from the pure a priori intuitions of space and time through which the manifold 
given to sensibility is synthesised, by distinguishing the Transcendental Aesthetic of the 
first Critique from the Transcendental Logic. This, in Benjamin’s view, unwarranted 
distinction explains the necessity for retaining a minimal but uncognizable a posteriori 
“given”. The ‘“material of sensation” was artificially distanced from the animating centre 
of the categories by the forms of intuition by which it was only imperfectly absorbed’ (P 
94.). Kant is therefore able to introduce a check or critical limit with which to resist 
speculative deduction: the requirement that the ‘flights of fancy’ of the understanding be 
grounded upon intuitability. In this way, ‘Kant achieved the separation of metaphysics 
and experience, or, to use his own terms, between pure knowledge and experience’. 
Theoretical knowledge guarantees its certainty by being initially distinguished from, but 
then tied back to, the sensibility of experience. The speculative crux of Benjamin’s 
project will be the undoing of this separation in order to permit a mediation between 
metaphysics and experience.  
 
1.2 The Neo-Kantian Problematic: Trendelenburg, Fischer and Cohen 
In the half-century after the death of Kant, German philosophy witnessed a Hegelian 
reinvigoration of a speculative idealism whose historical limitations eventually produced 
a ‘mistrust and a feeling of “nausea” for philosophical speculation’.7 In the wake of the 
perceived collapse of Hegelianism by the mid-eighteen hundreds, and motivated by the 
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success of empirical research in the positive sciences – which now threatened to leave 
philosophy idling behind with its dream of speculative metaphysics – the preoccupation 
with epistemology [Erkenntnistheorie] intensified, reaching its climax with the famous 
refrain from Otto Liebmann’s 1865 text Kant and his Epigones: ‘Thus we must go back 
to Kant [Also muß auf Kant zurückgegangen warden]’ (HC 1). 
 Because the eruption of the debate between the Kantian epistemology of Adolf 
Trendelenburg and the neo-Hegelianism of Kuno Fischer in the 1860s arose over the 
specific issue of the philosophical status of the pure forms of intuition in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the more general problem of validity of Kant’s minimal 
version of metaphysics, it will prove a useful starting point for our enquiry. 
Trendelenburg’s criticism of the Critique of Pure Reason revolves around the recognition 
of a “neglected alternative” to Kant’s claim, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that ‘space 
and time are either forms of sensibility or real existences’.8 For Trendelenburg, ‘even if 
we concede the argument that space and time are demonstrated to be subjective 
conditions which, in us, precede perception and experience, there is still no word of proof 
to show that they cannot at the same time be objective forms’.9 If Trendelenburg’s 
argument is correct, it would expose Kant’s ontological denial of the spatio-temporality 
of things-in-themselves as itself dogmatically metaphysical. Furthermore, at stake in 
Trendelenburg’s intervention is his belief that if space is demonstrated to be an 
exclusively subjective condition of our cognition of objects it would undermine the very 
possibility of scientific realism, since the natural sciences would only ever be capable of 
investigating the lawfulness of supposedly mere appearances. 
 Fischer rightly criticises Trendelenberg for misunderstanding the difference 
between transcendental and empirical ideality in Kant, and therefore for falsely conflating 
subjectivity per se with an empirical psychological subjectivity. As Graham Bird points 
out, Fischer ‘represents Kant’s position more accurately’ by arguing that ‘space and time 
are empirically objective (empirically real) but transcendentally subjective (not 
transcendentally real)’.10 In other words, they possess a metaphysical reality according to 
Kant’s critical conception of metaphysics, but not a speculative “metaphysics” 
concerning thing-in-themselves. But Trendelenburg’s broader concern with realism 
demands a justification for Kant’s imposed agnosticism towards the things-in-themselves, 
and therefore the grounds for the very distinction between the transcendental and the 
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empirical within the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first place. Whilst Fischer insists that 
this distinction is necessary, since it is the transcendental status of space and time as 
purely formal conditions by which all objects are knowable to us which guarantees their 
universality – and therefore the mathematical “objectivity” of the positive sciences –  
Trendelenburg correctly raises the ambiguity of their unique transcendental status in the 
first Critique. 
 This controversy over the possibility of a critical metaphysics of nature within 
Kant’s transcendental idealism echoes the debates over the scientific status of the social 
sciences and humanities also invoked by the neo-Kantians in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.11 If time as a pure form of intuition in the Aesthetic is dogmatically 
metaphysical, this undermines the very status of history as a discipline of scientific 
enquiry which imposes historical narratives onto events, and therefore the possibility of 
even a critical metaphysics of history.12 However, it is Hermann Cohen’s intervention in 
the neo-Kantian dispute – initially in the essay ‘On the Controversy Between 
Trendelenburg and Kuno Fischer’ (1871), and its subsequent development into the longer 
work on Kant’s Theory of Experience (1871) – which is significant for the Benjaminian 
project of a metaphysics of history, because in his attempt to resolve the disagreement 
between Trendelenburg and Fischer he reverses the terms of the inquiry and therefore the 
meaning of a priority in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The value of such an argument 
for the project at hand will lie not in the resulting “critical idealism”, but for rethinking 
the relationship between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic in 
Kant’s first Critique according to a theory of experience which permits a mediation 
across the artificial abyss imposed upon the architectonic.  
 It is Cohen’s thought that serves as the frequent backdrop from which Benjamin’s 
own arguments develop, and his acquaintance, admiration, and disappointment with 
aspects of Cohen’s work is documented in Gershom Scholem’s biography of their 
friendship.13 In his early essays ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming 
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philosophical projects not only between the Marburg school and the South-Western school, but 
between individual thinkers within those schools. Whilst I follow Benjamin’s own generic 
references to “neo-Kantianism” here, for reasons that are explained below this chapter will 
examine Benjamin’s critical relationship to neo-Kantianism through the work of Hermann 
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of a tension between a historical realist and an epistemological idealist interpretation of the 
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13 Cf. Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship, trans. Harry Zohn, (New 
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on ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’ (published 1924-5), the ‘Critique of Violence’ (published 
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Philosophy’ from 1917-18, Benjamin regards the redevelopment of the Kantian system as 
a philosophical task which, having been partially initiated by neo-Kantianism, was to be 
completed by the proposed ‘coming philosophy’. Under the changed political 
circumstances of the 1930s, the difference in tone of Benjamin’s 1939 overview of neo-
Kantianism in a review of Hönigswald’s Philosophy and Language might be interpreted 
not so much as hostility at the betrayal of his teachers (Rickert had taught Benjamin, 
along with Heidegger, at the University of Freiburg in 1913) but disillusionment at the 
failure of neo-Kantianism to follow through such a transformation, and its subsequent 
complicity with the forces of bourgeois fascism. Whilst Cohen’s hope for a historical 
reconciliation of Judaism and German humanism may have appeared naïve in 1917, for 
example, his words take on a tragic irony in the light of the political events of the 1930s.14  
 Although Benjamin proposes the transformation of Kantian philosophy beyond 
what he later calls the narrower aims of Kant’s ‘epigones’, and thus beyond the 
limitations of Cohen’s own critical idealism, understanding the sources from which 
Benjamin’s philosophical project develops remains of central importance to 
comprehending the programmatic philosophical intentions of Benjamin’s thought. That 
such a trajectory has remained relatively obscured until recently may in part be accounted 
for by the historical circumstances surrounding the decline of neo-Kantianism: in the 
aftermath of the First World War there was little appetite for a continuation of the 
perceived pre-war “institutions” and, having established itself as the prevailing 
orthodoxy, neo-Kantianism was unable ‘to propagate itself institutionally into the next 
generation’; additionally, the rise of anti-Semitism in the inter-war period lead to the 
                                                                                                                                                     
1921), the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to the book on baroque drama (published 1928), the 
‘Review of Hönigswald’ (submitted for publication in 1939, but unpublished in Benjamin’s 
lifetime), and most famously in Benjamin’s critique of the “endless task” in his theses ‘On The 
Concept of History’ (1940). It is clear that Benjamin was familiar with at least Cohen’s books 
on Kant’s Theory of Experience, the Aesthetic of Pure Feeling, and with Religion of Reason 
out of the Sources of Judaism (cf. Gillian Rose, ‘Walter Benjamin – Out of the Sources of 
Modern Judaism’, Judaism and Modernity, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), p.177, n.12; Bernd 
Witte, Walter Benjamin: An Intellectual Biography, trans. James Rolleston, (Detroit, Wayne 
State, 1991), pp.42 & 52-54). 
14 Cohen saw in the original ‘destruction of the Jewish state’ a messianic teleology, such that ‘I 
must leave it to my own country to bring about, within the profusion of its other moral goals, 
the realization of my endeavours and hopes for my religion and its followers all over the 
world’ (Hermann Cohen, ‘The German & Jewish Ethos II’, Reason and Hope, trans. Eva 
Jospe, (New York, Norton, 1973), p.185). Cohen uncritically endorses Kant’s philosophy of 
history when he claims that the ‘German ethos must become the central force of such a 
federation which will establish world peace…[and hence] a just war is the preparation for 
perpetual peace’ (Hermann Cohen, ‘The German & Jewish Ethos I’, Reason and Hope, op. cit. 
p.183). Thus, ‘the spirit informing pure religion is more akin to the German spirit than to that 
of any other people. Hence, we German adherents of Jewish monotheism place our trust in 
history, confident that our innermost kinship to the German ethos will be acknowledged ever 
more willingly and frankly. Sustained by this confidence, we shall thus go on as German men 
and German citizens and at the same time remain unshakeably loyal to our Jewish religion’ 
(Hermann Cohen, ‘Judaism’s Relevance for Modern Man’, Reason and Hope, op. cit., p.220). 
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dispersal of key Jewish figures in the neo-Kantian tradition, many of whom died in exile 
having failed to make any impact in the English-speaking world.15 Nonetheless, the 
philosophical value in unearthing and explicating the Kantian and neo-Kantian origins of 
Benjamin’s critical philosophy has been testified by several recent and important 
studies.16 In contrast to Howard Caygill’s Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience – 
the most prolonged examination of the Kantian origins of Benjamin’s early thought to 
date – the discussion that follows will recognise the positive as well as negative 
importance of Cohen’s philosophy for the young Benjamin.  
 
1.3 Hermann Cohen and Kant’s Theory of Experience  
The preoccupation with the possibility of knowledge that characterises Trendelenburg 
and Fischer’s epistemological [Erkenntnis-theorie] approach is initially jettisoned in 
                                                       
15 Alan Kim, ‘Paul Natorp’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n. 23, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natorp/ (accessed 25/09/09). Heidegger’s famous victory at the 
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as by Franz Rosenzweig’s assertion that it was not Cassirer, but Heidegger who best furthered 
the spirit of Cohen’s thought (cf. Gabriel Motzkin, ‘Emil Lask and the Crisis of Neo-
Kantianism. The Rediscovery of the Primordial World’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 
Volume 94, No. 2, (April-June 1989), pp.173 & 176-7); Franz Rosenzweig, ‘Vertauschte 
Fronten’, Gesammelte Schriften, III, (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp.235-7). For more 
on the implications of the Davos dispute for Cohen’s neo-Kantianism, cf. Gillian Rose, 
‘Hermann Cohen: Kant among the Prophets’, Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays, 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1993); Alan Kim, op. cit.). Yet the quasi-mythical resonance this 
encounter still holds testifies to the extent to which the neo-Kantian sources out of which much 
post-war German philosophy critically developed were occluded in the search for such an 
inaugural historical break. 
  In his biography, Gershom Scholem notes a late 1917 polemic against Hermann Cohen, 
‘initiated by a lady, in the journal Kant-Studien, which betokened a nationalistic and mild but 
unmistakable anti-Semitic orientation on the part of certain neo-Kantians’ (Gershom Scholem 
op.cit., p.60). Prominent Jewish neo-Kantians included Hermann Cohen, Ernst Cassirer, Emil 
Lask, Jonas Cohn, Siegfried Marck, and Richard Hönigswald, of whom Lask was killed in 
action in 1915 and the others died in exile (cf. Alan Kim, op. cit). Only Cassirer managed to 
have an impact outside of Germany in his lifetime, although this situation is being rectified in 
the case of Hermann Cohen with a number of recent English publications (cf. the discussion of 
the reception of Cohen’s philosophy in Andrea Poma, ‘Hermann Cohen: A Philosophical 
Classic?’, Yearning for Form and Other Essays on Herman Cohen’s Thought, (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, Springer, 2006); Kenneth Seethskin, ‘Jewish Neo-Kantianism: Hermann Cohen’, 
History of Jewish Philosophy, Routledge History of World Philosophies, Vol. II, (London & 
New York, Routledge, 2003)). Both Heinrich Rickert and Bruno Bauch, however, were at least 
complicit with the established Nazism, and the relationship between neo-Kantianism and the 
“Jewish Question” around the First World War was also complicated by, for example, Cohen’s 
endorsement of German nationalism as congenial to Judaic rational monotheism. 
16 In particular, Howard Caygill, The Colour of Experience, (London & New York, Routledge, 
1998); Rudolphe Gasché, ‘Objective Diversions: On Some Kantian Themes in Benjamin’s 
“Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”’, Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: 
Destruction and Experience, eds. Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne, (London & New York, 
Routledge, 1994); Nikolaus Lambrianou, ‘Neo-Kantianism and messianism: origin and 
interruption in Hermann Cohen and Walter Benjamin’, Walter Benjamin: Critical Evaluations 
in Cultural Theory, ed. Peter Osborne, (Abingdon & New York, Routledge, 2005), Volume 1. 
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Cohen’s own epistemo-critical [Erkenntnis-kritik] starting point. Hence, whilst Cohen 
had been a student of Trendelenburg’s at the University of Berlin, the critical edge of his 
response to Trendelenburg’s interpretation of Kant resulted in the rejection of his work, 
Kant’s Theory of Experience, when it was submitted as a Habilitationsschrift in Berlin.17 
Trendenlenburg’s insistence on the necessity of the neglected alternative implies the 
“subjective” status of space and time refers to merely psychological conditions of a 
cognizing subject. Trendelenburg begins – Cohen argues – with the question, ‘Is the 
nature of things grounded in the conditions of our mind?’, and resists the skeptical 
implications of this specific formulation by insisting on the neglected alternative that 
space and time are both ideal and real of the things-in-themselves outside of their 
appearance for us. Rejecting Trendelenburg’s attempt to psychologise the Kantian 
faculties, and therefore his attempted solution, Cohen claims that the ‘meaning and value 
of the Kantian doctrines of space and time’ instead provide ‘another way of enquiring 
into the principle of knowledge’, one that now begins with the non-psychological 
question: ‘must and can our thought be confirmed by the laws of nature?’.18  
 The ground of Cohen’s intervention into the Trendelenburg-Fischer controversy, 
then, concerns not so much the status of space and time themselves but the proper 
meaning of Kant’s transcendental method. Hence, Cohen declares the aim of his Kant 
book ‘to establish Kant’s theory of a priority on a new basis’, specifically the discovery 
of the a priori character of knowledge as producing its experience (KTE iii, HC 8). By 
emphasising the ‘laws of nature’ (i.e. the only possible metaphysics of nature within the 
critical philosophy), Cohen begins from the epistemological certainty acquired in Kant’s 
transcendental idealism on the basis of scientific knowledge. ‘[O]ne can start off from the 
physiology of the senses, or from pure psychology, from metaphysics in its ancient 
meaning, or from that metaphysics which is known as the theoretical science of nature’, 
Cohen points out, but anyone ‘who does not feel at home in Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic will lose his bearings at speculative crossroads’.19 By ‘The Principle of the 
                                                       
17 Cf. Lydia Patton, Hermann Cohen’s History and Philosophy of Science, PhD Thesis, McGill 
University, 2004, p.12. This rejection forced Cohen to habilitate instead at the University of 
Marburg under the more sympathetic supervision of Friedrich Albert Lange. Following 
Lange’s death in 1875, Cohen was appointed to his professorship, and in the following decades 
Cohen published the System der Philosophie, which became the ‘cornerstones of the Marburg 
School of neo-Kantianism’: the ‘Logik der reinen Erkenntnis’ (1902), ‘Ethik des reinen 
Willens’ (1904), and the ‘Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls’ (1912). A further key text, Religion of 
Reason out of the Sources of Judaism was written following his departure from Marburg to the 
Institute of Judaism in Berlin in 1912 and published posthumously in 1919 following Cohen’s 
death the year before (cf. Lydia Patton, op. cit., p.13). 
18 Hermann Cohen, Kants Theories der Erfahrung [hereafter KTE], (Dümmler, Berlin, 1877), 
p.229, trans. HC p.52. 
19 Hermann Cohen, ‘Zur Kontroverse zwischen Trendelenburg und Kuno Fischer’, Schriften zur 
Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, 1 Bde. (Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1928), p.230, trans. HC p.6. 
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Infinitesimal Method and its History: A Chapter on the Foundation of Erkenntniskritik’, 
written in the intervening period between the first and second editions of Kant’s Theory 
of Experience, Cohen is presenting his “epistemo-critical idealism [Erkenntniskritisch 
Idealismus]” according to a tradition of scientific idealism extending from Plato through 
Leibniz to Kant, and for which ‘idealism as a critique of knowledge has scientific facts as 
its objects, not things and not events, not even those of simple consciousness’.20 
 Cohen’s development beyond Kant is to insist that the epistemological certainty of 
facts of science is dependent on some ‘foregoing rational structure’ which Cohen 
reclassifies as an a priori ‘productive synthesis’.21 He therefore seeks to preserve the 
objective status of “facts” by insisting not merely on the passive forms of sensibility, but 
on the active production of the scientific-logical experience itself. We ‘become aware of 
natural laws…through a synthetic process of reasoning,’ Cohen argues, ‘and can then 
enquire into the foundation of that reasoning, and into the grounds for claiming that the 
argument applies to the objects of experience’.22 The deeper rational synthesis which 
makes scientific facts logically “experienceable”, Cohen argues, resembles the nature of 
an underlying scientific hypothesis. As such it organises the phenomena into a scientific 
experience and manifests itself in the experience of the phenomena as lawful. These ‘pure 
forms of thought are not intended to be discovered a priori,’ Cohen insists, but the 
‘synthetic principle’ is available to us from which we might ‘discover the necessary 
forms of given experience’ (KTE 206; HC 13). This position suggests a deeper 
transcendental structure to the a priority of Kant’s idealism, in doing so abolishing the 
artificial distinction between the Aesthetic and the Logic in order to re-impose what will 
effectively become a theory of different orders of knowledge.  
 For Cohen, then, a transcendental justification of the possibility of metaphysics 
itself within Kant’s philosophy – as the scientific cognition of lawful facts – points to the 
implicitly scientific theory of experience underlying Kant’s idealism. As Lydia Patton 
clarifies, what Kant’s epistemology provides for Cohen is the ‘basis for applying pure 
laws of thought to real phenomena,’ and ‘the paradigm case of which is the conceptual 
reasoning behind Newton’s laws of nature’.23 This pushes consideration of the first 
Critique away from the “reality” of that which is “given” to sensibility, towards the 
“lawfulness” of that which is “synthesised” in the relation between sensibility and 
understanding: away from the Aesthetic and towards the Logic. For, as Poma makes 
                                                       
20 Hermann Cohen, ‘Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur 
Grundlegung der Erkenntnisskritik’, Werke, Volume 5, (Hildesheim, Zurich & New York, 
Georg Olms, 1984), §6, trans. HC pp.57-8. 
21 Lydia Patton, op. cit., p.75. 
22 Ibid., p.52. 
23 Ibid., p.15. 
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clear, the meaning of this deepening of the a priori ‘cannot be totally understood within 
the context of the transcendental aesthetic, since what is missing is an investigation of 
the act of “synthesis,” which alone constitutes experience, and of the categories, the a 
priori conditions of the unity of the synthesis’ (HC 10). Because the law itself is not 
directly intuitable, since it is precisely the law itself that produces the “experienceability” 
of the phenomena, this demands a rethinking of the limits set by Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic, which in doing so departs from the structural separation of the sensibility from 
the understanding in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  
 In Kant’s Theory of Experience, Cohen argues that in the Critique of Pure Reason 
the Aesthetic already points towards the importance of the Logic in deducing the formal a 
priori elements of experience. Philosophical reflection on experience identifies the purely 
formal elements of experience, a method explicitly established in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, which deduces space and time as the pure intuitions of sensibility. This 
methodology, Cohen argues, is present but hidden in the Transcendental Logic, which 
moves from judgement to the categories, and then to the purity of the principles. 
However, it is only in the Transcendental Logic, with its deduction of ideality of the 
principles of experience, that the phenomenal-noumenal distinction that characterises 
Kant’s transcendental idealism becomes properly clarified. The Aesthetic therefore 
presupposes the Logic for the clarification of the empirical reality and transcendental 
ideality of the pure intuition – space and time – discovered there (cf. HC 10-11).  
 Distinguishing sensibility from the understanding is an abstraction between 
faculties that mistakenly occludes the character of the co-operation between the a priori 
forms of both in the underlying synthesis necessary for the possibility of an experience. 
‘The synthesis is the common tie,’ Cohen maintains, ‘which guarantees the same a 
priority, in the forms of intuiting and thinking” (KTE 104-5; HC 11). Rejecting what he 
regards as a psychological conception of knowledge as representation, Cohen restores 
logic to its rightful place at the heart of Kant’s system by imposing a deeper logical 
“synthesis” (HC 82). Whilst this anticipates Heidegger’s own radical reinterpretation of 
the Critique of Pure Reason’s “common tie” in his 1929 study, Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, Cohen’s “synthesis” therefore takes the form of a logical rather than 
ontological unifiability.24  
                                                       
24 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James C. Churchill, 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), pp.20ff. Heidegger appeals to a structurally 
analogous third kind of (transcendental) synthesis: a precursory act of reference to the essent 
which constitutes the ‘direction and the horizon within which the essent is first capable of 
being experienced in the empirical synthesis’. Despite this structural similarity, Heidegger 
quickly distances his interpretation from neo-Kantianism, and in particular from Cohen’s 
Kant’s Theory of Experience, arguing that, ‘The purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
completely misunderstood, therefore, if this work is interpreted as a “theory of experience” or 
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 The a priori does not therefore simply precede objects, but constructs them 
according to a principle of synthesis in which, ‘the conditions of the possibility of 
experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of 
experience, and that for this reason they have objective value in a synthetic a priori 
judgement’ (KTE, 48-9; HC 13). On the one hand, this understanding of the a priori 
‘deepens into the formal conditions of experience’, and, on the other, enlarges into a 
concept of experience constructed in pure intuition and pure thought: the construction of 
experience itself.25 The implications of this intervention into the Trendelenburg-Fischer 
controversy is that knowledge must come about ‘in science and continues to take place 
from a given grounding,’ which has the consequence that Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic is an investigation that ‘no longer refers to a subjective fact, but to a state of 
affairs given objectively and founded on principles, not on the process and apparatus of 
cognition, but on the result of these, science’.26 It is not with the “subjective” 
phenomenological experience of space and time that the transcendental method is 
concerned, but the “objective” scientific principles of lawfulness rationally produced 
within the empirical intuition of space and time.  
 After insisting that reality ‘is a relation between intuition and thought…[and] 
cannot be reduced to the “pure” element of either intuition or thought, since that will 
deprive it of its irreducibly relational character’, Cohen concludes that ‘reality is a 
“presupposition of thought,” a “condition of experience” that “lies at the ground of 
[experience] and is presupposed for its possibility”’.27 No longer needing to presuppose a 
material “given” in sensibility, productive thought becomes the sole origin of both 
knowledge and object, proceeding from a synthetic scientific fact to the pure logical 
presuppositions of its possibility. Cohen therefore insists upon ‘the new thing that Kant 
has to teach us’: 
 
Reality is not in the crude [material] of sensible discovery, and also not in what is pure 
in sensible intuition, but rather must be given validity as a particular presupposition of 
thought, like substance and causality, as a condition of experience...28 
 
The deeper reality prior to empirical experience becomes, in Cohen’s idealism, the unity 
of pure thought itself. 
 This pure thought becomes the ‘legitimate medium for the development of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
perhaps as a theory of the positive sciences’ (ibid., p.21). 
25 Klaus Christian Köhnke, The Rise of Neo-Kantianism, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.185. 
26 Hermann Cohen, ‘Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte’, op. cit., §7, 
trans. Lydia Patton, op. cit., p.90. 
27 Lydia Patton, op. cit., p.117. 
28 Hermann Cohen, ‘Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte’, op. cit., §18, 
trans. Lydia Patton, op. cit., p.117. 
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Idea’ in Cohen’s formulation of the dialectical interaction of the faculties. To do so he 
draws upon the account of dialectic given in Plato’s mature dialogues, in particular that 
methodology of hypothesising described in the Republic, which takes its phenomenal 
starting assumptions: 
 
...not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and 
springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is 
the starting-point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first 
dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion’, all the while ‘making 
no use whatever of any object of sense [aisthetoi] but only of pure concepts [eidos]’.29  
 
Plato likens this dialectic of grounding to the methodology of the mathematical and 
geometrical sciences or technai, which move beyond mere intuitions of particular 
phenomenon to consideration of concepts by using those intuitions as figures standing in 
for ideals. Cohen takes up and broadens Plato’s appeal to scientific methodology in his 
1878 essay ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas and Mathematics’ by noting how ‘the fundamental 
concept of [Plato’s] specific philosophical method – springs from this characteristic of 
geometrical thought, at least for its gnoseological legitimation’.30 Thus he generalizes 
Platonic dialectic into a characteristic of pure thought itself in order to explain the 
resulting distinction between understanding and sensibility in the Kantian architectonic. 
As a consequence, ‘one of the most profound and daring thoughts in [Plato’s] 
methodology’ for Cohen is ‘that he detects a reason for thought in sensation itself’, such 
that numbers ‘are already at work in sensation itself’.31 
 Central to the particularity of Cohen’s critical idealism, then, is this understanding 
of the transcendental method of philosophy as a Platonic “giving account” [Rechenschaft 
geben]. Since the a posteriori material content of cognition is ‘from the beginning only 
present in us ourselves – as the entirety of a phenomenon’, Cohen argues, the content is 
‘inherently united in and with the form’ in the ‘whole phenomenon’, and ‘only analysed 
afterwards out of the effect on our senses’.32 Cohen calls this nature of this unity an 
Origin [Ursrpung], one that cannot be conceived as some “first” act, akin to the 
temporality of the initial suggested in the standard notion of synthesis, because it is 
immanent in every act and the a priori ground of knowledge itself. Cohen explains the 
continuity between pure and empirical thought as the dialectical mediation of judgement 
                                                       
29  Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, (Cambridge, MA. & London, Harvard University Press, 
1969), 511b. 
30 Hermann Cohen, ‘Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik’, Schriften zur Philosophie und 
Zeitgeschicte,, 2 Bde, (Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1928), p.361, trans. HC p.32. 
31 Hermann Cohen, ‘Logic der reinen Erkenntnis’, Werke, hg. Vom Hermann-Cohen-Archiv am 
Philosophischen Seminar (Hildesheim, Zürich, G. Olms, 1977), Volume 6, pp.472-73, trans. 
HC p.35. 
32 Hermann Cohen, ‘Logic der reinen Erkenntnis’, op. cit., trans. Klaus Christian Köhnke, op. 
cit., p.182. 
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as the logical ground of thought, knowledge, and experience. It is scientific judgement, 
identified with the Platonic technai of mathematics, geometry, astronomy, and contiguous 
with the quantitative world addressed by physics, that Cohen utilises to advance this 
idealist claim.33  
 Once Cohen has removed the Aesthetic by resolving it entirely into the Logic, 
space and time become emphasised as categories of mathematical thought. As a 
consequence, the ‘logic of origin becomes the logic of pure knowledge’: that of an 
“originative” production which is both ‘the necessary beginning of thought’ and ‘the 
moving principle in every development’.34 What, in the Logic of Pure Reason, Cohen 
describes as Ursprungdenken – thinking based on the principle of origin – is a ‘pure, 
generating activity which has no beginning but is a primal leap, an act of origination’.35 
Cohen presents the dialectical logic of origination as equally one of production and 
conservation [Erhaltung]: “There is no exchange, but conservation, at the same time, of 
separation and unification. Unification is conserved in separation and separation in 
unification…Therefore, it is to be expected that unity be conserved in manifoldness and 
manifoldness in unity”.36 The difference between this concept and Hegelian sublation 
[Aufhebung] is emphasised by Cohen, who regards it as rectifying what he takes to be the 
two fundamental errors in Hegel’s philosophy of identity, as Andrea Poma explains: ‘the 
elimination of the difference between concept and being, thought and reality, and the 
elimination of the difference between concept and idea, and thus the elimination of the 
difference between being and what ought to be, between reality and task, for the identity 
of concept with being’ (HC 77). In seeking to oppose himself to what he perceived as 
Hegel’s philosophy of identity, Cohen insists on maintaining the difference between the 
real and the ideal in the Kantian system.37 
 Whilst it is this concept of Ursprung and the dialectic that it introduces into 
experience which permits the transformation of a transcendental version of idealism into 
an outright logical idealism in Cohen’s thought, it is clear from the ‘Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue’ to the Origin of German Tragic-Drama that the dialectical structure of 
Ursprungdenken is not abandoned by Benjamin. Along with Cohen’s analysis of the 
scientific theory of experience operating in Kant’s system, it therefore has an important 
                                                       
33 In his discussion of the education of the philosopher rulers, Socrates specifies the five 
mathematical studies of arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics 
(Plato, Republic, op. cit., 524e-531c). 
34 Hermann Cohen, ‘Logic der reinen Erkenntnis’, op. cit., p.36, trans. HC pp.85-6. 
35 Hermann Cohen, ‘Logic der reinen Erkenntnis’, op. cit., p.36, trans. Reiner Munk, Hermann 
Cohen’s Critical Idealism, Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought Volume 10, (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, Springer, 2005), p.275. 
36  Hermann Cohen, ‘Logic der reinen Erkenntnis’, op. cit., p.62, trans. HC p.87. 
37 cf. Klaus Christian Köhnke, op. cit., p.196. 
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influence on the course of Benjamin’s own development of Kantian philosophy, even if – 
as the rest of this chapter will maintain – he is motivated by the opposite intention to 
Cohen. The importance of Cohen’s theory of experience for Benjamin’s work will be 
described in the remainder of this discussion, and the trajectory by which he sought to 
overcome this implicit problem then examined in Chapters 2 and 3. The conclusion to 
Chapter 3 will return to Cohen’s philosophy to examine in more detail how Benjamin re-
appropriates the concept of Ursprung in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ within the 
context of a philosophy whose ontological and dialectical structure has been radically 
transformed. The argument being developed in what follows is that this transformation is 
indebted to an aesthetic metacritique of the purism of reason in Kant and Cohen. 
 
1.4 Hamann’s Metacritique of the Purism of Reason 
Hermann Cohen’s recognition that an implicit theory of experience lies at the heart of 
Kant’s transcendental idealism and, moreover, that it is a specifically scientific concept of 
experience that animates the critical philosophy is decisive for Benjamin. ‘The concept of 
experience that Kant relates to knowledge…has nothing like the same scope as that of 
earlier thinkers’, Benjamin concurs, adding ‘[w]hat counts for him is the concept of 
scientific experience’ (P 94). Like Cohen, he draws a distinction between the generalised 
sense in which Kant seems to speak of “experience” in the Critique of Pure Reason, and 
the specific character of experience that Kant utilises when he seeks to deduce its purely 
formal character. Unable to recognise this implicit distinction, Kant’s philosophy takes as 
‘immediate and natural experience’ what is already structured and synthesised under the 
model of unity and continuity offered by “knowledge”. Hence the “scientific” model of 
experience operating in Kant’s philosophy marks what Benjamin calls a ‘metaphysics 
that has become rudimentary’, and which Cohen seeks to overcome by rendering it first 
explicit and then critically correcting it.38 
 For Benjamin, the required transformation of Kantianism and the ‘development of 
the transcendental idealism of experience into a speculative idealism’ must therefore seek 
a ‘confrontation’ with the ‘stumbling block’ of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic (P 94). 
As Benjamin notes, it is the neo-Kantian school – and, it should be added here, Hermann 
Cohen’s philosophy in particular – that systematically sought this ‘confrontation’. But in 
contrast to Cohen, Benjamin insists there ‘is no doubt that Kant does not intend to reduce 
all experience so exclusively to scientific experience, no matter how much it may belong, 
in some respects, to the training of the historical Kant’ (PCP 105). This inherited concept 
of experience, ‘whose best aspect, whose quintessence, was Newtonian physics’ had, 
                                                       
38 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ [hereafter PCP], SW1 p.103. 
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Benjamin argues, ‘a restricting effect on Kantian thought’ (PCP 101). Where pre-Kantian 
philosophers ‘sought to establish the closest possible continuity and unity [between 
experience and knowledge]…through a speculative deduction of the world,’ Kant instead 
seeks to keep them distinct. He strives to separate scientific experience ‘as far as possible 
from the ordinary meaning of the experience, and in part, since this was only possible to a 
degree, to distance from the centre of our understanding of knowledge’ (P 94). The 
“scientific” conceptions of space and time become valid as the legitimate forms of 
experiential intuition, whilst all other forms of intuition become ‘illusory’ [scheinbaren] 
(P 94). In this way, Kant mistook his Newtonian “phenomenal” as the only one, and 
implicitly excluded all other conceptions of phenomenal experience. Hence, ‘in the neo-
Kantian rectification of one of Kant’s metaphysicizing thoughts...a modification of the 
concept of experience occurred’ which involved ‘the extreme extension of the mechanical 
aspect of the relatively empty Enlightenment concept of experience’ (ibid.). The neo-
Kantian school is therefore ‘distinguished by the fact that it continued to use the battle 
plan set out in Kant’s thought’, and whilst the ‘positivism’ of ‘the exact sciences’ had 
‘nurtured the growth of critical thinking’ it is also responsible for its limitations.39 
 ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ situates this ‘great transformation and 
correction which must be performed on the concept of experience’ for Kant in the context 
of the philosophy of Johann George Hamann, arguing that it should be theorised by 
‘relating knowledge to language’ on the model provided by Hamann’s 1781 Metacritique 
of the Purism of Reason. Hamann’s metacritique anticipates Cohen in recognising an 
implicit theory of experience operating at the basis of Kant’s transcendental idealism. But 
rather than regarding this as a problem to be resolved in the manner of Cohen’s effective 
excision of phenomenological experience, Hamann utilises this dependence on 
experience to generate an aporia at the heart of Kant’s “Newtonian” project of 
Enlightenment. Hamann claims that Kant’s transcendental idealism is able to suppose a 
“pure intuition” of the forms of space and time because of an ‘old, cold prejudice for 
mathematics before and behind it’.40 Arguing that this encapsulates either a ‘Gnostic 
hatred of matter or else a mystic love of form’, his metacritique concludes that Kant’s 
supposedly critical metaphysics of nature is grounded upon a presupposition of a “pure 
reason” which has been supposedly purified of experience, history, and language in such 
a way that, according to Kant’s position itself, its own status remains impossibly and 
contradictorily metaphysical. 
 For Hamann, however, the ‘apodeictic certainty of mathematics’ is based solely on 
                                                       
39 Walter Benjamin, ‘Review of Hönigswald’s Philosophie und Sprache’, SW4 p.139. 
40 J. G. Hamann, ‘Metacritique of the Purism of Reason’, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 
ed. Kenneth Haynes, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.208-10. 
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its primarily “curiological” or pictorial-imagistic function. Whilst this is fore-grounded in 
the linguistic nature of mathematical objects, it not exclusive to it but is rather the general 
condition of all language.41 Kant’s prejudice for the logical certainty of mathematics is 
ungrounded, therefore, and cannot be the basis of the idealism that Cohen privileges in 
the Logic of Pure Reason in order to overcome the problem of the Aesthetic.  The 
implicit dogmatism which Trendelenburg had recognised in the neglected alternative 
between realism and ideality is not overcome in Cohen’s logical-transcendental 
deepening of the empirical-psychological misunderstanding of Kant’s concept of 
experience, because the necessity attributed to scientific knowledge still relies on the 
assumption of a pure reason which is hypocritically inexplicable. Generalizing this 
insight into the imagistic-linguistic nature of mathematical signs, Hamann responds to 
Kant’s question in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason – ‘how is the power of 
thought itself possible?’ – by insisting that ‘the faculty of thought is possible...before and 
without, with and beyond experience’ only through the ‘genealogical priority of 
language’ before the table of categories, and therefore only through language as ‘the pure 
forms a priori...[and] the true, aesthetic elements of all human knowledge and reason’.42 
Language is therefore both essential to reason and the source of reason’s self-
misunderstanding.43 Experience is primarily linguistic, for Hamann, and at the basis of 
reason’s capacity for thought lies a pure aesthetics of language.  
 The implicit valorization of mathematics which Cohen draws upon in his own, 
Platonized version of Kantian idealism therefore suffers from the same prejudicial purism 
of reason which Hamann claims misconstrues the true linguistic nature of the objects of 
mathematical and geometrical thought. For the pure intuition which Cohen, following 
Kant, grounds in mathematics assigns a seemingly unique status to mathematical objects 
by insisting on their capacity to transcend the dichotomies between sensibility/rationality, 
passivity/spontaneity, and form/content which they themselves ground. Cohen therefore 
transforms into a virtue the paradoxical status of the pure thought which Hamann detects 
at the ground of Kant’s philosophy, by reifying it into a logical entity. Cohen’s intention 
to overcome the problematic separation of understanding and sensibility in the Kantian 
architectonic proceeds by attempting to fully resolve the Aesthetic into the Logic. On the 
basis of this “pure thought”, Cohen hopes to rescue the certainty of knowledge that had 
been threatened by speculative metaphysics. But as Hamann’s metacritique makes clear 
this is a paradoxical project since it ultimately depends upon the Aesthetic in its 
                                                       
41 Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
42 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p.xvii; J. G. Hamann, ‘Metacritique of the 
Purism of Reason’, op. cit., pp.210-211. 
43 Ibid., p.211. 
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exploitation of language and experience.  
 Benjamin concurs with this point when, in the essay ‘On the Program of the 
Coming Philosophy’, he suggests that Kant’s ‘consciousness that philosophical 
knowledge was absolutely certain and a priori, the consciousness of that aspect of 
philosophy in which it is fully the peer of mathematics’ mistakenly lead him to devote 
‘almost no attention to the fact that all philosophical knowledge has its unique expression 
in language and not in formulas or numbers’ (PCP 108). It is in order to correct this 
misunderstanding in Kant and Cohen that Benjamin draws upon the theological idea of 
language as revelation in Hamann’s aesthetics. For Hamann: 
 
Every phenomenon of nature was a word, – the sign, symbol, and pledge of a new, 
secret, inexpressible but all the more fervent union, fellowship and communion of divine 
energies and ideas. All that man heard at the beginning, saw with his eyes, looked upon, 
and his hands handled was a living word; for God was the word.44 
 
The assumption of this general linguistic ontology – in which all creation, perception, 
thought, speech, and production become forms of expression – becomes necessary to 
solve the basic hermeneutical problem of meaning or significance, which assumes a far 
greater importance in Benjamin’s thought than the supposedly timeless certainty of 
knowledge sought for by Cohen.  
 This is clear when, in his announcement for the journal Angelus Novus in the early 
1920s, Benjamin claims that the only true sort of relevance is the contemporary, and 
dedicates the journal to articulating this ‘experience of a particular way of thinking’.45 
The enduring relevance of Kantianism for Benjamin lies precisely in its ability to give 
philosophical status to this phenomenology of the ephemeral, and not in the neo-Kantian 
attempt to exclude it as problematic. In fact, Benjamin’s criticisms of mature neo-
Kantianism focus upon the transformation of ‘transcendental questioning’ into ‘a 
ceremony no longer animated by any real intellectual effort’, in which ‘the terms of 
transcendental philosophy’ have fallen precisely because neo-Kantianism reneged upon 
the critical perspective inherent in its ‘oppositional resolve’.46 Benjamin’s contention is 
                                                       
44 J. G. Hamann, ‘The Last Will and Testament of the Knight of the Rose-Cross; Concerning the 
Divine and Human Origin of Language’, Writings on Philosophy and Language, op. cit., 
pp.108-9. 
45 Walter Benjamin, ‘Announcement of the Journal Angelus Novus’, SW1 pp.292 & 296. 
46 Walter Benjamin, ‘Review of Hönigswald’s Philosophie und Sprache’, SW4 pp.140 & 142. It 
is significant that Benjamin proposes a ‘threshold’ in the decline of neo-Kantianism. Criticising 
Cohen for ‘lacking a precise historical imagination’ in the last part of his System, the ‘Ästhetik 
des reinen Gefühls’ (1912), Benjamin explains that ‘the critical and imaginative energies 
decline’ as those who now find themselves in power ‘adapt themselves to the established 
order’. The dominance of neo-Kantianism thus contributed to its loss of critical edge, and 
ultimately to its complicity with the rise of fascism. The ‘threshold’ of this decline, Benjamin 
argues, is marked by Cohen’s 1914 essay ‘Über das Eigentümliche des deutschen Geistes’ 
(‘On the Particularity of the German Spirit’) – the now naïve seeming sentiments of this and 
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that Kantian philosophy becomes redundant where it fails to incorporate the ephemeral 
and contemporary, including the seismic transformations in the nature and structure of 
experience following the traumatic events of the First World War and the new conditions 
of urban life under the changing relations of industrial capitalism.47 
  
1.5 Metacritique or Theological Nostalgia? 
Hamann’s metacritique opposes Kant’s vision of a pure reason by pointing out its 
fundamentally unknowable and therefore contradictory character. It is not simply that 
such a pure reason has to be transcendentally deduced, but that no part of that 
transcendental deduction and justification can operate without the sensible and aesthetic 
function of language and experience. The inexperienceable knowledge at the basis of 
transcendental idealism thus renders all knowledge paradoxical. Hamann would like to 
conclude at this point, in order not merely to make more room for faith than Kant’s 
critical project had levied, but to expose with a proto-deconstructive flourish the nature of 
the Enlightenment project’s contradictory faith in reason and knowledge. 
 In Benjamin’s earliest writings there is a tendency to appropriate Hamann’s 
theology of language in order to similarly gesture towards some lost spiritual unity 
between thought and experience, evoking the Biblical idea of the Fall to explain this 
absence. Benjamin argues that ‘all expression, insofar as it is communication of content 
of the mind, is to be classed...[and] understood only as language’, but because 
contemporary communication represents a departure from the original unity of divine 
creation and revelation, it is devalued from its position in the Enlightenment as the 
paradigm of representation, instrumentality, and mastery over nature to a merely 
parasitical act of translation in Hamann’s philosophy.48 Speech is the translation ‘from an 
angelic language into a human language, that is to translate thoughts into words, – things 
into names – images into signs...’, which reveals the ‘wrong side of a tapestry’ in 
showing the ‘Stuff, but not the [divine] Workman’s skill’.49 Poetry is the approximation 
of that divinely creative word within human speech, which Hamann invokes as the 
‘mother-tongue of the human race’ because of its capacity for self-revelation.50 In its 
absence, ‘all we have left in nature for our use are jumbled verses and disjecti membra 
                                                                                                                                                     
other essays on Germany have been commented upon earlier – and Natorp’s Deutscher 
Weltberuf (‘German World-Mission’, 1918). 
47 ‘Peoples and races, dispersed across paradisiacal spaces in the vision of the Enlightenment, 
became the compact mass of consumers in the world market’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘Review of 
Hönigswald’s Philosophie und Sprache’, SW4 p.140). 
48 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Language as Such and the Language of Man’ [hereafter LSLM], SW1 
p.63. 
49 J. G. Hamann, ‘Aesthetica in Nunce’, Writings in Philosophy and Language, op. cit., pp.66-7. 
50 Ibid., pp. 63-4. 
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poetae [limbs of the dismembered poet]’.51 
 When, in ‘The Life of Students’ from 1915, Benjamin considers the ‘fragmented 
and derivative’ expressions of student life as ‘the distorted and fragmented torso of the 
one erotic spirit’, his work therefore seems to draw heavily on Hamann’s notion of 
language in order to critique the lost spiritual greatness of German youth (LS 44). For 
Benjamin, this cultural fragmentation is reflected in the ideological division between the 
students in the university and the workers in the community, which further manifests 
itself in the life of students as the perversion of erotically creative, spiritual labour into, 
on the one hand, the intellectualized and egoistical vocationality of the men’s student 
fraternities and, on the other, the de-eroticized economy of the body in the prostitution 
which develops at the margins of the university. The influence of Simmel’s sociological 
analysis of modernity upon Benjamin’s thought is evident here, with its themes of the 
alienating effects of modern culture and its fragmentation and distortion of the creative 
spirit.52  
 An holistic appeal to some unspecified spiritual and cultural unity forms the centre-
piece of Benjamin’s early essay, when he proposes as the criterion of the true ‘spiritual 
value of a community’ the question of whether the ‘whole, undivided nature of a human 
being should be expressed’ in the achievements of its individuals (LS 39). In other words, 
the young Benjamin has a tendency to seek the overcoming of the alienating split 
between aesthetics/science and experience/metaphysics (which secures the basis of 
Kant’s critical philosophy) by appealing to some original unity which permits a 
speculative metaphysical experience. It is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, discussing the 
influence of Hamann’s philosophy on his thought in his autobiography, who singles out 
as ‘the principle underlying all of Hamann’s utterances’ the belief that: ‘Everything a 
human being sets out to accomplish, whether produced by word or deed or otherwise, 
must arise from the sum of his combined powers; anything isolated is an abomination’.53 
A recognition of the importance of Hamann’s theology for Benjamin’s appeal to some 
whole and undivided expression of human nature should therefore be extended to note  
the Hammanian concept of the “torso” underwriting Benjamin’s depiction of the 
‘mutilation of youth’ and the dismemberment of the student “body”. 
                                                       
51 Ibid. 
52  In his ‘Introduction’ to Philosophical Culture from 1911, Simmel argues that the ‘disharmony 
of modern life, in particular the intensification of technology in every sphere combined with 
deep dissatisfaction with it, arises from the fact that things become more and more cultivated 
but people are capable only to a lesser degree of deriving from the improvement of objects an 
improvement in their subjective lives’ (George Simmel, ‘Introduction to Philosophical 
Culture’, Simmel on Culture, eds. David Frisby & Mike Featherstone, (London, Sage, 1997), 
p.35). 
53 J. W. von Goethe, ‘From My Life: Poetry and Truth’, Collected Works [hereafter CW], ed. 
Douglas Miller, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.380-1. 
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 In ‘The Life of Students’, Benjamin argues that ‘the only possibility’ for opposing 
this mortification is ‘to liberate the future from its deformations in the present’ through an 
‘understanding’ which he defines as ‘an act of cognition’ (LS 34 & 46). It is the 
philosophical formulation of this act of cognition which needs to be explored. What he 
refers to at one point as the expression of a ‘totality of will [des Wollenden]’ is 
anticipated in the rest of the essay in accordance with an ‘eros of creativity’ associated 
with spiritual productivity (LS 34 & 46). The ‘Metaphysics of Youth’ makes it clear that 
such creativity has now been lost to us, and that only now can we ‘see what we have 
unwittingly destroyed and created’.54 The lost spiritual creativity in these early essays on 
youth therefore reflects that which, in ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of 
Man’, is theologically described as ‘the paradisiacal language’ of ‘perfect knowledge’ 
from which humanity has fallen:  
 
the Fall marks the birth of the human word, in which name no longer lives intact and 
which has stepped out of the name-language, the language of knowledge, from what we 
may call its own immanent magic, in order to be expressly, as it were, magic. The word 
must communicate something (other than itself). (LSLM 71) 
 
Human communication must overcome its representational aspect in order to mirror the 
divine act of creation through speech. To depict is, in these early works, to speculatively 
call into being through language alone: effectively, an intellectual intuition. This holistic, 
spiritual, and erotic creativity understood is the antithesis of alienated production in 
Benjamin’s early work. 
 This is variously associated with the genius of artistic expression, the ‘conversation 
of prayer’, and the Adamic act of naming.55 In ‘the name, the mental being of man 
communicates itself to God’, Benjamin claims, adding that it does so ‘without residue’ 
(LSLM 65). Consequently, ‘God’s creation is completed only when things receive their 
names from man, from whom in name language alone speaks’ (LSLM 65). Because ‘the 
germ of the cognizing name’ is the linguistic being created by God, the capacity for 
human naming to denote the particular singularity of the thing is conceived as an act of 
translation from ‘an imperfect language into a more perfect one’ which cannot but add 
knowledge to it (LSLM 70). The true genius ‘creates the silence of a new language’ which 
is also described as a ‘conception without pregnancy’.56 When Benjamin declares, in ‘On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, that ‘the unique union’ of ‘conception 
and spontaneity together’ is found only in the linguistic realm – in ‘the translation of the 
language of things into that of man’ of which Adam’s act of naming is paradigmatic – the 
                                                       
54 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, SW1 p.6. 
55 Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 p.53. 
56 Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 p.53. 
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act of cognition required to liberate the philosophy of history in ‘The Life of Students’ 
returns to Hamann’s philosophy of language.  
 To “name” is therefore to liberate a pure linguistic element within concepts, one 
that is capable of denoting not universals but particulars and that can be detached from 
concepts and bound up with signifying words.57  What is central to such “naming” is an 
ontology of material signification in which a thing-like and not concept-like component is 
transmitted in communication. Rejecting any conception of language as fundamentally 
representational (i.e., signifying something else), Benjamin therefore draws on Hamann’s 
characterisation of language as imagistic to propose a non-conceptual theory of 
signification or expression This appeal to the immanent magic of the word in Benjamin’s 
early thought is discernible in the differing conceptions of “metaphysics” presented in the 
essay ‘On Perception’. Benjamin argues that the ‘assertion that a metaphysics is possible 
can have at least three meanings’ (P 93). The first meaning – the possibility of a 
metaphysics of nature understood as the system of nature, that is, ‘the a priori constitution 
of natural objects on the basis of the determinants of the knowledge of nature in general’ 
– is the only one endorsed by Kant. The second – metaphysics as the ‘transcendent use’ 
of the categories – is rejected by Kant, but possible for Cohen, since critical idealism 
removes the artificial separation of the understanding and sensibility, and thus posits the 
possibility of unintuitable knowledge in the existence of scientific laws (P 94). The third 
meaning of the possibility of metaphysics, ‘that of the deducibility of the world from the 
supreme principle or nexus of knowledge’ – or, as Benjamin calls it, the concept of 
‘speculative knowledge – is rejected by both Kant and Cohen, but endorsed to a qualified 
extent by Benjamin’s speculative version of linguistic idealism. 
 Benjamin’s understanding of truth in these early essays often utilises theological 
language to construct what Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe calls a ‘messianic Kant’.58 This 
draws Benjamin’s developing philosophy of history away from a preoccupation with 
scientific knowledge and towards the experienceability, legibility or significance of 
history. For example, it is possible to recognise from his letter to Gershom Scholem the 
extent to which Benjamin’s original dissertation topic on Kant and the philosophy of 
history would have remained critical of Kant for applying this scientific discourse of 
justification to ‘a certain historical constellation of ethical interest’.59 ‘It is precisely the 
                                                       
57 Benjamin finds confirmation for this thesis, in ‘The Ground of Intentional Immediacy’, in the 
neo-Kantian realism of Alois Adolf Riehl (cf. Walter Benjamin, ‘The Ground of Intentional 
Immediacy’, SW1 p.88). 
58 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Introduction to Walter Benjamin’s The Concept of Art Criticism in 
German Romanticism’, Walter Benjamin and Romanticism, eds. Andrew Benjamin & Beatrice 
Hanssen, (London, Continuum, 2002), p.15. 
59 Walter Benjamin, Letter to Gershom Scholem (dated December 23rd 1917), The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin: 1910-1940 op. cit., p.105. 
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ethical side of history that is represented as inadequate for special consideration’ in 
Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View’, Benjamin 
argues, and in its place ‘the postulate of a scientific mode of observation and method is 
posited’.60  
 However, there is a danger that if theology simply replaces science as the bedrock 
of Benjamin’s early speculative transformation of transcendental idealism, a Hamannian 
pragmatics of faith remains the only possible outcome for the metacritique of the 
Newtonianism of Kant’s Enlightenment project. When Benjamin reflects on the denial of 
metaphysical experience in his early discussions of bourgeois philistinism, he has a 
tendency to invert this feature of alienated social existence with an affirmation of its 
possibility through a Hammanian theology or a Goethean poetics of experience.  
 
Coda: Towards a Metaphysics of Experience 
Every ‘demand for a return to Kant rests upon the conviction that this system…has, by 
virtue of its brilliant exploration of the certainty and justification of knowledge, derived 
and developed a depth that will prove adequate for a new and higher kind of experience 
yet to come’ (PCP 102). The ‘outlines of a development of the transcendental philosophy 
of experience into a transcendental or speculative philosophy’ are discerned by Benjamin 
in the efforts of the neo-Kantian school’s ‘abolition of the strict distinction between the 
forms of intuition and the categories’ (P 95). Cohen’s recognition of an underlying, 
originative relationship between what Kant had divided into the Transcendental Aesthetic 
and the Transcendental Logic therefore provides the starting point for Benjamin’s critical 
engagement with Kant. But Cohen is able to overcome the arbitrariness of Kant’s 
narrowly scientific concept of experience by expanding the Logic, and the scientific 
model of knowledge it contains, to such an extent that the Aesthetic is enveloped into 
purely mathematical-logical medium of knowledge. The result is a fully scientific or 
logical idealism, which disposes of the materiality given to sensibility to the extent that 
the a posteriori of experience is transformed into an underlying logical structure original 
to knowledge.  
 Whilst Cohen subsequently sought to resolve the Aesthetic entirely into the Logic 
in order to provide a logical foundation for scientific experience, Benjamin refuses such a 
move on the basis that the Logic is constituted in advance according to a merely 
“mechanical” exploitation of the Aristotelian categories. In his intention to justify a more 
speculative concept of experience, Benjamin turns beyond the Kantian system in order to 
ground intellectually an experience of ephemerality which is inadequately articulated in 
                                                       
60 Ibid. 
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his immature thought through dogmatic appeals to spirit, youth, and poetry. The “lateral” 
distinction between the Aesthetic and the Logic is replaced in Cohen’s neo-Kantianism 
by a “medial” one of “experienced knowledge” within a wider sphere of “knowledge”. 
Positioning Cohen’s idealism in these terms permits the distinction between his own 
“epistemo-critical” [Erkenntniskritik] response to Kant and that route which Benjamin 
will traverse to become more apparent. 
 In ‘On Perception’, Benjamin reconfigures Kant’s critical system around the same 
interpretative schema as Cohen, under the two central headings of “Experience” 
(Erfahrung) and “Knowledge” (Erkenntnis), before going on to compare the relationship 
between the two in terms of that between a painting and the landscape it depicts. Whilst 
the painting of the landscape is a construction, arrangement or configuration of the real 
landscape, because it must always emphasise and omits particular details of the view 
before it, it is nonetheless impossible to speak of such a landscape independently of the 
painting and thus its inherent possibility for artistic configuration. Describing what might 
be termed this potential for portrayal in the landscape as the ‘symbol of its artistic 
context’, Benjamin compares this to “experience” as the ‘symbol of this context of 
knowledge’ (P 94). The knowability of experience ‘therefore belongs in a completely 
different order of things from knowledge itself’ (ibid.), resulting in a necessary distinction 
between the spheres of experience as it appears for knowledge and experience when it is 
postulated outside the context of knowledge. In contrast to what has been termed Cohen’s 
sphere of “experienced knowledge” within the medium of “knowledge”, Benjamin 
reversal of this relationship posits “known experience” within the broader medium of 
“experience” in general, or a transcendental concept of pure experienceability.  
An adequately higher sphere of experience must phenomenologically incorporate 
the most diverse kinds of intuitions, including the “ephemerality” of the contemporary, 
the “spirituality” of youth, the “irrationality” of the supposedly primitive, and the 
“mysticism” of the paranormal, into ‘a pure and systematic continuum of experience’ 
(PCP 105). With this the Aristotelian table of categories will be ‘completely revised’ to 
permit the ‘knowledge of an experience which is multiply gradated and nonmechanical’ 
(PCP 107). Whilst Benjamin appeals to a ‘theory of orders’, founded upon ‘primal 
concepts’ and comprising ‘that which Kant discusses in the transcendental aesthetic, and, 
furthermore, all the basic concepts not only of mechanics but also of geometry, 
linguistics, psychology, the descriptive natural sciences, and many others...’, it is 
important to insist that in relation to his transformation of Kantian philosophy, the 
“primal” nature of these concepts must be formulated in such a way that their 
primordiality is not understood as chronological or logical, but as ontological (PCP 107). 
Benjamin will effectively seek to “invert” Cohen’s idealist move beyond Kant by placing 
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the “known experience” appearing within the Logic into a mediated relationship with the 
Aesthetic, as a deeper and more fundamental level of transcendental experience. The 
result of this Hamannian metacritique of Cohen’s neo-Kantianism must lead beyond the 
magic of naming conceived as a speculative knowledge from within idealism, and be 
developed instead into a transcendental concept of pure experience which leads 
Benjamin’s philosophy towards a transcendental empiricism and a materialist theory of 
ideas.61 
                                                       
61 Here, Benjamin comes closest to the later neo-Kantianism of Emil Lask, whose influence upon 
Martin Heidegger and George Lukács has become the subject of a number of recent studies (cf. 
István M. Fehér, ‘Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of the 
categories’, Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, ed. Christopher E. Macann, (London & 
New York, Routledge, 1992), Volume 2; Theodor Kisiel, ‘Why Students of Heidegger will 
have to read Emil Lask’, Man and World, 28, 3, (July, 1995)). Lask emerged, like Benjamin, 
out of Rickert’s Baden rather than Cohen’s Marburg School, publishing two works – Logic of 
Philosophy and the Doctrine of the Categories [Die Logik der Philosophie und die 
Kategorienlehre] (1911) and The Doctrine of Judgement [Die Lehre vom Urteil] (1912) –  
before his death in the First World War. His philosophy ‘adopts the “standpoint of 
transcendence” to given an ontological interpretation of the object as a unity of categorial form 
and alogical material’ (Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: 
Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology, (Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University 
Press, 2001), p.28). This ‘resurgent metaphysics’ lays claim ‘to something more “primordial” 
than what has already been elaborated scientifically’: ‘a transcendental objectivity which 
implies a rediscovery of the primordial world’ (ibid., p.28; Gabriel Motzkin, op. cit., p.173). 
Thus, ‘In contrast to Cohen, for whom the object is constructed in the scientific judgement, 
Lask argues that “the most basic problems of logic reveal themselves only if pretheoretical 
cognition is included in the investigation.”’ (Stephan Galt Crowell, op. cit., p.28). Such 
cognition reflects an alternative access to Being, not through knowledge but through an 
aletheiological experience of truth. For Gabriel Motzkin this ontology implies a rejection of 
Hegelian dialectic: it ‘implies that matter, the principle of the sphere of Being, is the principle 
of generation’, entailing a ‘devaluation of Hegelian generation as a dialectic of identity and 
contradiction’, such that ‘Lask rather like Marx thought that the substrate is objective’ (Gabriel 
Motzkin, op. cit., p.177). 
 
 
2.  Walter Benjamin’s “Tender empiricism”: 
Towards a Materialist Theory of Ideas 
 
There is a tender empiricism which becomes intimately identical with its object and thereby 
becomes actual theory. 
   – J. W. von Goethe, Maxims and Reflections, #565 
 
2.1 The Problem of Biological Experience in Kant’s Critique of Judgement 
Walter Benjamin’s early ‘Program for the Coming Philosophy’ designates the problem 
faced by ‘every great epistemology’ as linking ‘the question of the certainty of 
knowledge that is lasting’ with ‘the question of the integrity of an experience that is 
ephemeral’ (PCP 100). The previous chapter argued that Kant’s transcendental idealism – 
and subsequently Cohen’s critical idealism – only managed to ‘give a valid explanation’ 
for the former, rescuing the eidetic approach of Platonic philosophy through a 
transcendental methodology concerned primarily with universals in the context of 
knowledge. Because in doing so Kant could secure knowledge only for a reality of ‘a 
low, perhaps the lowest, order’, he was unable to incorporate the integrity and 
particularity of the ephemeral. Concerned only with the universal formality of the 
objectively necessary, the Kantian concept of experience is unable to integrate the 
majority of phenomenological experience into its system. 
 The ‘Program for the Coming Philosophy’ suggests that the resources for 
postulating an alternative model for the possibility of historical experience might be 
sought in Kant’s third Critique which deals with judgement not in the context of the 
mathematical sciences, but in its application to artistic and biological experience. When 
Benjamin claims that one of the greatest problems of Kant’s philosophy concerns the 
third part of the system and ‘the question of those scientific types of experience (the 
biological ones)’, he acknowledges that Kant did not ground such experiences in the 
Logic and raises the question of why he did not do so (PCP 107). By considering the 
problem of life within Kant’s Critique of Judgement, it will become apparent that the 
answer to this question lies in the radically unsettling character of biological experience 
for Kant’s critical metaphysics of nature. This exposes the architectonic of the Kantian 
system to the troubling possibility of a speculative intuition. The third Critique wards off 
such a possibility only by insisting on the merely regulative status of the consequent 
judgement, effectively denying scientific value to the nascent biology of Kant’s age. 
 Following the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant becomes increasingly concerned with 
integrating into his scientific system those experiences which evade the conceptual grasp 
of the mechanically orientated categories of the understanding, from ethical and historical 
to aesthetic and biological types of experience. In the Critique of Judgement, concerned 
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with exploring the latter two, he identifies the concept of natural purpose as ‘that stranger 
in natural science’ which, in the words of Timothy Lenoir, force him to conclude that ‘the 
life sciences must rest upon a different set of assumptions and that a methodological 
strategy different from the physical sciences must be worked out if biology is to enter 
upon the royal road to science’.1 In Kant’s example, a tree considered as the effective 
cause of its species in reproduction, of itself in growth, and of its organs in preservation, 
must also involve an idea of a final cause, in order to explain the ultimate self-
organization of, respectively, the reproductive processes, formless plant material, and 
interdependent organs.  
 What Kant terms a “natural purpose” is therefore ‘both cause and effect of itself’, 
or more precisely: ‘the possibility of its parts (as concerns both their existence and their 
form) must depend on their relation to the whole’, and furthermore, ‘the parts of the thing 
[must] combine into the unity of a whole because they are reciprocally cause and effect of 
their form’ (CJ Ak. 370 & 373). Natural purposes possess a unique and ‘paradoxical 
status’ within Kant’s system, being something given in experience which, according to 
Alberto Toscano, ‘cannot be an object of knowledge, and allows for no direct 
representation, no subsumption under a concept’.2 The faculty of understanding now finds 
itself ‘not simply incapable of anticipating the form of the organism (which is no reason 
for alarm, considering our cognitive finitude) but cannot even formulate its possibility’.3 
More than this, Kant’s insistence on the uncognizable character of biological organization 
renders it uniquely inexplicable: unlike the kind of speculative concepts which arise from 
the transcendental use of reason (the rational Ideas which are thinkable, but not 
intuitable), natural purposes are nonetheless given to sensibility and therefore intuitable 
but not thinkable. The problem of biological “life” in Kant therefore corresponds to the 
seemingly impossible experience of a speculative intuition.  
 This curious status of natural purposes reveals what Toscano identifies as ‘a certain 
instability at the heart of the project of transcendental philosophy’, which threatens to 
undermine not only the stability of science, but the scientific foundations upon which 
Kant’s transcendental system is constructed.4  The ‘essential difficulty’ that troubles 
Kantian biology is ‘that mechanical modes of explanation’, which proved so effective 
within natural philosophy and its Newtonian understanding of reality, are nonetheless 
                                                       
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement [hereafter CJ], trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis, 
Hackett, 1987), Ak. 390; Timothy Lenoir, ‘The eternal laws of form: morphotypes and the 
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2 Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between Kant and 
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3 Ibid., p.31. 
4 Ibid., p.22. 
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‘inadequate to deal with many processes of the organic realm, where the relationship of 
cause to effect is completely different from that encountered in the inorganic realm’.5 
Singular organisms therefore seem to fall within a strange hinterland between the 
principles of natural mechanism and rational freedom, and hence outside the proper 
conceptual domain integral to scientific understanding as conceived in the first Critique.6 
Just as it seems impossible to Kant that there could be a science of aesthetics, so it 
appears unfeasible from his historical perspective that there could be a “science” of life. 
However, Kant does not consider the troubling question of whether his own conception of 
nature and the mechanistic categories of the understanding which govern it might be 
amiss. In order to preserve the systematic unity of his transcendental philosophy, he is 
therefore required to give an explanation for this limitation which accounts for the 
impossible appearance of natural purposes, and he seeks to do so without undermining 
the universal applicability of the metaphysics of nature which he had secured for 
Newtonian science in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
 Kant manages to preserve his existing concept of scientific experience by assuming 
that a different kind of exhibition must be involved in biological experience and sets 
about explaining this through a diagnosis of the conceptual limitations of human 
understanding and an appeal to a reflective operation of judgement. The anomalous 
contingency of natural organisms is therefore explained by ‘the particular that judgement 
has to bring under the universal supplied by the concepts of the understanding’ (CJ Ak. 
406). ‘For the universal supplied by our (human) understanding does not determine the 
particular; therefore...the variety of ways in which they may come before our perception 
is contingent’, and it is ‘this contingency that makes it so difficult for our understanding 
to unify the manifold in nature so as to [give rise to] cognition’. Consequently, the 
contingency of the particular follows from the limitations of the abstract universal 
concepts – defined as ‘analytically universal’ – utilised by the human intellect. Whilst 
they are capable of determining the common characteristics of things, they leave the a 
posteriori content of the particular undetermined. 
 This limitation follows from Kant’s separation of the Transcendental Logic from 
the Aesthetic, and preserves the human understanding as a “power of concepts” but in 
doing so comes perilously close to permitting a seemingly speculative intuition of a 
deeper underlying freedom behind phenomena.  Kant therefore explains this concept of 
natural purpose as one reflectively borrowed from the rational concept of human 
                                                       
5 Ibid., pp.317-8. 
6 ‘But teleology does not seem to belong to natural science. For natural science requires 
determinative and not merely reflective principles in order to indicate objective bases for 
natural effects....So teleology as a science does not belong to any doctrine, but belongs only to 
critique’ (CJ Ak. 417). 
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intentionality or purposes, and in this way evades the question of the reality – in this 
instance, both its transcendental and its empirical reality – of such a concept by referring 
to its merely regulative status (CJ Ak. 406). In a passage which is perhaps indebted to 
Kant’s Piestist upbringing, he goes on to draw a distinction between an archetypal and an 
ectypal understanding of the world which mirrors that drawn more generally in Protestant 
theology between the archetypal theology of God’s self-revelation (i.e., theology in the 
infinite mind of the Creator) and the ectypal theology of God’s revelation to his finite 
creatures (i.e., theology as we apprehend it).7 Kant hypothesises an intellectus archetypus 
capable of possessing an ‘intuition of the whole as a whole’ and consequently of grasping 
the particular parts and their relation to the formal whole via “synthetical universals” or 
“archetypes”.8 Such intuitions are denied to our discursive understanding with its power 
of concepts, precisely because the “archetypal intellect” ‘does not (by means of concepts) 
proceed from the universal to the particular and thus to the individual’ (CJ Ak. 406).  
 Toscano notes how the introduction of this opposition and the diversion into 
reflective judgement is enforced ‘for the sake of the systematic unity of critique and its 
theistic destination’: ‘the absolute separation of life from matter...the heteronomous 
nature of causation; the a priori character of the grounds of scientific knowledge; the 
subordination of biological evidence to mechanism as the legislating authority in the 
realm of appearances’.9 It permits Kant to preserve both the Newtonian certainty of a 
mechanistic world of forces and the necessarily imperfect understanding of finite 
creatures. To the extent that Cohen’s fully-fledged idealism moves beyond the finite 
capacities imposed by Kant, it sacrifices the unity of the mechanical categories and 
recovers a pure logic whose dialectical structure introduces concepts of “origin” and 
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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., Ak. A838//B866). 
9 Alberto Toscano, op. cit., pp.25 & 44. 
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“end” as fundamental categories of experience. The regulative status of teleological 
judgement in Kant’s account of biological organisms is shifted in Cohen’s philosophy 
from a pragmatic condition of exhibition to the context of an ethical idealization of 
history. Whilst Kant keeps nature and history separate, treating natural purposiveness as 
if free, Cohen resolves biology into history: evolution is reinterpreted as the “boundary” 
which borders upon the infinite, ideal and moral task of human history.10 
 This problem of living organisation or natural purposes provokes Kant’s 
agnosticism towards the scientific status of the discipline which will only come to be 
christened “biology” by Lamarck – the “Science of Life” in Gottfried Reinhold 
Treviranus’s description – a decade later in 1802.11 Whilst the mechanism which Kant 
puzzled over would be identified half a century later with Darwin’s research into natural 
selection and evolution, his diversion into reflective judgement at this point nonetheless 
marks the refusal to countenance other philosophical possibilities. What appears to us in 
its contingency still features as a universal characteristic of life: this suggests an 
underlying lawfulness that Kant cannot account for in the usual transcendentally idealist 
manner, because the absence of a cognizable concept indicates it has not been 
determinately supplied as a pure form of reason as, for example, causality supposedly 
has. The “purity” of this content must therefore considered outside of the transcendental 
or critical idealist explanation. 
 
2.2 The Romantic Theory of Experiment and the Problem of Form 
The emphasis placed upon biology and the natural sciences in this chapter is intended 
primarily to counter the suggestion of any straightforward substitution of scientific 
knowledge for spiritual or religious pragmatism in Benjamin’s metaphysics. For it is here, 
specifically in the impossibly speculative intuition of nature, that an aesthetic dialectic, 
which overcomes the artificially imposed abyss between the categories of the 
understanding and the forms of sensibility, becomes possible, one which has the potential 
to liberate the Kantian concept of experience from the positivist prejudices of the 
Newtonian context of mathematics and physics.  
 This possibility is further reinforced by the value that Benjamin places upon the 
Romantic philosophy of science in his dissertation on ‘The Concept of Art Criticism in 
Early German Romanticism’ (1919). Benjamin’s consideration of the cognition of natural 
objects forms part of his reconstruction of the epistemology underlying the Early German 
                                                       
10 Cf. Hermann Cohen, ‘Ethik des reinen Willens’, Werke, hg. Vom Hermann-Cohen-Archiv am 
Philosophischen Seminar, (Zürich, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1981), Volume 7, pp. 40ff; cf. HC 
247-8. 
11 Joel Black, ‘Scientific Models’, The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, ed. Marshall 
Brown, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), Volume 5, p.126. 
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Romantic concept of criticism, and therefore takes up, albeit only in an indirect way, the 
question of biological experience which is raised in his ‘Program for the Coming 
Philosophy’. The Romantics raised Kant’s concept of criticism to a higher power, 
Benjamin argues, through which it acquires ‘an almost magical meaning’ for speculative 
philosophy as an “objectively productive” thought in which ‘the knowledge of truth 
sprang forth magically, as it were, from insight into the falsehood’ of the restrictive 
conditions of thought.12 Hence, as ‘soon as the philosophy of history, in Kant...still 
explicitly and emphatically affirmed both the possibility of thinking an intellectual 
intuition and its impossibility in the realm of experience, a manifold and almost feverish 
endeavour emerged to recover this concept for philosophy...’ (CC 121). It therefore 
‘appeared quite plausible’ to the Romantics that the overcoming of the philosophical 
extremes of dogmatism and scepticism could be carried out in aesthetics ‘under the same 
name by which Kant had arbitrated that conflict in epistemology’, and moreover that 
“higher criticism” could even prove more important – because more speculative – than 
Kant’s own epistemological critique (CC 144-5). If the ‘theory of natural knowledge is 
indispensable’ both as the basis of and for the exposition of this concept of criticism, it is 
here that the problem of biological experience in Kant might be exploited to overcome 
the critical reservations of his own architectonic (CC 144). At the same time, there is a 
danger that the Romantic privileging of the form of knowledge threatens to collapse into 
an intellectual intuition reasserting the kind of productivity of thought which underlies 
Cohen’s idealism.  
 The central feature of Romantic science is the overcoming of the absolute dualism 
between subject and object by the insistence on reality as a medium of perception in 
which the ‘subject-object correlation is abrogated’ (CC 146). The immediacy of 
perception therefore ‘proceeds from a medium common to the perceiver and the 
perceived,’ Benjamin explains, ‘as the history of philosophy shows in the case of 
Democritus, who describes perception on the basis of a partly material interpenetration of 
subject and object’ (CC 147). This mediated conception of perception shares with 
Hamann’s theology of linguistic revelation, considered in the previous chapter, an appeal 
to the immanent magic of the cognitive word. As a consequence of this account, the 
Romantic conception of criticism is seen to correspond to their scientific understanding of 
the  “experiment [Experiment]” as a ‘magical observation’ in which ‘the experimenter is 
capable...of getting nearer to the object and of finally drawing it into himself’ (CC 148).  
 Benjamin goes on to note that Novalis ‘cites approvingly Goethe’s opinion “that 
every substances has its closer rapport with itself, just as iron in magnetism”’, and agrees 
                                                       
12 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’ [hereafter CC], SW1 
p.142. 
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that ‘Goethe’s work displays a concept of empiricism [Empirie] which is very close to the 
Romantic concept of observation’ (CC 148 & n.149, 192; translation altered). This is 
most apparent in Goethe’s description of his scientific approach as a ‘tender empiricism 
[zarte Empirie] which becomes intimately identical [innigst identisch] with its object and 
thereby becomes actual theory [zur eigentlichen Theorie wird]’.13 Adopting Johann 
Heinroth’s description of his thought as a thinking objectively, Goethe describes an 
experience in which thinking ‘is not separate from objects; that the elements of the object, 
the perceptions of the object, flow into my thinking and are fully permeated by it; that my 
perception itself is a thinking, and my thinking a perception’.14 The residual traces of this 
encounter appear in thought as material after-images [nachbilder], a concept which will 
become important to Benjamin’s mnemonic understanding of historical experience. 
Fundamental to Goethe’s concept of experience, therefore, is a similar theory of the 
“experiment” as a ‘mediation [vermittler]’ in which the absolute division between subject 
and object is suspended.15  
 Benjamin’s claim concerning the similarity between the Romantic and Goethean 
theory of experiment is qualified, however, by the reservation that ‘the ultimate intention 
of [Goethe’s] regard for nature does not at all coincide with the romantic theory in 
question’, and he concludes that he must at this point leave ‘undecided’ how far the 
Romantic “experiment” ‘actually accords with Goethe’s opinion’ (CC n.149, 192 & 
148).16 Nevertheless, Benjamin takes up this distinction again – this time in the context of 
art – in the supplementary afterword to the dissertation on ‘The Early Romantic Theory 
of Art and Goethe’. Here he is less equivocal, insisting that the important distinction 
between the Romantic and Goethean theories of criticism is based upon their differing 
conceptions of the nature of the medium of observation. Benjamin admits in a footnote 
that ‘[n]o evidence’ for this Goethean position ‘can be offered within this narrow 
framework’ because ‘the relevant passages would require as detailed an interpretation as 
the propositions of the early Romantics do’ (CC 199, n.308). Although he indicates that 
such an exposition ‘will be pursued elsewhere in the widened context it demands’, no 
such direct discussion appears except in scattered references across his subsequent work 
                                                       
13 MR #565. It should be noted that this tender empiricism is distanced from the “expanded 
empiricism” of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie by Goethe on the basis that Schelling ‘is seldom 
capable of recognizing law in an individual case’ (MR ##1373 & 1374). 
14 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Significant Help Given by an Ingenious Turn of Phrase’, CW12 p.39. 
15 Ibid. 
16 This displays a resistance to the common predilection to uncritically conflate Goethean and 
Romantic science within the domain of Naturphilosophie, a tendency which has been 
challenged in a number of recent studies. R. H. Stephenson, for example, rejects the description 
of ‘Goethe’s Romantic approach to science’ as ‘still persistent “hyperbolic caricatures” of 
Goethe’s position’ (R. H. Stephenson, Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge and Science, 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995), p.21 [emphasis added]). 
32 
(CC 199, n.308).  
 The distinction drawn between a Romantic and a Goethean conception of the 
Absolute, and therefore of the nature of the “experiment” as it mediates between subject 
and object, suggests that for Benjamin there is something specific about the Goethean 
concept of experience which proves fruitful for his own attempt to think beyond the 
narrowly scientific limitations of the Kantian theory of experience, and which is, 
nonetheless, distinguishable from the Romantic model of criticism so important to his 
philosophy. In this chapter, a feature of the Goethean concept of experience will be 
examined which does not receive explicit attention in Benjamin’s discussion, but which 
nonetheless clarifies it difference from Romanticism: the quasi-materialist aspect of what 
Goethe defines as his “objective thinking”. Benjamin’s discussion of the pure contents 
which are associated with a Goethean intuition of nature make it clear that, in contrast to 
the formalism of the Romantic theory of reflection, there is here an implicit mediation 
between subject and object which suggests a materialist theory of ideas. The Romantic 
conception of the medium through which the object penetrates the observing subject in 
artistic criticism is that of a Fichtean ‘medium that shelters in itself and builds out of itself 
the context of forms’ (CC 179). This indicates ‘a continually more comprehensive 
unfolding and enhancement of poetic forms’ in transcendental poetry, in which the work 
undergoes ‘an infinite process of fulfilment’ through progressively intensifying reflection 
(CC 168). At the heart of Romantic reflection is a theory of pure form which 
problematically reasserts the Fichtean idealism of an immediate cognition through self-
knowledge, in which the content of thought is conceived as the ‘form of the form’ of 
thinking. Hence, in Benjamin’s reading, at the basis of the Romantic philosophy of 
science lies the belief that there is ‘in fact no knowledge of an object by a subject’, only a 
‘self-knowledge’ in which the ‘subject-object correlation is abrogated’ entirely at the 
expense of the object.17 What Benjamin characterises as the ‘radical, mystical formalism’ 
of the Romantic theory of cognition therefore effectively ends up jettisoning a theory of 
experience altogether for an idealism of intuitive knowledge, from which all content has 
                                                       
17 CC 146. Winfried Menninghaus has criticised Benjamin’s characterisation of Fichte and Early 
German Romanticism for being an inaccurate distortion of their work and intentions. She 
argues, for example, that rather than ‘guaranteeing immediate cognition’ (as Benjamin suggests 
here), reflection ‘produces a reversal in its relation to what is reflected, an ‘ordo inversus’; it 
guarantees precisely that the absolute “can never be obtained from within itself.” [Novalis, 
Schriften, ed. Paul Kluckhohn (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1968-81), Volume 2:127, p.131]’ 
(Winfried Menninghaus, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Exposition of the Romantic Theory of 
Reflection’, Walter Benjamin: Critical Evaluation in Cultural Theory, ed. Peter Osborne, 
(London & New York, Routledge, 2005), Volume 1, p.29. The problem of Benjamin’s 
interpretation of Romanticism will be considered in the final chapter; it is sufficient to point 
out that whether the Fichtean-Romantic account of knowledge is more complex and 
sophisticated than Benjamin allows, it still proceeds essentially through the primacy of the 
cognizing subject. 
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been effaced (CC 123). Partly as a consequence of this, the Romantics are forced turn to 
religion to attain the semblance of content within their work (CC 179). 
 Goethe, in contrast to Early German Romanticism, neglects the philosophical 
problem of form. Although this assertion is made by Benjamin within the context of a 
discussion of Goethe’s aesthetics, it will prove to have an important implication for his 
theory of science. Benjamin’s criticism is that Goethe leaves the problem of the absolute 
form of art unresolved because he is unable to distinguish this from the presentational 
form of particulars works. As a consequence of this confusion, his understanding of form 
is based upon the historical determined form of Greek plastic art, which is generalized 
into a theory of “style” that privileges ‘representation of a typifying sort’ (CC 184).  For 
example, in ‘Simple Imitation, Manner, and Style’, Goethe sought to transcend the 
imitative and expressive artistic forms of Naturalism and Mannerism by defending a 
“style” in which the artist seeks some ‘order in multiplicity of appearances and learn to 
juxtapose and recreate distinct and characteristic forms’.18 Because a ‘great work of 
art...treats its diverse subject matter as a unified whole and reveals the significance and 
dignity of even the most ordinary subjects, it goes beyond nature’, he argues, concluding 
that the truth [Wahrheit] of art lies not in its verisimilitude [Wahrscheinlichkeit] to nature 
but in its capacity to represent the essence of things ‘in visible and tangible form’.19 
Whilst Benjamin does not oppose the capacity attributed to art here, he does criticise 
Goethe for the unhistorical assumption that it is the specific forms of classical art which 
remain important and capable of expressing the truth outside of the context of the 
classical world.  
 Under the influence of Winckelmann’s classicism, Goethe comes to regard Greek 
art as prototypical. To understand Benjamin’s claim, it is useful to consider George 
Lukács description of Goethe’s aesthetic as the ‘attempt to create a bourgeois classical 
art’.20 Goethe ‘sough the model and the foundation for the solution to the problem of 
form in Greek art’, Lukács argues, albeit in a way that was not concerned with simply 
imitating the classical laws of genre but applying them to ‘the material which the modern 
age offers its poets’. For Lukács, the recognition of the ‘category of the characteristic as 
an essential distinguishing feature of ancient art’ provides Goethe with a realist model for 
the depiction of the objective social content of life.21 Furthermore, the distinction Lukács 
draws between “portrayal” and “reportage” in contemporary literature suggests the value 
                                                       
18 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Simple Imitation, Manner, Style’, CW3 p.72. 
19 J. W. von Goethe, ‘On the Truth and Verisimilitude of the Artwork [Über Wahrheit und 
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Kunstwerke]’ (1798), CW3 pp.77-8; J. W. von Goethe, ‘Simple 
Imitation, Manner, Style’, CW3 p.72. 
20 Georg Lukács, ‘The Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe’, Goethe and His Age, trans. 
Robert Anchor, (London, Merlin Press, 1979), p.76. 
21 Ibid., pp.78-9. 
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that the “characteristic” in classical art might have held for Goethe. Whereas “reportage” 
reproduces reality in accordance with scientific verification, which takes ‘the fact, i.e. the 
individual case...concretely and individually...as an example of the illustration in general’, 
“portrayal” is concerned with ‘the reproduction of reality in a manner faithful to its true 
content’: that is with truth, ‘...immaterial [of] how many details may not coincide with the 
underlying empirical reality’.22 
 In an earlier essay, Lukács clarifies this through a discussion of “portraiture”. The 
‘likeness’ between a portrait and its subject is not one of empirical verisimilitude but of 
the ‘intensity of the work and its vision’, which compels us to ‘feel that his life was 
exactly as shown by the lines and colours of the painting’ in its ‘struggle for truth’.23 This 
becomes even more apparent in landscape painting, because ‘in front of a landscape we 
never ask ourselves whether this mountain or that river really is as it is painted there’.24 
Benjamin’s criticism of Goethe’s understanding of style in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ 
and ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’ anticipate his later objections to Lukács’ position in the 
debate on literary realism. Goethe’s discussion offers a ‘reference to the criterion of 
certain prototypes’, specifically the ‘sublime naturalism’ of Greek plastic art 
(encapsulated, Benjamin says, in the anecdote concerning the sparrows alighting on the 
grapes painted by a Greek master, which Goethe mentions in ‘On Truth and 
Verisimilitude in Art’), but fails to provide any ‘philosophical clarification of the problem 
of form’ itself (CC 184 & 181).  Consequently, Goethe – like Lukács – takes 
classical realism as a model to be imitated, rather than an archetype to be learnt from.  
 Despite this, Goethe’s insight into the need for representation in relation to truth 
leads him into the profound depths of the problem of content in art, and it is here that his 
thought surpasses that of the Early German Romantics. Since it is not the visible world of 
nature that art so strenuously strives to represent as true, the object of art cannot be taken 
simply as the specific contents of the particular artwork. The relation between the work 
and that which it seeks to represent or resemble ‘signifies precisely the relation of what is 
perceptible in the highest degree to what in principle is only intuitable’ (CC 180). It is 
here that Goethe’s aesthetic touches upon his metaphysics of nature, since this relation 
between the perceptible and the intuitable indicates what he understands as that between 
the phenomena and the “primal phenomena [Urphänomen]” or “archetypes [Urbilder]” of 
nature. Benjamin characterises this realm of the ‘supreme conceptual unity of content’, 
which ‘manifests itself in a limited, harmonic discontinuum of pure contents’ (CC 179). 
                                                       
22 Georg Lukács, ‘Reportage or Portrayal?’, Essays on Realism, ed. Rodney Livingstone, 
(London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1980), pp.48-52. 
23 Georg Lukács, ‘On the Nature and Form of the Essay’, Soul and Form, trans. Anna Bostock, 
(London, Merlin Press, 1974), p.11. 
24 Ibid., pp.10-11. 
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The truth that art seeks to represent or make perceptible concerns the pure contents of 
“true nature” that are intuited but not perceived. Here, then, in the context of biological 
experience which so troubled the Kantian system with its impossibly speculative 
intuition, Goethe’s concept of the primal phenomenon embodies the struggle to overcome 
the narrow limitations of Newtonian science through a specifically metaphysical theory 
of experience.  
 
2.3 “To Portray Rather than to Explain”: Goethe’s Aesthetics of Science 
Whilst Kant’s Critique of Judgement is regarded by Timothy Lenoir as the ‘definite 
analysis’ of the ‘difficulties and intricate problems’ relating to this emergence, Goethe – 
whose Metamorphosis of Plants was published the same year as the third Critique – is 
acknowledged ‘[o]ne of the most distinguished co-workers in this enterprise’.25 In 
contrast to Kant, Goethe sought a speculative metaphysics of nature, insisting that there 
are ‘problems in the natural sciences which cannot be adequately discussed without 
involving the help of metaphysics; not just, however, a school and world-wisdom, but the 
kind that existed before, with and after physics, that now is and will be hereafter’ (MR 
#546). His scientific writings, however, are largely unsystematic, offering a blend of 
original empirical research in geology, comparative anatomy, plant morphology, colour, 
and the weather with isolated philosophical reflections influenced by Spinoza and Kant, 
and filtered through his aesthetic sensibilities as a poet, dramatist and novelist. Although 
Goethe could not give proper philosophical foundation to this theory, the value his 
science held for Benjamin concerns an attempt to rescue a speculative and metaphysical 
concept of experience from the ideological prejudices of his day.  
 Goethe’s lifelong engagement with science should be understood as a passionate 
intellectual struggle against the mathematization and quantification of scientific empirical 
inquiry which is encapsulated for him in Newton’s approach to a merely “artificial 
nature”. Hence, his research into the presence of a metamorphosized intermaxillary bone 
in the human skull is directed against the theological insistence on the absolute and fixed 
distinction between humans and other creatures; the Metamorphosis of Plants against the 
rigid and essentialist classificatory system of Linnean taxonomy, whose ‘conceptual 
approach [was] more suited to the spirit of the time’ which favoured preformation theory 
as the ‘successive development undergone by things dating from the time of Adam’; and 
the Theory of Colour against the “pathological” artificiality of the Newtonian 
experiments upon colour which imprisoned phenomena in a ‘gloomy empirical-
                                                       
25 Timothy Lenoir, ‘The eternal laws of form: morphotypes and the conditions of existence in 
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mechanical-dogmatic torture chamber’.26 His other investigations into the weather and 
geology are similarly motivated by the desire ‘to banish mathematical philosophical 
theories from those area of physics where they only hinder insight instead of furthering it, 
and where mathematical treatment has found such a wrong-headed application by the 
one-sidedness of the development of scientific education’ (MR #1282).  
 For Goethe the dominance of the mathematical approach to empirical science 
depends upon a reification of form which ends up mistaking exactitude for truth.27 This 
obsession with quantity leads the mathematical scientist to attempt to ‘include the 
immeasurable world together with the measurable and calculable world’ so that 
‘everything appears tangible, within reach and mechanical’ (MR #1286). But Goethe 
insists that ‘quantity and quality must be looked upon as the two poles of visible being’, 
and whilst ‘[n]othing is of value [to mathematics]...except form: content is a matter of 
indifference’, his attempt to develop a morphological appreciation of nature is intended to 
grasp and represent its dynamism, its particular content, and its specific quality (MR 
#1286 & #605).  
 The emergence of the biology as a scientific dispute at the end of the eighteenth 
century undergoes a crisis that occurs whenever a ‘corpus of knowledge is ready to 
become a science’, Goethe argues (MR #419). It is torn between two conflicting “ways of 
representing [Vorstellungsweisen]”: the “Universalists [Universalisten]” who seek to 
‘separate what is particular and give a separate account of it’, and are therefore 
‘convinced and imagine that everything is always and everywhere there, even though in 
infinitely varied and manifold shape, and is also discoverable’, and the “Singularists 
[Singularisten]” who ‘keep the general in view while wanting to add and integrate what is 
particular’. They ‘concede the main point’ to the Universalists, but ‘always want to find 
one exception where type [Typus] is not particularly marked’. This is represented in the 
natural sciences when biology, specifically “comparative anatomy” in this case, finds 
itself split between the distinct disciplines of “natural history” and “natural philosophy”. 
The former remains Universalist in assuming that ‘the variety of forms in the organic 
world is a known phenomenon,’ and arranges phenomenon ‘according to the forms that 
are observed and the characteristics that are sought out and recognised’ and ‘eliminating 
all that is arbitrary insofar as possible’.28 The fruitfulness of such an approach lies in the 
value of a fixed standard for comparison between the diverse and complex 
                                                       
26 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Outline of a General Introduction to Comparative Anatomy, Commencing 
with Osteology’, CW12 p.117; J. W. von Goethe, ‘The Content Prefaced’, CW12, p.67; MR 
#430. 
27 ‘What is exact about mathematics except exactitude? And this, is it not the result of an innate 
sense of truth?’ (MR #607). 
28 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Outline of a General Introduction to Comparative Anatomy, Commencing 
with Osteology’, CW12 p.117. 
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transformations of phenomena. The “type” for the Universalist is therefore a universal 
and fixed form. 
 But this is effective only to the extent that it eliminates the contingent and the 
arbitrary, the very object pursued by “natural philosophy”, in its analysis of the structural 
interrelationships of chemical compounds and physical forces, with a Singularist attention 
to the ‘inner structure’ beyond the ‘surface appearance of forms’.29 Because breaking 
down its object into constitutive parts is less problematic for what Goethe calls 
“unorganized matter” in chemistry than for the organized interrelationships of living 
organisms, this knowledge of inner structure is far more problematic for biology as the 
science of life. For building upward from the part to the whole fails to capture – indeed it 
destroys – the special unity of the living thing, as Kant’s third Critique made clear.  
 Goethe praises the Singularists for seeking out the exceptional, but he criticises 
their approach for jettisoning the “type” altogether, based upon their misunderstanding of 
its character as a basic form [Grundgestalt] and for denying its existence when it is 
hidden. Osteology, for example, is deprived of a ‘promising approach’ with its ‘indirect 
denial of the type [Typus]’, which accounted for its previous incapacity to perceive 
physiological similarities between humans and apes.30 In ‘wonder[ing] if another path – a 
better one – might not open up for me,’ Goethe sought to ground his new science of 
“morphology” in a concept of “type” that transcends the limitations of the Universalist 
and Singularist approaches. For whilst a use of a “type” is necessary for grasping the 
‘constructive interrelationship’ of parts that so troubled Kant’s concept of “natural 
purposes”, this concept should not be understood as some fixed and universal form. 
Goethe preferred to speak of “formation [Bildung]” over “structured form [Gestalt]”, 
which describes ‘the end product and what is in process of production as well’ and does 
not ‘exclude what is changeable and assume that an interrelated whole is identified, 
defined, and fixed in character’.31 Similarly, in a discussion of the problem of “natural 
purpose” in Kant’s treatment of living organisms, Goethe opposes those concepts which 
offer a purely formal solution because ‘there is always a material quality about such an 
organic substance’.32 His schematic outline therefore interposes ‘power’, ‘force’ and 
‘striving’ as an interpenetration of matter and form in life. 
 ‘Impelled from the start by an inner need,’ Goethe says that he ‘had striven 
unconsciously and incessantly toward primal image and archetypes, and had even 
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30 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Outline of a General Introduction to Comparative Anatomy, Commencing 
with Osteology’, CW12 p.124. 
31 J. W. von Goethe, ‘The Purpose Set Forth (From On Morphology)’, CW12 p.63. 
32 J. W. von Goethe, ‘The Formative Impulse’, CW12 p.35. 
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succeeded in building up a method of representing it which conformed to nature’.33 
Importantly, Goethe does not attempt to determine and conceptualise the apparent 
freedom of “natural purpose” that so troubled Kant’s third Critique, but instead employs 
the “type” as a mode of aesthetically grasping the inner structure of living things across 
its various transformations. This is evident in Goethe’s description of the “leaf” as the 
primal organ of the plant. The capacity for “multivalence” in the sequence of organs 
produced by a plant and for “intermediacy” between these forms lead Goethe to suggest 
an ‘underlying kindship...of leaves, calyx, corolla, and stamens, which develop after one 
another, and, as it were, from one another’ according to a ‘process, by which one and the 
same organ presents itself to our eyes under protean forms...’.34 Whilst Kant despaired as 
to how a later organ could be the paradoxical cause of an earlier one, Goethe 
demonstrated that ‘the protean organs of the vegetating and flowering plant’ possess an 
underlying identity, originating in ‘a single organ, the leaf’.35 This identity is neither that 
of a genetic realism, in which the actual, empirical leaf is the common ancestor of the 
more evolved organs, nor the generic nominalism of an abstract concept of fixed and 
common features. The “leaf” stands in for a ‘general word [ein allgemeine Wort] to 
describe this organ’ which is ‘descriptive of the standard against which to compare the 
various manifestations [Erscheinungen] of its form [Gestalt]’. It is utilised with the 
‘reservation that we accustom ourselves to relate the phenomenon to one another in both 
directions’, since the ‘sepal is a contracted stem leaf’ as much as the ‘stem is a sepal, 
expanded through the intrusion of cruder saps’.36 In his later scientific writings,  Goethe 
develops this concept of the “type [Typus]”, speaking of the “archetype” [Urbild] and 
later of the “primal phenomenon [Urphänomen]’ as the experience of this unity of ideal 
type and particular manifestation.   
 The orientation of such a perspective can be seen in Goethe’s description of 
morphology as ‘a science new not because of its subject matter...but because of its 
intention and method, which lend its principles their unique form’. This intention, he 
adds, is ‘to portray rather than explain’.37 The fundamental issue at stake in Goethe’s 
philosophy might therefore be characterised as the development of an “aesthetics of 
science”, and at the heart of this aesthetics lies the “type” as the embodiment of the 
characteristic, capable of expressing the true underlying content of object without 
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resorting to an abstract concept of universal form.38 The scientific “type” or “archetype” 
therefore corresponds in many respects to the characteristic which Lukács praises so 
highly in Goethe’s “bourgeois classicism”. Lukács does not reflect upon the methodology 
of “portrayal” outside of the context of literary realism, but it is likely that it is Goethe’s 
scientific research, particular is search for the “primal plant” whilst in Italy in the late 
1780s, which provokes his turn from Sturm und Drang to classicism. 
 
2.4 The Scientific Genius: Imagination and Production 
The implicit philosophical context of Goethe’s attempt to formulate a more speculative 
metaphysics of nature in contrast to that of Kant is of fundamental importance to 
Benjamin’s construction of a higher concept of experience with his concept of criticism. 
This is apparent not only from the esoteric afterword on Goethe in the dissertation on 
Romanticism – which begins, it should be noted, with a quote from Goethe’s material for 
the Theory of Colour – but can be surmised from the oblique references to the 
epistemological structure of the Goethean “Ideal” in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to 
the Origin of the German Tragic Drama (written in 1924-5, published 1927). Benjamin 
claims there that the concept of Ursprung he introduces in the work – and which he 
distinguishes from Cohen’s own logical Urpsrung – may be formulated using ‘Goethe’s 
term, ideals’, insisting that the ‘Ideas...are the Faustian “Mothers”’.39 Again, the work is 
introduced with a quotation from Goethe’s theory of science, this time one which raises 
the explicit question of the relationship between art and science. This centrality is also 
confirmed in the later Arcades Project, which admits that, ‘In studying Simmel’s 
presentation of Goethe’s concept of truth, I came to see very clearly that my concept of 
Ursprung in the Trauerspiel book is a rigorous and decisive transportation of this basic 
Goethean concept from the domain of nature to that of history’ (AP N2a, 4).40  
 For Benjamin, what Goethe’s writings on science explore is the possibility of a 
metaphysical experience of truth. The emphasis that Benjamin places upon the intuition 
                                                       
38 Goethe ‘deployed a novel mode of writing...in order to re-enact in language at least something 
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Goethe’s Aesthetic Intuition in Literature and Science’, Science in Context, 18, 4, (2005), 2); 
Cf. also R. H. Stephenson, Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge and Science, op. cit., p.3. 
39 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama [hereafter OGT], trans. John Osborne, 
(London, Verso, 1998), p.35. 
40 The apparent delay in what Beatrice Hanssen calls this ‘moment of belated revelation’ is 
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University in Berlin at the time Simmel’s book on Goethe was first published in 1913, but 
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for the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia in the late 1920s (Beatrice Hanssen, ‘Philosophy at Its 
Origin: Walter Benjamin's Prologue to the Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels’, MLN, 
Comparative Literature Issue, 110, 4, (September, 1995), p.825). 
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of a pure content accords with Goethe’s transformation of Kantian philosophy through 
the insistence that the Urphänomen is not an Idea of pure reason but an experience 
[Erfahrung]. Although at first Goethe describes the anatomical archetype [anatomische 
Typus] as ‘in essence, the concept or idea [den Begriff, die Idee] of the animal’ in the 
‘Outline of a General Introduction to Comparative Anatomy’, when he first sketches out 
his “symbolic plant” for Schiller as part of his ‘enthusiastic description of the 
metamorphosis of plants’, he rejects the explanation given that it is a Kantian Idea 
[Idee].41 If it is an Idea and not an experience [Erfahrung], Goethe claims, then ‘...I may 
rejoice that I have ideas without knowing it, and can even see them with my own eyes’.42 
This insistence on the inherently aesthetic aspect – what R. H. Stephenson describes as 
the conviction that ‘meaning is intrinsically sensuous’ – demands that the ideal “type” be 
distinguished from the transcendental idea of pure reason, as Schiller sought to do’.43 Yet 
Goethe’s subsequent and intensive study of Kant also indicates the extent to which the 
concept of the transcendental still assumes an important role within his thought. 
 Goethe will later, in the context of art, speak of the necessity for a ‘Critique of the 
Senses [Sinne]’ in the manner of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (MR #468). He comes to 
speak of this as ‘a higher empiricism [höhere Empirie]’ which relates to nature ‘as human 
reason relates to practical life’, that is, in a transcendental sense (MR #411). The 
distinction between an ‘ordinary intuition [Gewöhnliches Anschauen]’ and a ‘pure 
intuition [reines Anschauen]’ in Goethe’s work must therefore be distinguished from 
Kant’s mathematical-geometrical pure intuition of space and time in the first Critique, 
and associated instead with the kind of ‘pure experience [reinen Erfahrung]’ which 
would be derived from a transcendental deduction of ordinary experience in a “critique of 
pure sensibility” (MR ##533 & 1226). 
 Suggesting that Kant had adopted a ‘roguishly ironic way of working’, Goethe 
embraces the very problem of the speculative intuition in the Critique of Judgement by 
endorsing it as an ‘intuitive perception of eternally creative nature’. He cites as 
‘particularly significant’ for this transformation the account given by Kant of the 
intellectus archetypus.44 Since Kant permitted the Idea of freedom to appear within 
consciousness as a fact of reason, Goethe suggests, the “freedom” of nature so 
problematic in Kant’s account of natural purpose might be something itself given in 
experience, and not simply imposed upon the organism as a consequence of the 
contingency of its indeterminate particularity. Moving beyond Goethe’s own description, 
                                                       
41 J. W. von Goethe, ‘The Content Prefaced’, CW12 p.69; J. W. von Goethe, ‘Fortunate 
Encounter’, CW12 pp.19-20. 
42 Ibid., pp.19-20. 
43 R. H. Stephenson, Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge and Science, op. cit., p.50; MR #468. 
44 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Judgement Through Intuitive Perception’, CW12 pp.31-2. 
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we might call this an analogous “fact of experience”, appearing as an imperative for 
expression within consciousness. Benjamin understands the concept of experience 
contained in Goethe’s tender empiricism in this way when he defines its object as ‘pure 
contents...in principle only intuitable’, which announce themselves ‘in the feelings as 
pure’, and which are sensed as a ‘necessity that the content...become completely 
perceptible’ (CC 180).  
 In this context, and in relation to his sketch for Schiller of the “primal plant 
[Urpflanze]” as a concrete convergence of Idea and Experience, Goethe’s description of 
his capacity to ‘imagine a flower in the centre of my visual sense’, whose ‘original form 
never stayed for a moment; it unfolded, and from within it new flowers continuously 
developed...’ becomes significant.45 He calls such products ‘fantasy flowers’, insisting 
however that they are ‘as regular as rosettes carved by a sculptor’. The use of the term 
“fantasy” here indicates an involvement of the imagination, in the same sense that Kant 
speaks of the ‘imagination, insofar as it produces imaginings involuntarily as well, is 
called fantasy...’.46 Goethe elsewhere describes this as an ‘exact sensorial imagination 
[exakte sinnliche Phantasie]’, one which is indispensable to art and serves a fundamental 
role in his own scientific attempt to render pure content perceptible through its aesthetic 
and image-creating function.47  
 In the Critique of Judgement, the role of the imagination – as an intermediary 
power capable of mediating between concepts of the understanding and sensible 
intuitions – is given an expanded role by Kant analogous to that performed on judgement. 
Prior to the third Critique, judgement had been seen as primarily involved with the 
subsumption of particular sensible intuitions under universal concepts of the 
understanding. The capacity for inductive reasoning within natural science, however, 
suggests a more reflective role for judgement, which is capable of finding hypothetical 
laws for the subsumption of particular sensible intuitions not themselves determined by 
the understanding. It does so by indirectly borrowing principles of pure reason to stand in 
for concepts within the understanding. In the biological experience of living organisation, 
the receptivity of our merely “ectypal” or derivative understanding is dependent upon the 
images supplied by sensibility, meaning our cognition of the organism involves a form 
derived from the spatially unified image of the whole in relation to the parts. Because this 
contradicts any mechanical explanation, and because we are not supplied with any other 
                                                       
45 J. W. von Goethe, ‘From a review of Johannes Purkinje’s Sight from a Subjective Standpoint’, 
quoted in Douglas Miller, ‘Introduction’, CW12 p.xxi. 
46 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert B. Louden, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ak. 167. 
47 J. W. von Goethe, ‘From a review of Ernst Stiedenroth’s A Psychology in Clarification of 
Phenomena from the Soul’, CW12 p.46. 
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adequate concept of form, we can only judge in accordance with regulative principle of 
purpose supplied by reason and understood as a formal and final cause (CJ Ak. 408). 
Since this is only an appearance of form for us, however, Kant insists that our need for 
such a teleological explanation does not logically contradict the simultaneous possibility 
of a mechanical one. We can negatively posit an intuitive type of understanding as a 
power of complete spontaneity, which is capable of an intellectual intuition of the thing-
in-itself outside of the spatial form supplied of our sensibility, and therefore 
hypothetically capable of proceeding directly from the intuition of a determinate universal 
to the particular parts.  
 Reflective judgement is at work not only in subsuming intuitions of living 
organisation under borrowed teleological principles of pure practical reason, but also as 
the experience of beauty in the reflective judgement of taste. However, the feeling of 
beauty can also be reproduced by the imagination in its expanded role as a productive 
power capable of finding sensible expression for the Ideas of pure reason. Like 
judgement, therefore, Kant extends the role of the imagination in the third Critique 
through a relationship with not only the understanding but now also pure reason. Unlike 
reflective judgement, however, Kant restricts the role to the artistic genius, and denies it 
any place in scientific knowledge. For Kant, the genius is able to imitate the beauty of 
nature through the unconscious production of artefacts which are animated by what he 
terms the Aesthetic Idea. Kant assigns this role to the “fantasy” of the productive 
imagination, which he distinguishes from merely reproducing in recollection, but which 
he insists is incapable  of creating a ‘presentation of sense that was never before given to 
our power of sense’.48 In calling the products of such presentations Ideas, Kant makes it 
clear that by ‘striv[ing] toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience’, 
they ‘hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts’, i.e. concepts of pure 
reason (CJ Ak. 314). Because such “Ideas” are nonetheless sensibly exhibited, Kant calls 
them Aesthetic Ideas, defining them as a ‘presentation of the imagination which compels 
[veranlaßt] much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no 
[determinate] concept, can be adequate’: an unexpoundable ‘intuition (of the 
imagination)’ for which the understanding can find no ‘adequate concept’ (CJ Ak. 314, 
trans. altered). 
 Despite the symmetry between reflective judgements of art and science, Kant 
restricts the role of Aesthetic Ideas to the artist, insisting that the genius for exhibiting 
such Ideas is ‘a talent for art, not for science’, since science must ‘start from distinctly 
known rules that determine the procedure we must use in it’ (CJ Ak. 313-4). At the core 
                                                       
48 CJ Ak. 314; Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, op. cit., Ak. 167-8. 
43 
of this distinction is the claim that Aesthetic Ideas ‘cannot be brought about by any 
compliance with rules, whether of science or mechanical imitation, but can be brought 
about only by the subject’s nature’ (CJ Ak. 317-8). Goethe certainly disagrees with Kant 
that scientific procedure is thoroughly determined in advance by distinctly known rules of 
investigation, but he does so on the basis of a rejection of Kant’s latter claim, that genius 
belongs only to the subjective nature of the artist. His “occasional poetry” is an objective 
poetry, he argues, because like his objective thinking in science it is based upon the 
material permeation of the subject by the object of investigation. ‘The phenomenon of the 
after-image [Nachbilder]’, which are the residual traces of this physical contact, as well 
as ‘memory, productive imagination, concept and idea must all be in play at once’, he 
argues, ‘and be manifest in the vivacity of the organ of perception, with complete 
freedom and without purpose or guidance’.49 Goethe describes this as planting a seed in 
the imagination which only later yields fruitful results, ‘offering them up of its own 
accord’.50 At the centre of Goethe’s disagreement with Kant, therefore, is an alternative 
understanding of the Aesthetic Idea, which is effectively coded by the concept of the 
Urphänomen in his work.  
 According to Kant, the Aesthetic Idea is the product of the imagination when it 
strives either to ‘give sensible expression to rational ideas of invisible beings’ or else to 
give things ‘exemplified in experience [Erfahrung]...sensible expression in a way that 
goes beyond the limits of experience [Erfahrung], namely, with a completeness for which 
no example can be found in nature (CJ Ak. 314). In the former a rational idea becomes 
sensibly animated through its imaginative conjunction with an aesthetic attribute, 
effectively serving as the symbolic expression of the transcendental and otherwise 
inexpressible Idea of pure reason.51 The other kind of expression occurs when the 
imagination poetically expands that which is exemplified in nature towards a 
supersensible completeness. In the lines, “The sun flowed forth, as serenity flows from 
virtue,” the experience of sunlight is animated and expanded through the practical rational 
                                                       
49 J. W. von Goethe, Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft. (Weimar, Leopoldina, 1947-1970), 
Volume 1, 9, p.348, quoted in R. H. Stephenson, Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge and 
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principle of virtue.52 Here, the productive imagination conforms to that creative, 
restructuring act [Schaffung] which moves beyond ordinary [alltäglich], empirical 
[empirische] nature [Natur] to produce ‘another nature out of the material actually given 
[anderen Natur aus dem Stoffe, den ihr die wirkliche gibt]’ (CJ Ak. 314). 
 The supersensible element of this Aesthetic Idea is assumed, on the basis of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, to be a pure rational form or principle. For Goethe, however, the 
Urphänomen, as a convergence of the real and the ideal, is conceived as the sensible 
expression produced through a tender empiricism of the supersensible material of pure 
content, given objectively to the subject in intuition. It involves the portrayal of that 
‘unknown [unbekanntes] quality of lawfulness in the object which corresponds to the 
unknown quality of lawfulness in the subject’ (MR #1344). The involvement that Goethe 
assigns to the imagination in his account of scientific experiment is therefore intended to 
counter not only the division between sensibility and reason in Kant’s philosophy, but 
also between the artist and the scientist. For Kant it is the practical “creation” (since 
subjective, individual and unconscious) of art which distinguishes it from the 
epistemological passivity of science (including natural science) as the accumulation of 
knowledge. In gesturing towards the possibility of the scientific genius, Goethe’s tender 
empiricism therefore rests upon a different understanding of the “productivity” of the 
imagination, and therefore of “production” itself. This difference proves crucial to 
Benjamin’s own critique of Goethean science. 
 
2.5 Urphänomen and Experienceability (I): Art 
In the opening sections of the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue,’ Benjamin implicitly conjoins 
his appropriation of the Goethean archetypes as ‘Faustian “Mothers” [which] remain 
obscure so long as phenomena do not declare their faith and gather around them’ with the 
erotic anamnesis described in Plato’s Symposium: ‘An understanding of the Platonic view 
of the relationship between truth and beauty is...indispensable to the definition of truth 
itself’ (OGT 35 & 30). For, he argues, ‘the innermost question of the Symposium’ 
concerns the beautiful as the appearance of truth for the lover who seeks it, and truth as a 
process of revelation capable of guaranteeing the existence of the beautiful (OGT 31). In 
this appeal to the Symposium, Benjamin implicitly distances his aesthetic Platonising of 
Kant from Cohen’s neo-Kantian valorization of the Republic’s privileging of the pure 
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intelligibility of scientific laws conceived as technai. It rejects the logical dialectic to 
which Cohen restricts his concept of Ursprung, emphasising the Kantian account of 
Aesthetic Ideas in order to distance the grasping of such truth from any intellectual 
intuition of the Idea itself. This approach is described not as a vision – even an 
intellectual vision – of the subject in relation to an object which stands apart from it, but a 
‘total immersion and absorption’ into truth (OGT 36). 
 However, Benjamin distinguishes this absorption from the Romantic concept of the 
“experiment” when he insists that their attempt to renew the Platonic theory of ideas is 
frustrated by their concept of truth as one of ‘reflective consciousness’ (OGT 38). The 
contrast merely implied in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ between the differing character of 
intuition in the Romantic and the Goethean theory of experiment can therefore be made 
explicit. To the extent that the concept of experiment in Early German Romanticism 
involves the dissolution of the absolute difference between subject and object, this 
nonetheless takes place within the context of knowledge, specifically the self-knowledge 
of pure form of thinking itself. The intuition that Benjamin discovers in Goethe’s tender 
empiricism, however, is that of an objective thinking which concerns itself not with 
knowledge but an “experienceability” or “perceptibility” of the pure contents of the 
object.  
This distinction is useful for clarifying the claim made by several recent 
commentators that it is phenomenology that provides the ‘conceptual language able to 
describe Goethe’s way of science accurately’.53 Whilst Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenological project arises in response to the same scientific problematic which 
receives paradigmatic expression in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, his proposal to ‘go 
back to the “things themselves”’ proceeds with a very different intention from Goethe’s. 
Husserl’s late essay on The Crisis of the European Sciences clearly shares with Goethe’s 
project what has been described as a ‘deep mistrust of the mathematization of nature’ 
which is countered through ‘a patient, participatory presence to phenomena’ in which ‘the 
fullness of the world reveals itself in new and surprising ways’.54 But Husserl’s ‘essential 
                                                       
53 David Seamon, ‘Goethe, Nature and Phenomenology: An Introduction’, Goethe’s Way of 
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54 Eva-Maria Simms, ‘Goethe, Husserl, and the Crisis of the European Sciences’, Janus-Head, 8, 
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phenomenological method appears to borrow Goethe’s own morphological description of the 
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this to the problem of grasping the unity of a living organism, and seems to draw on Goethe’s 
own morphological account in the Metamorphosis of Plants when he describes a method ‘in 
46 
intuition [Wesenerschauung]’, in contrast to Goethe’s ‘intuitive judgement [Anschauung 
Urteilskraft], draws on a model of abstraction as a ‘descriptively peculiar experience, 
responsible for setting the abstract content in relief from its concrete background’ – such 
as the capacity to ‘directly apprehend the Specific Unity Redness on the basis of a 
singular intuition of something red’ – in order to construct a broader linguistic account of 
“meaning” whose ultimate intention is to preserve the status of pure logical concepts.55 
Husserl’s real interest is not so much with things, or even the experience of things, but 
with how the ‘relation between a significant expression (in a particular speech act) and 
the ideal unity of meaning is like that between the Species Red and a red object of 
intuitive experience’.56 
 Similarly, the bracketing of the “real” transcendence of the object in 
phenomenological reduction merely serves to rediscover a sphere of immanence in the 
subject, understood as ‘absolute givenness of what is simply seen’ in the certain 
knowledge of Cartesian self-reflection.57 Goethe does sometimes speak of a disinterested 
approach towards the scientific object which, in an even more radical version of Kant’s 
judgement of taste, renounces the ‘natural way of seeing and judging things’ in their 
relation to oneself and one’s own ‘yardstick of pleasure and displeasure, attraction and 
repulsion, help and harm’.58 But in distinction to Husserl’s phenomenological bracketing, 
the intention of such a ‘gaze’ is to ‘find the measure for what he learns, the data for 
judgement, not in himself but in the sphere of what he observes’. In contrast to the 
“objectivity” discovered in the self-presence of Husserlian intentionality, Goethe argues 
                                                                                                                                                     
which one can certainly consider and dissect from the outside but which one can understand 
only if one goes back to its hidden roots and systematically pursues the life which in all its 
accomplishment, is in them and strives upward from them, shaping from within’. The 
comparison with Goethe’s morphological approach in The Crisis of the European Sciences, 
concludes that since, ‘the place where all problems of living inner being and of external 
exhibition are to be decided is in the end our human being, and the life of consciousness 
belonging to it’, an investigation of the phenomenological structure of consciousness is 
necessary and a transcendental bracketing of our natural prejudices regarding the external 
world (Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr, (Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1989), 
pp.113-4). 
55 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay, (London & New York, 
Routledge, 2001), Volume II, Investigation 2, pp.310-1 & 312. For Husserl’s linguistic account 
of meaning cf. Volume II, Investigation 1, p.168. Because in his later account of eidetic 
variation Husserl is perhaps closest to Goethe’s own methodology, and this in part arises as a 
criticism of the concept of experience in his earlier work, this last aspect of Husserl’s 
phenomenology will be considered in the next chapter. 
56 Ibid.., Volume II, Investigation 2, p.237 [emphasis added]. The ‘basic foundations of logic and 
epistemology’ are therefore to be taken as ‘valid thought-unities’, grasped as the ideal 
intentions of communication and assured by ‘defending the intrinsic right of specific (or ideal) 
objects to be granted objective status’(ibid., Volume II, Investigation 1, pp.168 & 237). 
57 Edmund Husserl, On the Idea of Phenomenology, trans. Lee Hardy, (AA Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp.26 & 30. 
58 J. W. von Goethe, ‘The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject’, CW12 p.11. 
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that the Socratic injunction to “know thyself” is nothing less than ‘a deception 
practiced...to divert attention from activity in the outer world to some false, inner 
speculation’.59 It is ‘our fellow men’ that know us best, that ‘know us better than we 
ourselves can’. This latter point makes it clear that Husserlian phenomenology has more 
in common with the Fichtean context of self-knowledge in Early German Romanticism 
than the objective thinking of the Goethean experiment. Fritz Heinemann’s 1934 essay on 
‘Goethe’s Phenomenological Method’ emphasises a number of fundamental differences 
between Goethe’s phenomenology and Husserl’s doctrine which are relevant in this 
respect. Most notably, Goethe’s science does not begin with a transcendental reduction, it 
does not ‘desert the sphere of concrete consciousness in order to construct its system 
upon this plane’, it does not ‘perform any “eidetic reduction”’, and, unlike Husserl’s, its 
principles ‘have reference to content, and can never be completely resolved into relations 
of pure form’.60 Joanna Hodge has therefore suggested that Benjamin’s ‘return to Goethe 
to theorize phenomena might also be taken as an oblique critique of the move in 
Husserlian phenomenology towards an idealism, which sacrifices the absolute priority of 
pre-predicative experience’.61 
 Whilst Goethe substitutes Kant’s mechanistic Newtonian view of the plant for that 
of an underlying but dynamic identity and continuity, the value of this endeavour lies less 
in its attention to the “leaf” as protean organ and more in what is at stake in the 
methodological intention of this transformation. The tender empiricism of Goethe’s way 
of science, particularly in the Metamorphosis of Plants but also in the Theory of Colour, 
is responding to precisely the problem of experience which so troubles Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement, and encapsulates the struggle to express the kind of experience which would 
be capable of incorporating the ephemeral, the contingent and the particular into scientific 
knowledge. However, as the earlier discussion of the Goethean intuition of pure content 
in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ and in ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’ noted, Benjamin also 
criticises Goethe for reducing “style” to the historically limited truth of classical realism 
and, as a consequence this neglect of any historical consideration of artistic form, for 
imagining that science could be turned directly into an art via an analogously conceived 
realism of the Urphänomen as archetypal. The “type” or “archetype” therefore offers little 
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more than a re-description of the empirical phenomenon, now viewed through its most 
typifying aspect. Goethe therefore took the sphere of “true nature” represented through 
aesthetic style to be ‘identical with the realm of archetypes or Urphänomen or ideals’ 
which is the object of science (CC 180). His conflation of artistic form with classical 
realism (distinguished by Goethe from naturalism) enables him to substitute an artistic for 
a scientific realism, without questioning the limitations of scientific form itself. The 
concept of experience introduced in his scientific writings therefore raises a profound and 
valuable philosophical insight into aesthetic representation, but it is problematically 
pursued within the context of scientific knowledge. Rejecting any such possibility in his 
essay on Romanticism, Benjamin insists that ‘the concept of intuition would perhaps 
contribute nothing’ to the question of ‘how nature appears to science’ (CC 180).  
 The concept of intuition, rather, must remain within the theory of art, such that the 
archetypes must be understood as residing ‘in that sphere of art where art is not creation 
but nature’ (CC 180; emphasised added). The truth of nature which is made visible in art, 
therefore, ‘must be rigorously distinguished from that [visible] nature on a conceptual 
level’, which suggests the ‘paradoxical resolution’ that ‘true, intuitable, Urphänomenal 
nature would become visible after the fashion of a likeness, not in the nature of the world 
but only in art, whereas in the nature of the world it would indeed be present but hidden 
(that is, overshadowed by what appears)’ (CC 181). What is “true” about such a nature is 
expressed not by the content itself – as if pure content could be expressed as visible 
content (in which case, it could conceivably be expressed in the phenomenon itself) – but 
in its way of appearing, specifically the particular presentational form of its 
representation (which in part also expresses the impossibility for its phenomenally 
appearing). The “true nature” discerned by Goethe appears as such only for art and not 
for science, since only the forms of art have the capacity to express this hidden 
perceptibility of the content. Goethe’s concept of experience derives from his great 
artistic feeling for nature, and his attempt to impose this upon natural science with its 
own limitations renders it paradoxical and ultimately meaningless.  
 
2.6 Urphänomen and Experienceability (II): Technology   
Goethe’s insistence that ‘we must necessarily think of science as art if we are to derive 
any kind of wholeness from it’, which Benjamin utilises as the epigraph for his 
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, anticipates Nietzsche’s similar attempt in The Birth of 
Tragedy to ‘look at science in the perspective of the artist, but art in that of life’.62 When 
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Benjamin characterizes the Goethean ‘quintessence of pure contents’ as the ‘museworthy 
[das Musische]’ (meaning those ‘invisible – but evident – archetypes whose guardians the 
Greeks knew under the name of the Muses’), his phrase recalls Nietzsche’s criticism of 
the ‘optimistic dialectic’ of Socratic science for driving ‘music out of tragedy with the 
scourge of its syllogisms’, and his question as to whether ‘ever-new configurations of 
genius [des Genius]’ might lead to a ‘music-practicing [des musiktreibenden]’ or ‘artistic 
[künstlerischen] Socrates’.63  
 Benjamin rehearses Nietzsche’s criticism in his 1916 discussion of the Symposium, 
where he ridicules the ‘unartistic [unmusisch]’ character of Socrates, whilst praising Plato 
for struggling to creatively express ‘the young philosophy’.64 Socrates transposes the 
imagery of female pregnancy directly into the spiritual domain, Benjamin argues, 
modelling intellectual creativity upon the biological and procreative functions of life and 
in doing so turning the erotic and the aesthetic into mere instruments of the intellect.65 
This requires Socrates to draws a sharp distinction between the daemonic philosopher and 
the materialistic craftsman, whose manipulation of the physical therefore rearranges, 
replaces and renews but does not create.66 What Benjamin describes as the ‘daemonic 
                                                                                                                                                     
perspective, the Kulturkampf or “cultural struggle” waged by Goethe and Schiller, is 
overlooked, the framework, and hence the structure, of Nietzsche’s thinking is distorted to the 
point of unintelligibility. Once restored, however, this perspective opens up afresh the 
coherence and purposiveness in Nietzsche’s philosophical aesthetics’ (Paul Bishop & R. H. 
Stephenson, Friedrich Nietzsche and Weimar Classicism, (Rochester, NY, & Woodbridge, 
Suffolk, Camden House, 2005), p.1. 
63 CC pp.179-180; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Clifton P. Fadiman, (New 
York, Dover, 1995), pp.50-55. 
64 Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 p.52. 
65 As a consequence, ‘the spiritual was sexual through and through’ for Socrates: ‘His notion of 
spiritual conception is pregnancy; his notion of spiritual procreation is discharge of desire’ 
(Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 p.53). For the philological and philosophical problems associated 
with this view that spiritual creativity in the Symposium employs metaphorical terms which are 
organised around ‘sex difference’ qua ‘biological necessity’ as a ‘transcendental or a priori 
ground...which is not itself amenable to interpretation or open to question’, cf. Stella Sandford, 
‘“All Human beings are pregnant”: the bisexual imaginary in Plato’s Symposium’, Radical 
Philosophy, 150, (July/August 2008), pp.24-35. Against this Sandford carefully examines the 
‘literary and conceptual specificity and complexity of the metaphors’, whose ‘disregard for 
propriety of reference in relation to the male and the female’ comprise a ‘bisexual imaginary’ 
which suggests instead the very ‘problematization of the presumption of sex difference as 
transcendental or a priori ground’ (ibid., p.30). The distinction drawn by Nietzsche and 
Benjamin between the Socratic and Platonic voices in the text, however, is not of principle 
concern to Sanford’s argument, and the attribution of this bisexual imaginary to one or the 
other is not made. 
66 Plato, Symposium, trans. M. C. Howatson, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
202e-203e. The “man of spirit [daimonios]” is inspired by Eros, a ‘great spirit 
[daimon]...intermediate between god and mortal’, whereas the “materialistic person 
[banausos]” is merely wise in skill [techne] or craft [cheirourgia]. Benjamin  himself utilises 
the Symposium’s myth of eros in his theory of fate and freedom in the ‘Outline of the 
Psychophysical Problem’, expanding upon its personification of Eros as a spiritual mediator in 
order to emphasise its binding role between humans and the divine, one which permits a 
divinatory communication to occur as a form of interpretation (Walter Benjamin, ‘Outline of 
the Psychophysical Problem’, SW1 p.400). 
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indistinguishability’ of Socrates’ talk in the Symposium derives from this intermingling of 
biological and essential nature, which Socrates can then only distinguish by reifying the 
material and the intellectual spheres of productivity.67  
 Benjamin accuses Goethe’s of sharing this ‘idea of the daemonic’, which he had 
named ‘after the example of the ancients and others who had perceived something 
similar’, and which asserts itself in his scientific relation to the natural world (GEA 316). 
As we have seen, Goethe’s scientific misunderstanding of the Urphänomen leads to a 
mythical ambiguity between “nature” and “true nature”, but Benjamin insists that truth is 
not ‘the object of knowledge’, for the ‘structure of truth...demands a mode of being which 
in its lack of intentionality resembles the simple existence of thing...’ (OGT 36). This 
mode of being is described as ‘primordial form of perception’ comparable to Platonic 
anamnesis and to Adamic Naming in which words appear unimpaired by cognitive 
meaning and therefore as a material, thing-like or even living existence.68 Benjamin 
discerns in Goethe’s later artistic works a ‘struggle to free himself’ from the clutches of 
daemonic myth, and in his literature from the Elective Affinities (1809) onwards – 
including From my Life: Truth and Poetry (1811-1830), the West-Easterly Divan (1819), 
and the second part of Faust (1832) – Benjamin discerns ‘a purer promise, no matter how 
darkly the myth holds sway in it’ (GEA 327).  
 Like Nietzsche, Benjamin contrasts the intellectual-erotic practice of Socrates from 
that artistic creativity of Plato, calling the ‘Platonic view of the relationship of truth and 
beauty’ in the Symposium one that is ‘indispensable to the definition of truth itself’.69 
                                                       
67 Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 p.62. 
68 This stands in contrast to Lukács’s description of the Platonic dialogue as a ‘significance-
supposing’ form of portrayal, because it concerns itself with questions regarding the existence 
of concepts and values, which it takes as the ‘sole true realities’ over that of things. The ‘really 
profound criticism’ of Plato, as well as mysticism, ‘resolutely reject the image...reach out most 
passionately for what lies beyond the image’: in their writings ‘there is no life of things, no 
image, only transparency, only something that no image would be capable of expressing 
completely’, which Lukács calls an “imagelessness of all images”. 
69 OGT p.30. Plato’s Symposium has a particular importance in Benjamin’s early writings, and is 
specifically referred to in the texts ‘Socrates’  (‘In the Symposium, Socrates praises the love 
between men and youths and lauds it as the medium of creative spirit...[But] ought Platonic 
love to mean un-Socratic love?’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 pp.53-4)), ‘The Theory of 
Criticism’ (‘Plato’s Symposium, at its climax, deals with this topic. Its message is that beauty 
achieves this virtual manifestation only within the truth as a whole’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘The 
Theory of Criticism’, SW1 p.219), ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’ (‘...the Platonic theory of the 
beautiful is connected with the still older problem of semblance, since, according to the 
Symposium, it first of all addresses physically living beauty’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘Goethe’s 
Elective Affinities’ [hereafter GEA], SW1 p.350), a letter to Florens Christian Rang (‘In the 
Symposium and the Timaeus, Plato defined the scope of the theory of ideas as the domain of art 
and nature’ (Walter Benjamin, Letter to Florens Christian Rang (dated December 9th, 1923), 
SW1 p.389), the ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem’ (‘Eros is the binding element in 
nature whose energies run free whenever he is not in control... “he is the mediator who spans 
the chasms which divides [the divine and the mortals]” [Plato, Symposium, op. cit., 202e]’ 
(Walter Benjamin, ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem’, SW1 p.400), and the ‘Epistemo-
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Platonic dialectic does not attempt to possess the true in an unmediated and conceptual 
way, but instead produces philosophical-dramatic dialogues whose beauty represents the 
truth by ‘mak[ing] visible not the idea but rather the latter’s secret’. But what Benjamin 
discerns as the purification of the daemonic into the genius does not leave the modern 
concept of artistic genius untouched.  
 Kant had already connected artistic genius (German: Genie) with its classical 
notion (Latin: Genius) by relating the inscrutable creativity of the artist to an innate 
natural talent, reflected in the ancient idea of ‘the guardian and guiding spirit that each 
person is given as his own at birth, and to whose inspiration [Eingebung] those original 
ideas are due’ (CJ Ak. 307-8). The attempt to develop a spiritual concept of experience in 
Benjamin’s earliest writings on the politics of youth invokes this association, investing 
the higher experience of youth with the spirit [Geist] of what he refers to in ‘The 
Metaphysics of Youth’ as the Genius. Benjamin specifically distances his theory of 
Genius from the formalist and idealist implications contained in Kant’s description of the 
artist, calling the artistic Genie one who is ‘forgetful and at a loss’ and whose 
conversation has ‘utterly cursed his memory in giving it shape’.70 By connecting his 
account of the Genius with das Musische Benjamin invokes this classical notion of the 
collective, productive inspiration of a person, group or place. But this remains tied to a 
dogmatic kind of spiritual expression in his earliest writings, and where he does draw 
upon examples of artistic practice they are primarily associated with the bourgeois and 
literary models of Goethe, Schiller, Stefan George and Hölderlin.  
 However, whilst in his early writings Benjamin criticises Goethe for ambiguously 
conflating nature as ‘the sphere of perceptible phenomenon and that of intuitable 
archetypes’, and insists that ‘only in the domain of art do the Urphänomen – as ideals – 
present themselves adequately to perception’, in a later review of Karl Blossfeldt’s 
Primal Forms [Urformen] of Art: Photographic Plant-Images (1928), he describes 
Blossfeldt’s photographs of magnified plant organs as visions in which ‘a geyser of new 
image-worlds hisses up at points in our existence where we would least have thought 
them imaginable’.71 Benjamin now offers a more nuanced description of such “pure 
contents”, insisting such forms are not merely ‘originary forms of art’ in the sense of 
mere models, but ‘originary forms of nature...at work as originary forms in all that was 
created’. Here, then, it is the technological form of photographs that ‘reveal an entire, 
unsuspected horde of analogies and forms in the existence of plants’, as ‘inner image-
imperatives [Bildnotwendigkeiten], which have the last word in all phases and stages of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Critical Prologue’ (‘This is evident above all in the Symposium...’) (OGT p.30)). 
70 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, SW1 p.7. 
71 GEA 315; Walter Benjamin, ‘News About Flowers’, SW2 p.156. 
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things conceived as metamorphoses’. In contrast to New Objectivity [Neue Sachlichkeit] 
in art, Benjamin insists, photography therefore represents a ‘truly new objectivity’, which 
is anticipated by the ‘fraternal great spirits – sun-soaked eyes, like those of Goethe and 
Herder...’.72 He adds that ‘this touches on the one of the deepest, most unfathomable 
forms of the creative, on the variant that was always, above all others, the form of genius, 
of the creative collective, and of nature...the fruitful, dialectical opposite of invention: the 
Natura non facit saltus of the ancients’.73  
 Here, then, the possible experience of a merely intuited “true nature” is not 
restricted to the realm of art, but granted to technology as a sphere capable of mediating 
the relationship between humanity and nature. In the final version of ‘The Work of Art in 
the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility’, dating from the last years of the 1930s, 
Benjamin characterises this realm as ‘another nature which speaks to the camera as 
compared to the eye’, no longer informed by human consciousness but by the 
unconscious.74 But even in the ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem’ from 1922-3, the 
claim that it is ‘technology in which the unity of life is formed’ suggests that whilst the 
realm of Urphänomen should be not be directly conflated with the visible nature of 
phenomenon, it is nonetheless in the whole realm of “second nature” and not merely that 
designated as art that the truth of nature may become perceptible for us.75  
 In a discussion of the Critique of Judgement, Howard Caygill argues that because 
of the ‘historical limitations of his concept of technology’, Kant recoiled from attributing 
any biological function to technology, which he ‘still considered externally, as something 
that has motive but not formative power’.76 As a consequence, Caygill claims, Kant was 
unable to fully think through the equivocation he discerned in the organistic character of 
living things and retreated from this insight to ‘an extremely limited conception of the 
technic of nature as a regulative idea’, leaving ‘the source of organization or life 
inscrutable’. Yet Kant’s reflections upon the causal reciprocity involved in natural 
purpose ‘clearly points to a prosthetic negotiation between the inside and the outside of 
an organism’, Caygill suggests, which threatened to turn the living thing into the 
‘ambiguous site of experience, both internal and external to mind and body’. If Goethe’s 
morphological writings share the historical limitations of Kant’s concept of technology, 
his struggle to overcome the Kantian theory of experience nonetheless lead him to 
conceptually anticipate the optical capacity of technology when he assigns all sorts of 
                                                       
72 Ibid., p.157. 
73 Ibid., pp.156-7. 
74 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (Third 
Version), SW4 p.266. 
75 Walter Benjamin, ‘Outline of the Psycho-Physical Problem’, SW1 p.395. 
76 Howard Caygill, ‘Stelarc and the Chimera: Kant’s Critique of Prosthetic Judgement’, Art 
Journal, 54, (Spring, 1997). 
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visionary insights to direct scientific observation.77 As Benjamin became increasingly 
preoccupied and familiar with avant-garde art practices, he came to recognise and 
reassess this implicit feature of Goethe’s work, and to reformulate his earlier rejection of 
Goethe’s aesthetics of science. Awakened to the observatory and perceptual potential of 
new technological forms, Benjamin realises that the ambiguous concept of nature in 
Goethe’s scientific writings anticipates a more general division between “first nature” and 
technology as a “second nature”, which is brought into practice by the liquidation of 
bourgeois artistic practices in the work of the avant-garde.  
 The work of the European Surrealists and the Russian Constructivists effectively 
render Goethe’s philosophy of science true, only now not as an “aesthetics of science” 
but as the scientific practice of art. More specifically, Goethe’s tender empiricism can 
now be read as the aesthetic anticipation of the ontology of the photographic and 
cinematographic image, whereby that which is represented, through the process of 
production, becomes part of the material element of the object itself. Goethe’s artistic 
fascination with the science of chemical and physical processes in his novel Elective 
Affinities has been frequently remarked upon, as has the influence of his Theory of 
Colour, whose research into the composition of light and the production of colour is 
thematically and chronologically close to the novel. What has received little attention is 
how these combined interests appear in the work as a fascination with the imagistic, in 
what might be understood as the conceptual anticipation in literature of the subsequent 
achievements of photographic and cinematographic technology. 78  
 There are a number of moments in Elective Affinities which offer a literary 
anticipation of the photographic snapshot. Whilst a camera obscura features in the novel, 
used by the visiting English gentleman to draw pictures of the landscape on the estate, 
and a discussion of the use of portraits to commemorate the dead raises the strange mix of 
temporal presence and absence which comes to the fore in the photographic image, it is 
the production of tableaux vivants as the attempts to impose the forms of painterly 
composition directly onto real life by using people and objects as its material which are 
                                                       
77 That is, Goethe assigned to the unaided human eye all sorts of capacities which only find their 
true achievement in technology, whilst denying the most basic advantages of existing 
technology: ‘The most disastrous aspect of modern physics: that experiments have been, as it 
were, segregated from the human factor and that nature is to be recognized only by the 
evidence of artificial...’ and ‘microscopes and telescopes really only serve to the unaided 
human senses...’ (MR ##706 & 502). 
78 In her discussion of Goethe, colour and technology in Hollywood Flatlands Esther Leslie 
points out how Edwin Land, the co-founder of the Polaroid Corporation, developed an 
‘astonishing new theory of colour’ whose procedures he said were drawn from Goethe’s theory 
of colour (Esther Leslie, Hollywood Flatlands: Animation, Critical Theory, and the Avant-
Garde, (London & New York, Verso, 2004), p.252. 
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most suggestive in this respect.79 ‘It was at this moment that the picture [das Bild] 
appeared to have been held and fixed [festgehahlten und erstarrt]’, Goethe writes of one 
of these staged constructions, his description of the participants seeming to mirror the 
effect upon the spectators: ‘Physically bedazzled [Physisch geblendet], spiritually 
astonished [geistig überrascht], the people standing around seemed to have just turned 
their eyes and to be in the act of looking back again in happy curiosity’.80 For the effect of 
this material construction – Goethe describes it as ‘presenting reality as image [die 
Wirklichkeit als Bild]’ – is at once stunning and uncanny.81  
 The representation of the nativity scene, enacted as a tableaux vivant in the novel, 
taps into a tradition of iconography recognised by the character of the Architect in the 
novel, and whose relevance to the ontology of the photographic image is emphasised by 
Peter Osborne.82 The ikon or theological image circumvents the modern notion of 
resemblance as copy to interpose an older notion of the image as ‘a visual presentation of 
reality, at once sensuously particular and ideal’, combining ‘the aesthetic, spatio-temporal 
concretion of an object of sight with the element of ideality inherent in ideas’.83 The 
chemical and optical process through which light from the object is imprinted onto light-
sensitive surfaces lends the photographic image the specific ontological form of 
participation in ‘the being of its referent’, a ‘“magical” aspect of photographic naturalism’ 
which Osborne characterises as ‘theological technology’.84 Photography takes on the 
magical aspect of naming which is so pivotal to Benjamin’s early work, and which 
Goethe sought in his use of the name “leaf” as a “primal phenomenon” for expressing the 
morphology of plants. 
 Goethe’s fascination with a consequential feature of this ontology, what Osborne 
calls the ‘immobalization of time’ in the image, derives from his interest in the plastic 
                                                       
79 J. W. von Goethe, Elective Affinities, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
Penguin, 1971), p.232; ibid., p.160; ibid., p.202. In a discussion of graves and monuments, it is 
suggested that portraits should be taken in the prime of life to commemorate the subject when 
they are deceased. This uncouples the monument from its physical location and permits the 
commemoration to exist as ‘an independent thing’ able ‘to stand in its own right’. But Ottilie 
questions the assumption of the fullness of this temporal presence, expressing an aversion to 
portraits because ‘they point to something distant and departed and remind me how hard it is to 
do justice to present’ (ibid., p.160). 
80 Ibid., p.202. 
81 Ibid. ‘The figures correspond so well to their originals, the colours were so happily chosen, the 
lighting so artistic, you thought you had been transported to another world...’, and Luciane’s 
‘living copy’ is later said to surpass the original. But the reality of the material produces an 
unsettling effect: the ‘...disturbing factor being a sort of anxiety produced by the presence of 
real figures instead of painted ones’ (ibid., pp.191-2). 
82 ‘...he suddenly realised that the art of representing pictures by three-dimensional figures had 
actually originated in the so-called Crib, in the pious representation devoted...to the divine 
mother and child’  (ibid., p.201). 
83 Peter Osborne, ‘Sign and Image’, Philosophy in Cultural Theory, (London & New York, 
Routledge, 2000), p.34. 
84 Ibid., pp.34-35. 
55 
style of classical art, notably Laocoon, which he praises for its portrayal of real 
movement as a fleeting moment.85 In the ‘plastic arts’, Goethe argues, the ‘most sublime 
expression of pathos...is to be found in the transition from one condition to another’, 
exemplified in the ‘moment of sudden transition’ of ‘child running along, full of vitality 
and joy of life, who is suddenly struck hard by a playmate, or otherwise hurt physically or 
emotionally’.86 The ‘new sensation has the impact of an electric shock on his entire 
body’, which produces a spiritual as well as physical effect in the observer. Goethe 
therefore describes the Laocoon as ‘an ideal subject’ because ‘struggling and suffering 
are combined in a single moment’: ‘I would describe the sculpture as a frozen lightning 
bolt, a wave petrified at the very instant it is about to break upon the shore’. The lightning 
bolt illuminates the scene like the photographic flash, interrupting the present like an 
electric shock in order to dialectically capture in a momentary image the very movement 
of transformation. 
 In the earlier discussion of Lukács’ concept of the “characteristic”, Goethe’s 
neoclassicism was distanced from any naturalism, and the element of construction which 
Goethe describes here in terms of sculpture is a case in point. The work has the 
semblance of nature, but for the connoisseur it is not the accuracy but the construction by 
the artist that is most appreciated and through which it goes beyond nature. He ‘sees not 
only the realism of what is imitated but also the excellence in the selection of subject 
matter, the imaginativeness in composition, and the supra-natural spirit of its micro-world 
of art’.87 Goethe recognises but misunderstands the importance of the emerging 
commodity form for this appreciation. The ‘average art lover’ has no concept of its 
construction and mistakes its truth for a verisimilitude towards nature, Goethe suggests, 
treating ‘the work of art like a piece of merchandise’. Goethe’s point concerns the passive 
consumption of the work as “real” by the ‘average art lover’, which is contrasted with the 
appreciation of the ‘true connoisseur’ who ‘feels that he must rise to the level of the artist 
in order to enjoy the work of art, that he must live with it, must see it again and again, and 
thus achieve a higher level of awareness’. Again, Goethe’s understanding of aesthetic 
appreciation here seems to coincide with his description of tender empiricism. Yet in his 
aversion to technology – which he regards as disrupting the visual and material mediation 
between subject and object – Goethe misses the point that it will be in technology itself 
that the ‘higher level of awareness’ he sought is possible; that it is in the photographic 
reproduction of the work that it can be experienced ‘again and again’; in the photographic 
enlargement that a higher level of awareness is permitted; and that it is primarily as a 
                                                       
85 cf. ibid., p.35. 
86 J.W. Von Goethe, ‘On Laocoon’ (1798), CW3 p.20. 
87 J. W. von Goethe, ‘On Truth and Verisimilitude in Art’, CW3 pp.77-8. 
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commodity that the spectator comes to “live with” the work.88 Goethe sought to impose 
an artistic appreciation upon the forms of science, but what his tender empiricism 
anticipates is the way in which technology demands a scientific transformation of the 
work, the forms, and the experience of the sphere once delineated as art. This claim will 
be examined here in relation to the material construction and ontology of the work, 
explored in relation to photograph and construction. The conclusion of Chapter 4 returns 
to this theme, within the context of the Goethean dialectic discussed in that chapter, in 
relation to the experience of the moving or cinematographic image.  
 Goethe’s tender empiricism therefore anticipates the dialectical transformation of 
art through science and technology. This recognition seems to have struck Benjamin 
during his two month stay in Moscow in 1927, where he was writing a biography on 
Goethe for the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia as well as a study of the collective forms of 
life under socialism for Die Kreatur, and where he was exposed to the sweeping 
transformations of a collectively orientated art under socialism. Benjamin is clear that the 
roots of the radical trends of the Left Poputchiki, which itself developed from the work of 
Vladiri Mayakovsky, Vsevolod Meyerhold, Sergei Tretyakov and the Left Front of the 
Arts (LEF), ‘stem directly from the last Western bourgeois slogans of the prewar period – 
from Futurism, Constructivism, Unanimism, and so on’.89 The revolutionary potential of 
the Surrealist experience of profane illumination stems from its metaphysical realism, a 
‘belief in the real, separate existence of concepts whether outside or inside things’ 
transposed from the ‘logical realm of ideas’ to the magical realm of words’.90 But this 
potential is blocked by the Surrealist emphasis on the subjective and individual world of 
the dream, which neglected any consideration of the collective forms and organisation of 
experience.91 Benjamin’s formulation of the importance of the expressionist poet and 
novelist Paul Scheerbart during this period – whose utopian fiction first glimpsed, he 
says, ‘the revolutionary character of technological achievement’ – prepares the ground for 
his appreciation of the technological innovations of the Russian Constructivists, whose 
socialist orientation permitted the overcoming of the bourgeois limitations of the 
European avant-garde, and the expansion of metaphysical materialism into the collective 
realm of technology.92  
                                                       
88 This is exemplified in Charlotte and Ottilie’s delight at the portfolio of copies from the camera 
obscura, which enables them ‘to range through the world thus comfortably in their solitude and 
to watch coasts and harbours, mountains, lakes and rives, cities, castle and many another spot 
with a name in history moving before their eyes’ (J. W. von Goethe, Elective Affinities, op. 
cit.p.202). 
89 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Political Groupings of Russian Writers’, SW2 p.8. 
90 Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism’, SW2 p.212. 
91 Walter Benjamin, ‘Surrealism’, SW2 p.217. 
92 The ‘orientalism, gothicism, his interest in theosophy and light-mysticism’ which provide the 
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 Benjamin’s lover Asja Lacis, for example, drew upon and discussed with him 
Tretyakov’s ‘idea of “the art worker” as a “psycho-engineer, a psycho-constructor” 
working on “a reorganization of the human psyche with the goal of achieving the 
commune”’.93 The First Working Group of Constructivists, established in March 1921 by 
Aleksei Gan, Aleksandr Rodchenko, Varvara Stepanova, Karl Ioganson, Vladimir 
Stenberg, Georgii Stenberg, and Konstantin Medunetskii, ‘set out to “involve its members 
in the revolutionary inventive work of the Constructivists, who...have decided to realise 
the communist expression of material structures”’, whilst Aleksei Gan’s subsequent 
manifesto on Constructivism (1922) opposed bourgeois artistic composition as the 
representation of reality by insisting on construction as an “organisation of life” through 
the integration and arrangement of material, real elements.94 This shift in the materials 
utilised by the artist, the technological transformation of the processes involved, and the 
collective, everyday intentions for the object lie closer to Plato’s materialistic craftsman 
than the daemonic prophet. The product is not longer a work of art, but a ‘real 
object...autonomous in its form and content’.95 In the restructuring of nature according to 
the Aesthetic Idea, the genius now no longer resembles Kant’s artist but the Goethean 
scientist: not simply the researcher into nature but an experimenter, although one guided 
not by the instrumental concerns of knowledge, but the desire to give expressive form to 
these pure contents.  
 Benjamin’s appreciation of Goethe’s tender empiricism shifts during this period, 
and his recognition of its applicability for the cultural analysis of technological forms 
signals a softening of his earlier criticism of its categorial deviation from art into science. 
Following his claims about Blossfeldt’s photographic images in ‘News about Flowers’ in 
1928, his ‘Short History of Photography’ the following year explicitly presents August 
Sanders’ collection of social photography in The Face of Our Time [Das Antlitz der Zeit] 
as a tender empiricism, which Benjamin calls a ‘comparative photography’ and which 
                                                                                                                                                     
backdrop to Scheerbart’s own utopianism is schooled in the primal elements of Goetheanism 
(Reyner Banham, ‘The Glass Paradise’, The Anti-Rationalist and the Rationalists, eds. 
Nikolaus Pevsner, J. M. Richards, Dennis Sharp, (Oxford, Architectural Press, 2000), p.189);  
Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Moscow Diary, ed. Gary Smith, (Cambridge, MA & 
London, Harvard University Press, 1986), p.82. 
93 Evgenii Bershtein, ‘The Withering of Private Life: Walter Benjamin in Moscow’, Everyday 
Life in Early Soviet Russia: Taking the Revolution Inside, eds. Christine Kiaer & Eric Naiman, 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2006), p.223. Benjamin describes 
Lacis herself as an “engineer [Ingenieur]” who had cut through his own psyche in his 
dedication to her in One-Way Street (written 1923-6, published 1928). 
94 Christine Lodder, Russian Constructivism, (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 
1983), p.3. 
95 Nikolai Tarabukin, Ot mol’berta k mashine [From the Easel to the Machine], (Moscow, 1923), 
p.8; trans. Christine Lodder, op. cit., pp.73-4. 
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recalls Goethe’s own comparative anatomy.96 Crucial to this insight is the recognition that 
the ‘social fact of art-as-photography’ in the technological reproduction of works 
corresponds to a transformation of aesthetics towards an understanding of production as 
collective creation and reception. In terms reminiscent of Goethe’s own description of 
tender empiricism, Alexander Rodchenko says of his constructivist practice of 
photomontage: 
 
In order to teach man to look in new ways it is necessary to photograph ordinary, 
familiar objects from totally unexpected viewpoints and in unexpected positions, and to 
photograph new objects from various vantage points so as to give a complete impression 
of the object. We are taught to look in a routine, inculcated manner. We must discover 
the visible world. We must revolutionize our visual thinking. We must remove the 
cataract from our eyes.’97 
 
Christine Lodder describes the resulting work as one which exploits ‘the objective 
descriptive content of the photograph to give reality to impossible but allegorical images, 
conveying coherent ideas’.98 Benjamin himself draws on this ‘new optics’ for his 
description of historical life in socialist Russia in the 1927 essay on ‘Moscow’. It will be 
captured by a presentational form, he says, in which is ‘devoid of all theory...a 
description of Moscow at the present moment in which “all factuality is already theory” 
and which would therefore refrain from any deductive abstraction, from any 
prognostication, and even with certain limits, from any judgement...’.99 What Benjamin 
perceives in the cultural and technological concretions of Russian life are not empirical 
facts, he insists, but the concrete convergence of the real and the true: Urphänomen. 
 
                                                       
96 ‘So it was quite in order for an observer like Döblin to have hit on precisely the scientific 
aspects of this work, commenting: “Just as there is comparative anatomy...so this photographer 
is doing comparative photography...’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘Little History of Photography’, SW2 
p.520). 
97 Alexander Rodchenko, ‘Puti sovremennoi fotograffi’, Novyi lef, 9, (1928), pp.38-9; trans. 
Christine Lodder, op. cit., 202. 
98 Christine Lodder, op. cit., 199. 
99 Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Moscow Diary, ed. Gary Smith, (Cambridge, MA & 
London, Harvard University Press, 1986), p.132. 
3. On Human Life and Life as Such: 
Refractive Dialectics and Historical Judgement 
 
Tell no-one but the wise, 
For the masses will only mock: 
I praise the living thing 
That yearns for flaming death. 
    –J. W. von Goethe, ‘Blessed Yearning’, in West-Easterly Divan 
 
But besides the concept of synthesis, another concept, that of a certain non-synthesis of two 
concepts in another, will become very important systematically, since another relation between 
thesis and antithesis is possible beside synthesis. 
    –Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ 
 
3.1 Kant’s Historical Sign: Idealism and Realism in Historical Experience 
In the previous chapter, the speculative concept of experience operating in Goethe’s 
scientific writings was considered in relation to Benjamin’s development of a materialist 
theory of ideas and its implications for his understanding of genius in relation to art and 
to technology. However, the appearance of truth which Benjamin associates with the 
semblance characteristic of beauty can be defined not only in terms of its relationship to 
“natural” phenomenon but also to “historical” ones.1 Goethe’s thought therefore proves 
fruitful for Benjamin not only in the context of an experiential relationship mediating 
between a subject and a present object, but also in considering the aporetic appearance of 
the past object for the present historian. Here, the medium of observation examined in the 
last chapter is understood in terms of a ‘now of legibility [das Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit]’, 
which Benjamin later defines as the “historical index” pertaining to the dialectical image 
(AP N3, 1). Benjamin claims this dialectical view of history begins with Goethe, and 
understands his own concept of the original phenomenon [Ursprungsphänomen] as a 
transposition of the truth of the primal phenomenon [Urphänomen] ‘from the pagan 
context of nature...into the Jewish context of history’.2 
 The project of utilising a speculative concept of experience to legitimate what 
Benjamin calls a Judaic conception of history is apparent from the early essay on ‘The 
Life of Students’, in which Benjamin speaks of the ‘exclusive task of criticism’ as an ‘act 
of cognition’ which makes legible an ‘image of the highest metaphysical state of 
history...deeply rooted in every present’ (LS 37). He calls the attendant view of history 
one whose metaphysical structure ‘appears to be concentrated in a single focal point’ like 
‘the messianic domain or the idea of the French Revolution’ (LS 37). The latter reference 
                                                       
1 GEA pp.350-1 & OGT pp.30-1; Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ [hereafter 
OSMB], SW4 p.352, n.63. 
2 Walter Benjamin, ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian’ [hereafter EF], SW3 p.262; AP N2a, 
4. 
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recalls Kant’s description of the French Revolution as a ‘historical sign’, a philosophy of 
history informed by an Enlightenment understanding of progress which is the ostensible 
target of Benjamin’s writing here and elsewhere. It is therefore important to understand 
Benjamin’s introduction of this messianic image as an alternative to Kant’s historical sign 
and undialectical philosophy of history. 
 Just as the organisation of living nature necessitates a diversion into reflective 
judgement for Kant, which seeks to intervene between theoretical understanding and 
practical teleology, so the contingency of collective human action poses a problem for 
historical experience. The discipline of history, Kant argues, attempts to find regularity 
and lawfulness in human affairs, yet discovers only the senselessness of a farcical 
comedy.3 The philosophical historian must, however, ‘attempt to find a purpose in nature 
behind this senseless course of human events’, and in line with the Copernican revolution 
of his critical philosophy he therefore proposes the supposition of a transcendental 
standpoint for history.4 In ‘The Conflict of the Faculties’, he nonetheless seeks in the 
phenomenon of history a ‘historical sign [Geschichtszeichen]’ which would demonstrate 
‘the tendency of the human race viewed in its entirety...which points to the existence of 
such a cause and to its effectiveness…undetermined with regard to time, and which 
would allow progress toward the better to be concluded as an inevitable consequence’.5 
 Kant argues that the French Revolution may be taken as such a sign. As with the 
experience of the beautiful in nature, such a historical experience is universal and 
disinterested – indicating an innate, moral character – whilst its compression of the 
progressive character of time and space into an momentary instant renders it a mere 
signifier of a more sublime and transcendental Idea of a cosmopolitan totality. The 
dualistic separation of the transcendental idea and the historical phenomenon results in 
Kant’s critical metaphysics of history permitting an experience of the historical sign only 
as the undialectical symbol of those ‘progressive tendencies’ ridiculed by Benjamin in 
‘The Life of Students’ (LS 37). Kant’s idealism may therefore be taken as one of the 
principle targets when Benjamin opposes that ‘view of history that puts its faith in the 
infinite extent of time and thus concerns itself only with the speed, or lack of it, with 
which people and epochs advance along the path of progress’ (LS 37).  
 Although Benjamin denounces the bad infinity of Kant’s rational Idea, he is also 
clear that the historian cannot capture the content of the genuine historical object through 
                                                       
3 Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, Kant: Political 
Writings, 2nd Edition, ed. Hans Reiss, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.41; 
cf. also Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor, (Lincoln & 
London, University of Nebraska Press, 1992), p.151. 
4 Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, op. cit., p.42; 
Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p.151. 
5 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, op. cit., p.153. 
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‘the pragmatic descriptions of details (the history of institutions, customs, and so on); in 
fact, it eludes them’ (LS 37). The obverse face of Kant’s transcendental idealism is an 
empirical realism which takes the historical phenomenon as something that is historically 
constituted and completed in time. Whilst the collective practice of the participants will 
be judged by Kant as a “success” or “failure”, it is only the enthusiastic sympathy aroused 
in the detached spectators which indicates a higher, progressive, and incomplete ideal.  
 The denunciation of a similar empirical realism occurs in Benjamin’s ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’ when he objects to the historicist preoccupation with ‘genesis 
[Entstehung]’ as ‘the process by which the existent came into being’, a position which 
identifies the  historical object with the ‘naked and manifest existence of the factual’ 
(OGT 45). Such an inadequate concept of the historical object is seen operating, for 
example, in the “inductive approach” of Konrad Burdach’s positivist history of art. The 
obsession with historical actuality in Burdach’s ‘nominalism....and his resistance to the 
slightest loss of contact with the factual, are to be attributed to the fear of departing from 
what is correct’ (OGT 43). The idealism behind Kant’s semiotics of the historical sign 
therefore reinforces a complete separation of phenomenon and idea, which posits the 
former according to a historicist devotion to a scientifically conceived actuality and the 
latter as an infinite and regulative principle of religious totality.  
 Benjamin’s criticism of such a view derives from his attention to the necessary 
appearance of truth and from an ontology of expression which is capable of conceiving of 
such semblance. The consequence of Burdach’s historicist concern with actuality in the 
context of the history of art is the abandoning of any conception of the essential except 
with regard to every individual, particular object. To talk of artistic genres or historical 
epochs as essential structures is therefore taken as a hypostatization of a merely general 
concept, based upon exemplary works as perfect and complete prototypes for future 
judgement. Such ‘scientific verism’ assumes the historical object to be that which is given 
and already completed in the “facts” of history, and neglects any consideration of how the 
truth of the historical object is able to appear to the judgement of later generations (OGT 
41). This conforms to a ‘bourgeois conception of language’ denigrated in ‘On Language 
as Such and the Language of Man’, and it is against this view that Benjamin develops an 
alternative and quasi-theological account of naming as a judgement which aims at the 
completion and fulfilment of the incomplete object (LSLM 65). 
 At the heart of this conception – and the point at which his views on nature and 
history intersect – is a theory of expression which posits an alternative understanding of 
the appearance of truth, based on the critique of an anthropomorphic and instrumental 
view of both language and history. The former is prevalent in the dominance of 
Aristotelian semiotics, which begins from the language of humans to claim that ‘the 
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means of communication is [through] the word, its object factual, and it addressee a 
human being’ (LSLM 65). Such a conception props up a positivist empiricism which takes 
the ultimate object “meant” or “signified” in language to be ‘factual subject matter’ 
(LSLM 65). Benjamin opposes this with a concept of a non-instrumental and non-
intentional theory of language as such. In the wider context of history, this non-
anthropomorphic conception of linguistic expression also leads to an expansion of the 
domain of the historical beyond that of the life of humans to include the sphere of the 
technological and the produced within a history of life (‘the living thing’) as such. 
 
3.2 The Weak Messianism of Early German Romanticism 
Benjamin’s metacritique of the hypocrisy of positivism with regard to its own language 
of exposition assumes a transcendental position, which deduces the condition of language 
as a medium of expression between two poles of communication. This corresponds to the 
concept of “experiment” discussed with reference to both Romantic and Goethean 
concepts of natural experience in the last chapter and, transposed into the historical 
domain, insists on a theory of historical observation as a medium in which subject and 
object interpenetrate.6 Importantly, Benjamin’s contention that at the ‘centre of linguistic 
philosophy’ lies a concept of revelation places language in a ‘most intimate connection 
with the philosophy of religion’ (LSLM 66). For such a claim introduces a notion of 
theological fulfilment to linguistic expression which expands the temporal dimension of 
signification from a concern with the historical relation of the apparently completed past 
to the present, to one with a future completeness only in the totality of history. Lacking 
this messianic register of historical fulfilment, historicism is reduced to the context of 
mere actuality, taking each particular historical object as something given and 
fundamentally completed in the past, and historical time as an empty, infinite and 
universal medium of human progression towards a constantly deferred and regulative 
                                                       
6 There is a paradox inherent to linguistic communication which demands an alternative account 
of signification must be sought: if signs are primarily understood as the capacity for one thing 
to represent or stand in for another, this capacity for representation suffers an infinite regress 
with regard to how signification itself first becomes possible. Benjamin’s solution is to regard 
things as primarily linguistic and therefore always already involved in signification. As a result 
of this transcendental perspective upon the necessary condition of language as such, Benjamin 
comes to understand signification as primarily expressive of itself: communicating the 
linguistic being of things. Drawing on Hamann’s theological idea of revelation as the creative 
Word of God, but assigning a fundamental importance to humans as essentially linguistic 
creatures, Benjamin introduces his theory of “naming” as a metaphysical – indeed theological 
– conception of signification. The “original” Word of God in things is understood as the ‘germ 
of the cognizing name’ which demands to be expressed in human language, and the task of 
human expression as a “naming” through which language in its absolute wholeness 
communicates itself to God (LSLM 65). The name is ‘the language of language (if the genitive 
refers to the relationship not of a means but of a medium’ (LSLM 65): a critical medium which 
extends between signifier and signified. 
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Idea.  
 Much scholarly attention has been given to how the turn to Early German 
Romanticism in Benjamin’s work is directed towards a philosophical reformulation of the 
concept of historical judgement and the view of historical experience it entails. However, 
without underestimating the importance of Early German Romanticism – in particular the 
work of Friedrich Schlegel – for Benjamin’s efforts, the discussion that follows focuses 
on how his criticism of Romanticism positions their thought as conceptually inadequate,   
and draws upon Goethe’s work to supplement and critically develop Romanticism in a 
way that provide a more valuable, dialectical overcoming of Kant’s reduction of language 
and history to the instrumentality of human speech and  action.  
 When, in ‘The Life of Students’, the critical act of cognition is charged with the 
task of ‘liberating the future from its deformed existence in the womb of the present’, the 
deformity of its object points to that ‘distorted and fragmented torso of the one erotic 
spirit’ which is to be transformed into a ‘single community of creative persons’ through 
love (LS 44-6). Here the torso is contrasted to a collective and completed spiritual whole, 
and the juxtaposition of both fragment and torso plays upon the paradoxical status of the 
particular as both incomplete but nevertheless completed. Benjamin later distinguishes 
the torso from the fragment by associating the former with the contingency of the work in 
its relation to the consummate archetype, a relationship expounded through Goethe’s 
aesthetics (CC 181). At the same time, Benjamin accuses Goethe of identifying the 
archetype with a genetically original, perfect and complete prototype, a confusion which, 
he argues, renounces thought by effectively denying the possibility of any positive 
moment in the judgement of particulars (which are always incomplete and imperfect in 
relation to the pre-existing ideal) and therefore leaving the problem of absolute form 
unresolved (CC 181). The Ideal, as the invisible archetype of nature, has no share in 
individual works, which therefore ‘never vitally coalesce’ into the higher, infinite and 
singular unity of the Romantic Idea. As a result, the ‘supreme conceptual unity’ of the 
Ideal decomposes into ‘a limited, harmonic discontinuum’ or ‘plurality of pure contents’, 
in relation to which – and in contrast to Romanticism – ‘the single work remains, as it 
were, a torso’, understood as something essentially imperfect and incomplete and yet 
nonetheless incapable of further completion and therefore effectively completed despite 
its contingency (CC 189 & 179).  
 Whilst it ostensibly proceeds from this Goethean concept of the present 
phenomenon as an imperfect and incomplete torso, criticism as liberation appears in ‘The 
Life of Students’ as the possibility for unhindered, organic growth, comparable to the 
‘profoundly organic individual development’ attributed to the true erotic creativity of the 
spiritual community (LS 39). This ideal of organic growth is reinforced by the reference 
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to the transformative potential of love, a principle taken from the later German 
Romanticism, for whom – Benjamin comments elsewhere – ‘observation was a sun 
beneath whose rays the object of love opens up to further growth’.7 This capacity for re-
formation suggests the autonomy and unity of living form, a notion which will be 
returned to in the discussion of the  Romantic “symbol” and which Benjamin claims has 
its roots in the Early German Romantic concept of reflection. It is in this sense that 
Benjamin defines the ‘essence of Romanticism’ –  explored in relation to the question of 
absolute form in art – as a ‘messianism’, exemplified in Friedrich Schlegel’s claim that 
the ‘inception of modern history’ is found in the ‘revolutionary desire to realize the 
kingdom of God on earth’.8 In ‘The Concept of Criticism’ and the ‘Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue’, Benjamin therefore opposes the historicism of art history by developing an 
alternative model of experience drawn in part from the philosophical aesthetics of Early 
German Romanticism and its messianic focus upon the work as a fragment.9  
 But whilst Benjamin cites the comment that Schlegel’s “new religion” denies ‘an 
ideal of human fulfilment that would be realized in infinity’ and demands it instead ‘at 
this very moment...at every point of existence, realized ideal on every level of life’, 
nonetheless the positivity of Romantic judgement as the medium of messianic 
intensification problematizes the virtuality associated with this conception of history.10 
For the Romantics seek to overcome the contingency of the singular in the virtual 
medium of progressive determination towards the Idea. As a consequence, the validity of 
all intermediary generic or epochal structures are dissolved in the positivity of 
intensification. The limitations of this view are discussed in the context of the Romantic 
relationship between the particular work of art and the universal essence of art, which is 
contained in the thesis of a progressive, universal poetry. Utilising Schlegel’s conception 
of the essential “idea” of art, Benjamin approvingly notes that in an ‘effort to secure the 
concept of the idea of art from those who would see it as an abstraction from empirical 
artworks,’ Schlegel seeks to identify this concept with the Platonic Idea as a ground. But 
Schlegel ‘committed the old error of confounding “abstract” and “universal” when he 
believed he had to make that ground into an individual’ (CC 167). Calling this the 
                                                       
7 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Philosophy of History of the Late Romantics and the Historical 
School’, SW1 p.284. 
8 Friedrich Schlegel, Athenaeum Fragments, #222, quoted in CC p.185, n.3. 
9 Benjamin’s “Romanticism” has been considered in some depth by a number of recent thinkers. 
Cf., for example, the essays in Andrew Benjamin and Beatrice Hanssen (eds.), Walter 
Benjamin and Romanticism, Michael Löwy’s reading of Benjamin in Fire Alarm, (London & 
New York, Verso, 2006), and Marcus Paul Bullock, Romanticism and Marxism: the 
philosophical development of literary theory and literary history in Walter Benjamin and 
Friedrich Schlegel, (New York, Peter Lang, 1987). 
10 Charlotte Pingoud, Grundlinien der äthetischen Doktrin Fr. Schlegels, (Stuttgart, 1914), 
pp.52ff., quoted in CC p.185, n.3. 
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‘mystical thesis that art itself is one work,’ Benjamin notes how Schlegel ‘strains his 
concepts and grasps at a paradox’ when this progressive formalism leads him to 
effectively deny any intermediary structure between the particular fragment and the 
individual, unified Idea (CC 166). 
 Whilst Benjamin protects the correlating Romantic notion of progressive, universal 
poetry from any ‘modernizing misunderstanding’, he does so only by re-invoking 
Schlegel’s fundamental error mentioned above (CC 168). Since ‘Schlegel strove for the 
determinacy, the individuality of the idea,’ the endlessness of this progression should not 
be interpreted as indicating ‘a mere function of the indeterminate infinite of the task’ 
within the ‘empty infinite of time’. The task is a determinate one, Benjamin reminds us: 
‘the ever more exact and thorough regulating and ordering of that medium [of forms]...the 
continually more comprehensive unfolding and enhancement of poetic forms’ [emphasis 
added]. With this, Benjamin joins together his criticism of Romanticism with the first 
section of his essay, concerned with Fichtean reflection. For Schlegel’s mystical thesis of 
individuality ‘stands in exact correlation with the principle which asserts the 
indestructibility of works that are purified in irony’ (CC 167). That is, the principle of the 
indestructibility of works – their progressively higher, reflective unfolding and 
determining of lawfulness in the continuous medium of forms – is equally mystical. For 
this reason, the notion of natural growth Benjamin introduces in relation to the liberation 
of the torso in ‘The Life of Students’ must be radically transformed from any conflation 
with the merely organic unfolding and indestructibility life of the parts and organs in 
relation to the individual whole. 
 This leaves the Romantic Absolute, with its emphasis on self-knowledge through 
reflection, as the parody of Socratic dialectics: a medium of progressive ascent through 
the pure forms of knowledge towards the ultimate Idea. Although Romantic criticism ‘in 
its central intention is not judgement but...the completion, consummation, and 
systematization of the work’, this completion coincides with its ‘resolution in the 
absolute’ (CC 159). Such a vision of consummation means that Romanticism eschews 
any judgement of the work according to prior models, instead performing an immanent 
criticism which takes as the only standard of the work ‘the reflection...imprinted in its 
form’ (CC 159). Romantic “judgement” therefore eliminates any moment of negativity, 
since the only criterion against which the work may be negatively judged concerns its 
original status as a work or not. This posits the genuine work as a fragment in relation to 
the absolute whole, necessarily incomplete but involved in an infinite and continual 
process of completion. Criticism becomes a ‘the medium in which the restriction of the 
individual work refers methodically to the infinitude of art and finally is transformed into 
that infinitude [Unendlichkeit]’ (CC 152). Novalis compares this to certain “mythical” 
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translations of works which, Benjamin explains, represent ‘a medial, continuous 
transposition of the work from one language into another’ (CC 154; emphasis added). 
Lacking any dialectical moment of completion or fulfilment, “Romanticizing” – as the 
immersion of the ‘central – that is, universal – moment of the work’ in the medium of art 
– becomes, in Novalis’ words, an ‘Absolutizing, universalizing, classification of the 
individual moment...’.11  
 The complete positivity in the ‘intensification of the consciousness of the work 
through criticism’ excludes from theoretical consideration what Benjamin calls the 
necessary, negative ‘moment of self-annihilation’ (CC 152). For Friedrich Schlegel, the 
work of art ‘must be a mobile transitory moment in the living transcendental form’ and 
the act of criticism directed at the overcoming of that contingency (CC 182). Benjamin 
calls this ‘contingent character of individual works’ their ‘status as a torso’ in relation to 
the infinitude of the absolute, and remarks that Schlegel’s concept of the Absolute as a 
medium of the lawfulness of forms is directed against this very torso character (CC 182). 
Because the Romantics could not acknowledge any conception of prototypes as 
‘autonomous works complete in themselves, definitively fashioned entities exempted 
from eternal progression’, they set about completely dissolving ‘the ancient works, as 
well as the ancient genres, into one another’ (CC 182-3). As a consequence, they also 
dissolved the temporality of art into the space of a flattened-out unity and continuity of 
the medium, which results in the ‘the absolute identity of the ancient and modern – in 
past, present, or future’ (CC 167). Benjamin’s concern to rescue the contingency of the 
particular leads him to integrate the concept of the torso associated with a Goethean 
theory of art into the transformed Early German Romantic concept of criticism. 
 A similar philosophy of art is apparent in Benedetto Croce’s ‘devotion to the 
particular’ as it is considered in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’. Whereas in Burdach’s 
positivism the essential is reduced to the particular, Croce’s ‘concern that departure from 
[the particular] might mean the complete loss of the essential’ results in the jettisoning of 
all aesthetic classification in order to preserve the integrity of the essence, turning it into a 
single and universal absolute. Since the originality and particularity of each artwork 
resists further classification according to merely abstracted common features, the result is 
that ‘the genre or class is, in this case, a single one: art itself...’.12 Croce’s “romantic” 
concern with the individual work ends up with a total immersion in the chaotic flux of 
particulars, which are doomed to remain merely unconceptualised ‘objects of vague 
wonder’ without the possibility of transformation and therefore without history (OGT 45). 
                                                       
11 Novalis, Schriften, (Berlin, 1901), Volume 2, pp.499 & 304, quoted in CC pp.152-3. 
12 Bernadetto Croce, The Essence of the Aesthetic, trans. Douglas Ainslie, (London, 1951), p.53; 
quoted in OGT p.43. 
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This incompleteness of the historical object as a fragment in relation to the singular Idea 
removes any reference to the actuality of history from process of completion. ‘From the 
point of view of the philosophy of art’, Benjamin says,  ‘...the historical process is merely 
virtual’ (OGT 38; emphasis added). In contrast to the absolute negativity of historicism, 
the positivity of Romantic criticism culminates in a virtuality divorced from actual history 
and the messianic structure of Early German Romanticism dissolves into a 
transcendentalism which makes only tenuous and momentary contact with the empirical. 
 
3.3 The Principle of Refraction: Chromatic-Linguistic Models of Experience 
In ‘The Concept of Criticism’, Benjamin seeks to rescue the messianic structure of 
Romanticism by supplementing the positivity of Romantic criticism with a negative, 
destructive moment drawn from a number of sources, including a radicalized version of 
their own concept of irony, Friderich Hölderlin’s principle of artistic sobriety, and 
Goethe’s contrasting thesis of the essentially uncritizable status of the particular work. 
What is gestured towards in each of these is a principle of destructibility, the negative 
movement of annihilation which proceeds not from lawful necessity but the contingency 
of the particular. In this essay, the critique of Romanticism attempts to develop the 
dialectical relation between completion and incompletion not by drawing on Goethe 
directly but, for example, on Friedrich Schlegel’s early work, where his Romantic 
understanding of criticism nonetheless ‘still stood close to Goethe’s conception’ (CC 
181). Schlegel gives Goethe’s theory of art a ‘pregnant formulation’, Benjamin suggests, 
‘in referring to Greek art as that “whose particular history would be the natural history of 
art in general”’ (CC 181). Here, then, it is the Romantic appropriation of Goethe which 
proves a more useful tendency for Benjamin, who quotes Schlegel’s insight concerning 
the ‘perfect intuition’ of the one ‘who dedicates himself to the lawfulness of that primal 
image’ and who gives content to an empty law by imitating ‘a highest aesthetic 
archetype’.13  
 The shift in Benjamin’s evaluation of Goethe considered in the previous chapter 
can be detected in the context of the historical object in accordance with the increasing 
importance attributed to Goethe’s dialectical view of historical judgement and the extent 
to which Benjamin is therefore able to draw on Goethean thought directly. Part of this 
change lies in his recognition, by the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, that the structural 
opposition established between Croce’s “philosophy” and Burdach’s “history” of art 
reflects a similar antithesis to that between natural philosophy and natural history in 
                                                       
13  Friedrich Schlegel, Jungendschriften, Vol 1, pp.123ff; quoted in CC 182. 
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Goethe’s own morphological writings.14 Benjamin’s attempt to construct an appropriately 
transdisciplinary approach to the artistic object – across the historicist actuality of art 
history and the messianic virtuality of Romantic aesthetics – indicates how his efforts 
should be understood as the foundation of a “comparative criticism” of historical objects 
in line with Goethe’s own morphological  “comparative anatomy” of natural ones. Here, 
then, it is Goethe’s Ideal which provides the model for a more direct overcoming of these 
antithetical tendencies, whilst the Romantic concept of reflection is dismissed for 
upholding a conception of truth associated with a progressive infinitude (OGT 38).  
 The principle of dialectical refraction central to Benjamin’s understanding of 
Goethe’s thought does not emerge for the first time in the essay on Romanticism, 
however, but can be detected operating even in Benjamin’s earliest writings. The concept 
of the torso which is given a decisive articulation in ‘The Concept of Criticism’, and 
which will be regarded as establishing the allegorical backdrop which runs through the 
Origin of German Tragic Drama, derives from the development of this principle of 
refraction within Benjamin’s models of chromatic and linguistic models of experience. 
Even prior to these works, however, the gradual foregrounding of this principle 
anticipates the growing centrality of Goethe’s thought for Benjamin’s philosophy. If the 
essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities fortifies the recognition of the uniquely modern 
                                                       
14 The recognition of a disciplinary dispute between the “philosophy” and the “history” of art is 
attributed by Benjamin to Heinrich Wöllflin, his own tutor at the Ludwig Maximillian 
University in Munich, and to Alois Riegl, around whose influential ideas Otto Pächt and Hans 
Sedlmayr had, in a series of articles published within their journal Kunstwissenschaftliche 
Forschungen, established the New Vienna School of art history. In a later review of Hans 
Sedlymar’s programmatic article, ‘Towards a Rigorous Study of Art’ (1931), Benjamin notes 
how it delimits two ways of approaching the work of art. The “historical” approach ‘could 
compare and classify these products on the basis of their properties, it could infer genetic 
connections (connections to a common ancestor or original source) from similar properties, and 
it could observe the transformations in works of art from one historical time to another’ (Hans 
Sedlymar, ‘Towards a Rigorous Study of Art’, The Vienna School Reader: Politics and Art 
Historical Method in the 1930s, ed. Christopher S. Wood, (New York, Zone Books, 2000), 
p.135). Sedlymar’s description of a one-sided art history treats the work as a generalised 
historical object, and traces the historical lineage of its generalizable features. In contrast, the 
“aesthetic” approach studies ‘internal organisation and structure; it can accurately classify 
works according to their natural groups and establish genetic connections among works on the 
basis of their properties; it can arrive at an understanding of the historical events whose 
products it is studying and of the force at work behind those events’ (ibid., p.139). Here, the 
critic prioritises the object as a work of art with specific aesthetic features, and is able to 
engage in classification according to those qualities. It is able to “date” the work in a 
“topological” rather than “chronological” sense, Sedlymar says, by ‘determining its position 
(earlier or later) in a genetic series, and it can locate and attribute – again, not by assigning 
empirical historical individuals (as creators) to particular things but by establishing natural 
groups and “aesthetic personages” in Benedetto Croce’s sense’ (ibid., p.13). Benjamin attempts 
to establish and overcome this opposition in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ and, shortly after 
the publication of the Origin of German Tragic Drama, writes that the precondition for any 
‘effective physiognomic definition’ of the uniqueness of the particular work is the 
decomposition of ‘the rigid partitions between the disciplines that typified the concept of the 
sciences in the nineteenth century’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘Curriculum Vitae (III)’, SW2 p.78). 
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insights achieved within Goethe’s mature work, the preparation for Benjamin’s re-
evaluation of the allegorical itself may be said to derive from the developing metaphysics 
of colour and language in his early thought. To the extent that these can be shown to 
possess an implicitly Goethean emphasis upon a productively refractive synthesis, the 
fundamental Goetheanism of Benjamin’s philosophy therefore becomes apparent. 
 In Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, Howard Caygill convincingly 
demonstrates the extent to which Benjamin’s early writings are concerned not only with 
the more familiar themes of time and language but also with a metaphysics of colour. 
This perception of ‘colour content’ is associated in Benjamin’s early work with ‘the 
interrelated totality of the world of the imagination’ and later with an obliquely immanent 
totality. The fascination that colour holds for children in the shifting nuances of the soap 
bubble or the intensities of artistic images involves a pure vision of ‘something spiritual’, 
detached from all reflection or intellectual concern with formal lawfulness.15 Caygill 
explores such a notion in relation to the ‘chromatic infinity’ intimated by Benjamin in the 
“phantasy” colours of Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece at Colmar.16 Grünewald 
‘painted the halo of the angel on his altar in the colours of the rainbow,’ Benjamin writes, 
‘so that the soul as phantasy can stream through its holy shapes’.17 His use of colour is 
comparable to that of the child’s spiritual experience, such that the infinity Kant restricted 
to the faculty of reason intrudes into an intuition of pure content distinct from Kant’s 
spatio-temporal intuition.18  
 It is significant that in his description of Grünewald’s work from the following 
year, Benjamin adds that this spiritual effect associated with the chromatic infinity of 
colours is achieved through the dialectical interaction between light (or radiance) and 
darkness (or the nocturnal). Now, the saints’ halos are said to emerge with such grandeur 
from the ‘greenest black’ because the ‘radiant is true only where it is refracted in the 
nocturnal...’.19 This dialectical conception of refraction as necessary for the appearance of 
                                                       
15 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Child’s View of Colour’, SW1 pp.50-1. ‘With these words, notes 
Benjamin, Goethe’s supplement to the colour theory reveals what is the essence of children’s 
games, games of pure contemplation in fantasy: soap bubbles, the damp colours of magic 
lanterns, indian ink and decal’ (Esther Leslie, Hollywood Flatlands, op. cit., pp.268-9; cf. 
Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972-1989), 4, 2, 
p.614). Goethe speaks of how the ‘child looks at the soap bubble as a colourful toy, and the 
older child is fascinated by the brilliant colours which appear when he looks at a piece of cut 
glass’ (J. W. von Goethe, ‘Contribution to Optics’ (1791), Goethe’s Theory of Colour, ed. 
Maria Schindler, (Sussex, England, New Knowledge Books, 1964), ¶8). 
16 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Child’s View of Colour’, SW1 pp.50-1; Howard Caygill, Walter 
Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, op. cit., p.12. 
17 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Rainbow: Dialogue on Phantasy’, Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit., 7, 1, 
p.25, quoted in Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, op. cit., p.12. 
18 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, op. cit., pp.83-4. 
19 Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 p.52. 
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true radiance is closer to Goethe’s than Newton’s scientific theory of colour. 20 Newton’s 
attempt to regulate nature through experimentation imprisons the phenomenon of colour 
in the ‘gloomy-empirical-mechanical-dogmatic torture chamber’ of the dark room, and in 
doing so fails to capture its essential nature (MR #430). His experiment in optics refracted 
light through a small hole into a darkened room, producing the effect of a colour 
spectrum on the opposing wall which can be replicated using a refractive prism.21 
‘Newton felt himself obliged to conclude, from those phenomena of colour which occur 
under certain conditions of refraction,’ Goethe writes, ‘that colourless light must be the 
result of a meeting of many coloured lights; he believed to be able to prove it’.22  
 In contrast to Newton’s method, Goethe insists that ‘direct experience alone should 
lie at the foundation of all natural science’ and that ‘a theory has value only when it 
includes all experiences’.23 The patient and attentive observer should not ‘seek for 
something behind the phenomena’, however, because ‘everything in the realm of fact is 
already theory’, so that the ‘blue of the sky’ already reveals ‘the basic law of chromatics’ 
(MR #430). Spurred on by an artistic experience of colour that differed greatly from 
Newton’s description, what he found in his own further experimentation is that not only 
do the colours disappear when the aperture is widened, implying to him a necessary 
concentration of the light within its darkened border, but that a different spectrum of 
colours is produced when the border between light and darkness is inverted. If we invert 
Newton’s prism experiment, Goethe writes, and ‘look at the black band on the white 
paper...we see that darkness as well as light has been transformed into colour’, but if we 
                                                       
20 ‘For over ten years colour – understood as an aspect of fantasy – played on [Benjamin’s] 
mind’: ‘He intended to write a book on colour and children’s literature...In 1927 he planned to 
write a documentary work on “phantasy”, the outline of which he showed to a children’s book 
collector in Moscow. As part of these interests he compiled a bibliography on the theme of 
colour. The bibliography included a book by the editor of Goethe’s scientific archive, Rudolf 
Steiner, on Goethe’s colour theory, and Portal’s Couleurs symboliques...Benjamin read 
Kandinsky’s Concerning the Spiritual in Art around 1919...His notes on the article by Müller-
Freienfels prompted him to recall a poem from Goethe’s West-österlichen Divan on God [Then 
he made the pink of dawn, it poured pity on the pain, So inventing for the dark, Of hues and 
harmonies a game, And everything that fell apart, Now could fall in love again.]…And he 
notes of it that the unifying element, the dawn, transition between light and dark, is a harmonic 
resounding play of colours and is just like the colour of fantasy. He adds that the same power 
of reconciliation appears in the rainbow, the symbol of peace…The “colours of fantasy” had 
been a theme for a while, since the first traces of Goethe’s colour romanticism emerged in his 
early writings such as “Reflection in Art and Colour” (1914-15), where colour is presented as 
the highest concentration of seeing, or “The Rainbow” (1915-16)’ (Esther Leslie, Hollywood 
Flatlands, op. cit., pp.263-4) 
21 The resulting ‘round, white figure, transformed and elongated by the prism according to [the 
colour sequence Red, Yellow, Green, Blue, Violet] calls to mind Newton’s SPECTRUM 
SOLIS; and for a moment we believe we are witnessing the effects of a ray of light split up 
through a hole in the shutter...’ (J. W. von Goethe, ‘Contribution to Optics’, op. cit., ¶67) 
22 Ibid., ¶38. 
23 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Research Into the Elements of a Theory of Colours’, Goethe’s Theory of 
Colour, op. cit., ¶14. 
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draw the same hasty supposition as Newton that ‘we have also a ray of darkness which, 
like light, we have to split up into five or seven colours, we can easily see that we are on 
the way to great confusion’.24 In contrast to Newton’s theory that white light is a 
composite of colours, which appear in the splitting apart of this unity and can be 
recombined once again to reproduce the effect of white light, Goethe offers a dialectical 
theory of colour which arises as the product of an interactive tension between light and 
darkness: the ‘black as well as the white object appears entirely coloured through the 
coloured radiation of the border, and that we need not to look anywhere else for the 
cause of this phenomenon’.25  
 Goethe’s initial experimentation therefore lead him to believe that Newton’s theory 
had disregarded the important and productive role of the prism itself as a turbid medium, 
and that it is not simply refraction that is required to produce colour, but the dialectical 
interaction and overlapping of the polarities of light and darkness which refraction 
produces. The primal experience of the blue of the sky can be said to express the truth of 
chromatics because ‘the darkness of space creates this effect through the veiling’ light of 
the sun. It is the Earth’s atmosphere as ‘a vehicle for moisture’ which must be 
‘considered a turbid medium’ in this instance, which refracts light through the darkness to 
produce our experience of the blue-coloured sky.26 Goethe makes it clear that he 
considers this medium to be matter itself: ‘In chromatics I oppose light and darkness to 
one another’, he announces, adding that ‘these would never have any connection if matter 
did not intervene’, because ‘whether matter is opaque, transparent, or even alive, the 
quality of light and dark will manifest in it, and colour in all its nuances will be created 
forthwith’.27 Colour is not the splitting of the composite unity of white light, as Newton 
supposed, but a new entity which is produced in the refractive interaction of light and 
darkness in a material medium.28 Colour is therefore effected through a specific type of 
synthesis between the metaphysical polarities of light and darkness, as a kind of 
overlaying of the two which produces something else. 
 Whilst Benjamin’s own account of spiritual colour partially draws upon this 
                                                       
24 Ibid., ¶¶56 & 67. 
25 Ibid., ¶66. 
26 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Colours in the Sky’, CW12 p.151. Similarly, a ‘turbid glass held before a 
dark background and illuminated from the front will appear bluish. The less turbid the glass, 
the bluer it will look; the least turbid glass will seem violet’. This is also why mountains in the 
middle distance seem darker blue than those in the far distance. ‘Conversely, the same glass 
held before something bright will look yellow. The denser the glass, the redder it will seem, so 
that in the end even the sun will appear ruby red’. 
27 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Except from “Toward a Theory of Weather’, CW12 p.148. 
28 The pure or absolute colours are the blue and yellow which result from the primal interaction 
of light and darkness in the medium of matter. Pure blue and yellow produce green when they 
overlap, or can be deepened into orange and violet when passed through a more dense medium, 
which result in the compound colour of purple-magenta. 
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insight, it is in the realm of language – that other model of speculative experience which 
is paradigmatic for Benjamin – that this account of refraction takes on a renewed 
importance. For it is in accordance with such a principle of refractive synthesis that 
Benjamin’s discussion of translation becomes explicable. Caygill argues that the 
speculative ‘exploration of the relationship between identity and infinity (the immanent 
totality)’ in his metaphysics of colour is, in ‘On Language as Such’, transposed into the 
philosophy of language, and Goethe himself describes colour as part of the spiritual 
‘language of nature’, in which the divinity of nature is revealed.29 
 The concept of erotic creativity which Benjamin develops in his early work seems 
in part to be inspired by a concept of the “totality of will” drawn from Goethe’s 
characterisation of Hamann as encapsulating a holistic theory of expression.30 Truly 
creative linguistic expression would imitate the divine in its capacity to unify body and 
soul, the senses and thought, the individual and the collective. But Goethe’s consideration 
of Hamann’s ‘splendid maxim’ on the spiritual unity of expression, evoked in Benjamin’s 
appeal to a “totality of the will”, includes a critical proviso which is important for this 
consideration of spiritual experience. In ‘anything transmitted verbally, except for 
poetry,’ Goethe writes, ‘...words have to be detached or isolated in order to say or mean 
anything’.31 As a result, Goethe argues, ‘[w]hen a person speaks, for that moment he must 
be one-sided...There can be no informing, no teaching, without separation’. Hamann’s 
attempt to resist this division and to ‘speak with the same unity that characterised his 
feelings, imagination, and thought’, results in the ‘darkness and gloom’ which contributes 
to the obscurity of what Goethe characterises as his sibylline style’.32 Radiant expression 
only emerges from this darkness, therefore, because this separation is permitted and 
endorsed. The obscurity of Hamann’s prose reveals a necessary moment within 
expression, the truth of divine revelation as it is manifested within finite experience. The 
lineage of the figure of the torso which passes down through Hamann’s writings – he 
refers to nature as Horace’s ‘disjecti membra poetae [limbs of the dismembered poet]’ – 
therefore takes on a new cadence in Goethe’s later work.33  
 In ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, the ‘greatness’ of spiritual expression is restricted 
to the ‘true spirit’ of the Genius in prayer and distanced from the communication of the 
artistic genius [German: Genie].34 The former ‘creates the silence of a new language’, 
                                                       
29 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, op. cit., p.22; J. W. von Goethe, 
‘Theory of Colour’, CW12 p.159. 
30 J. W. von Goethe, ‘From My Life: Poetry and Truth’, CW4 pp.380-1; cf. Chapter 1, Section 
1.5, above. 
31 J. W. von Goethe, ‘From My Life: Poetry and Truth’, CW4 pp.380-1, trans. altered. 
32 Ibid. 
33 cf. J. G. Hamann’s epilogue to ‘Aesthetica in Nuce: A Rhapsody in Kabbalistic Prose’. 
34 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, SW1 p.7. 
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Benjamin insists, associating this in the essay on Socrates with both the Platonic dialogue 
and with the spiritual colours of Grünewald’s altarpiece.35 The refractive element of such 
creativity – an expression which emerges through the silence of prayer – takes on an 
erotic dimension in these early essays, being associated with the purity of spiritual 
production classified as conception without pregnancy (where “pregnancy” is associated 
with the instrumentality and possessiveness of Socratic knowledge).36 Just as the true 
genius is not the ‘expressive, elicit one who vibrates in the light’, but rather the radiance 
of the ‘the expressionless one who breaks out of the night’, so true procreativity is 
characterised as the existence of the feminine emerging out of the masculine.37 In ‘On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, this ‘unique union’ of ‘conception and 
spontaneity’ which is characteristic of spiritual creativity is identified with the linguistic 
act of naming, which Benjamin calls ‘the translation of the language of things into that of 
man’, of the nameless into the name (LSLM 6).  
 The subsequent shift in Benjamin’s theory from a Hamannian conception of 
original unity to what might be called a more Goethean linguistics of translation is 
evident in ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1924). Here, Benjamin now cites not Hamann but 
Goethe’s notes from the West-Easterly Divan, which, along with Rudolf Pannwitz’s The 
Crisis of European Culture, are declared to be ‘the best comment on the theory of 
translation’.38 ‘The Task of the Translator’ extends the notion, deployed in the earlier 
essay on language, that a linguistic realm extends between the poles of the original 
language and the language of the translator which is not one of ‘abstract areas of identity 
and similarity’ but ‘media of varying densities’. Linguistic refraction occurs as the 
element passes through these media – comparable to the refraction of light as it passes 
through different liquids or through heated air – and because of this translation becomes a 
‘continuum of transformations’. In optics, this results in the illusory appearances 
associated with mirages, and the inverted and frequently condensed or expanded images 
termed “fata morgana”. Such an effect is caused when light travels through a dramatic 
change in the atmospheric temperature, which effects the density of the atmosphere and 
therefore the angle of refraction of the light and subsequent image.39 Benjamin’s own 
                                                       
35 Ibid., p.7; Walter Benjamin, ‘Socrates’, SW1 pp.52-3. 
36 Ibid., p.53. 
37 Ibid. This formulation draws upon a tradition of genius as the existence of the “natural” within 
the “historical”. Benjamin’s formulation is utilised here to demonstrate the model of refraction 
operating in his early chromatic, linguistic and erotic models. The attempt to expound this 
according to sexual stereotypes which have been criticised by Christine Battersby in Gender 
and Genius remains problematic (cf. Christine Battersby, Gender and Genius: Towards a 
Feminist Aesthetics, (Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1989). 
38 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task of the Translator’ [hereafter TT], SW1 pp.261. 
39 “Fata Morgana” is the Italian translation of Morgan le Fay, the shape-shifting half-sister of 
King Arthur, and refers to the phenomena of “castles in the sky” produced by the upward 
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interest in such particular phenomenon extends back to his notes on visual semblance 
from 1919, where ‘the semblance in which nothing appears’ is classified as ‘the more 
potent one, the authentic one’, and exemplified by the ‘fata morgana or chimera’.40  
 In ‘The Task of the Translator’ the divine Word, which Benjamin calls the germ of 
the name, is that ‘nucleus of pure language’ which is ‘tied to linguistic elements and their 
changes’ and ‘seeks to represent, indeed produce, itself in the evolving of languages 
themselves’ by being symbolized (TT 261). Detached from the flux of the various ways 
of meaning in different languages, it ‘persists in linguistic creations only in its 
symbolizing capacity’, where ‘it is weighed with a heavy, alien meaning (TT 261). 
Benjamin defines as the task of the translator ‘to realise in his own language that pure 
language which is exiled among alien tongues’ by turning ‘the symbolizing into the 
symbolized itself, to regain pure language fully formed from the linguistic flux’ (TT 261). 
Here, the continuous transformation of language – the process of refraction itself – 
becomes the object of expression, and an image which is able to fix and isolate this 
movement is sought. In doing so, the pure language ‘imprisoned in a work’ is liberated in 
the translator’s ‘re-creation of that work’ (TT 261). Translation therefore seeks to redeem 
the pure language of the name, and each translations offers a “completion” which is 
angled towards the realm in which the meaning of pure language is ultimately fulfilled. 
The kinship between human languages ‘cannot be defined adequately by an identity of 
origin’ but only as a transcendental identity between the totalities of their meaning as a 
whole, which is ‘achievable not by any single language but only by the totality of their 
intentions supplementing one another’ (TT 257).  
 What the genuine translation achieves is to allow the language of the translator, in 
the words of Pannwitz cited by Benjamin, to be ‘powerfully affected by the foreign 
tongue’ (TT 262). The intention is not to turn Greek into German, but to permit 
something new to emerge by turning German into Greek. Benjamin illustrates this act in 
the essay on translation by drawing upon Goethe’s own theory, expounded in the ‘Notes 
on Translation’ for the West-Easterly Divan. This describes the highest kind of translation 
as that which makes ‘the translation identical to the original, not so that it replaces the 
                                                                                                                                                     
refraction of the light from a distant object over the horizon, which subsequently vanishes 
when approached. For example, Goethe uses the term in Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship to 
describe how Wilhelm’s sudden good fortune and hopes for the future ‘built such a fantastic 
castle in the air, that not even a fata morgana [daß Fata Morgagna] could have produced a 
stranger combination’ (J. W. von Goethe, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, CW9 p.121). 
40 Walter Benjamin, ‘On Semblance’, SW1 p.223. This figure reappears in ‘A Berlin Chronicle’ 
(1932) and the Arcades Project, where it is associated with the infinite appearance of absolute 
distance: ‘The courtyard was one of the places where the city opened itself to the child; others, 
admitting him or letting him go, were railway stations. On departure, their openings were a 
panorama, the frame of a fata morgana. No distance was more remote than the place where the 
rails converged in the mist’ (Walter Benjamin, ‘A Berlin Chronicle’, SW2 p.623; cf. also AP 
F3, 2). 
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other [anstatt des anderen], but rather occupies the place of the other [an der Stelle des 
anderen]’.41 The difference between replacing the other and occupying the same place as 
the other depends upon the substitution of a flat ontology for a medial one. To put one 
language in the same place or on top of another implies an optical depth, according to 
which both are visible at the same moment. 
 For Goethe, ‘the translator who follows his original closely more or less abandons 
the originality of his nation, and thus a tertium quid comes into being for which the 
masses slowly have to develop a taste’. He describes this ‘third thing’ which is produced 
between the two languages in the same terms as Benjamin as an ‘interlinearity’. Whilst 
Goethe’s own language emphasises the strange temporality of translation – an 
incongruence or unfashionableness which Benjamin will later characterise as “greatness” 
in his discussion of Goethe’s own works, considered later – it is the optical terminology 
of Benjamin’s own writing which brings out the chromatic model inherent to this theory 
of linguistic production. A ‘real translation is transparent’, Benjamin says, ‘it does not 
cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though 
reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all them more fully’ (TT 260). 
The optical imagery utilised here suggests that productivity of naming in the medium of 
language is, as Caygill suggests, at least partially modelled on a metaphysics of chromatic 
differentiation. Goethe’s description of the translation “occupying the place of the other” 
is interpreted by Benjamin in terms of a translucency which is neither mere transparency 
nor absolute opacity, but a productive intensification of languages, in which something 
new is created. Optical refraction therefore provides a model for a “synthesis” in which 
the existing polarities do not disappear with the emergence of the new, but which 
continue to exist in a productive, overlapping tension upon which the created thing 
always remains dependent. The “identity” of this third thing is an appearance which is 
instable, contingent and utterly dependent upon the antinomical relationship out of which 
it emerges. Benjamin does not devalue the semblance character of this appearance, 
however, but treats it with the upmost seriousness and importance.  
 Whereas the ‘continuum of transformations’ referred to in ‘On Language as Such’ 
evokes the Romantic concept of translation as a ‘a medial, continuous transposition of the 
work from one language into another’, Benjamin insists in ‘The Task of the Translator’ 
that whilst the genuine translation enacts a transformation of the nameless into the name, 
this act of completion through petrification subsequently means the translation itself 
‘proves to be untranslatable’ or uncriticizable (CC 154; TT 262). If the immanent 
“translatability” of a linguistic creation corresponds to the Romantic conception of 
                                                       
41 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Note and Queries for a Better Understanding’ (from West-Easterly Divan), 
trans. Jorg Waltje, Other Voices, 2, 2, (March, 2002). 
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criticizability as an essential incompleteness, it nonetheless finds its fulfilment in the 
redemption of translation, more generally as naming (TT 254 & 261). Because 
translations themselves remains untranslatable, however, the act of translation does not 
set into play the infinite intensification of Romantic reflection, but provides a multiplicity 
of partial completions each of which, at the point it touches the original, provides the 
tangent of its path to infinity (cf. TT 261). Refraction is not, therefore, the decomposition 
of an original, historical unity but a productive tension which liberates and produces the 
transcendental purity of language. Like colour it is the dialectical tension between the 
original language and the new language which permits the purity to appear as a result of 
the refractivity of the medium This appearance corresponds to that ‘limited, harmonic 
discontinuum of pure contents’ associated with the Goethean Ideal in ‘The Concept of 
Criticism’, a harmony expressed by colour or music. Here, then, the early account of 
refraction is developed into a Goethean theory of translation that enables the modification 
and transformation of the Romantic concept of criticism. 
 When Benjamin comes to reflect upon the imagination in his notes from 1920-1, he 
continues to insist that ‘every work of art is grounded in the imagination’, and that the 
‘pure conceiving’ which is the basis of each work is a mode of intuition ‘closest to the 
mind of children’.42 This is ‘most obvious’ in the ‘pure appearance’ of ‘the world of 
light’,  Benjamin comments. His insight into the necessarily refractive manifestation of 
spiritual radiance means he now gives a more complex account of the appearance of this 
pure content of colour. It is illustrated not only by the Paradisiacal colour previously 
associated with Grünewald’s saints – and here evoked by the paintings of Philipp Otto 
Runge – but also with the muted greys of Hans von Marées’ work, and most importantly 
with the allegorical image of ‘sun setting over the abandoned theatre of the world with its 
deciphered ruins’.43 Furthermore, the creativity of the imagination earlier associated with 
the child-like phantasy of colour is now said to have ‘nothing to do with forms 
[Gestaltung] or formations’ but “manifestations [Erscheingung]” as ‘de-formations 
[Entstaltung] of what has been formed’.44 The productivity of the imagination takes on 
the refractive, de-formative aspect previously associated with the “genius” of 
Grünewald’s use of colour. This free play of the imagination induces, on the one hand, a 
feeling of delight which follows from the Paradisiacal purity of its birth, and, because its 
productivity ‘creates no new nature’, it reveals on the other ‘the world caught up in the 
process of unending dissolution’, one that ‘never leads to death, but immortalizes the 
                                                       
42 Walter Benjamin, ‘Imagination’, SW1 p.281. 
43 Ibid., p.282, n.2; ibid.,p. 281. 
44 Ibid., p.280. 
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doom it brings about in an unending series of transitions’.45 Benjamin associates the 
melancholic production of such a perspective in the notes on imagination with what he 
calls a ‘genius for forgetting’, an idea which, it will be argued, takes on a theological 
dimension in relation to the messianic completion of history.46  
 If this account of the productive imagination corresponds to the necessary 
structural moment of annihilation omitted in the positivity of Romantic judgement, its 
roots lies in the refractive model of colour which dates back to 1916. Whilst Caygill 
emphasises the significance of this paradigm of ‘chromatic differentiation’ for the 
development of Benjamin’s speculative concept of experience, it is surprising that his 
account includes no reference to Goethe’s own seminal Theory of Colour.47 Although 
Benjamin’s investigations into colour do not reproduce Goethe’s theory directly, the 
importance they attach to refraction – as the veiling or overlapping of one polarity by 
another – for a speculative metaphysics of colour indicates a familiarity with and 
proximity to Goethe’s thought which comes to inform Benjamin’s presentation of 
Goethean aesthetics in ‘The Concept of Criticism’. Although Goethe’s early 
morphological science has much in common with Romanticism when it opposes any 
conception of nature as static and fixed, it is his later theory of colour that most clearly 
expresses the productive tension underlying his theory of nature and thus distinguishes it 
from that of the Romantics.48 It is, furthermore, a distinction that is predominant in the 
                                                       
45 Ibid., pp.281-2. 
46 Ibid., p.282. 
47 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, op. cit., p.xiv. 
48 The concept of form [Gestalt], for example, as something that is ‘made fast, is cut off, and is 
fixed in its character’ is associated with the mechanistic categories of the Kantian 
understanding by Goethe and rejected for omitting ‘the element of mutability’ which is, 
conversely, prevalent in formation [Bildung] as that which ‘has been brought forth and 
likewise what is in the process of being brought forth’ (J. W. von Goethe, ‘On Morphology’, 
Goethe’s Botanical Writings trans. Bertha Mueller, (Woodbridge, Connecticut, Ox Bow Press, 
1989), p.23). The introduction of the “leaf” as a protean organ in The Metamorphosis of Plants 
is ‘only an abstract idea or concept, or something which in actuality is held fast but for an 
instant’, and is meant to express an underlying schema or process of transformation 
(ibid.,pp.23-4). Goethe’s scientific writing represents the general shift from a static to a 
dynamic conception of nature which culminates in Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Lukács 
extends Marx’s argument that Germany’s political backwardness contributed to the theoretical 
progressiveness of Hegelian dialectic – ‘we Germans have lived our future history in thought, 
in philosophy’ – to the whole Age of Goethe as ‘one of the last progressive periods of 
bourgeois thinking’ (Karl Marx, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right’, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton, (London, Penguin Books, 
1992), p.249; Georg Lukács, ‘Preface’, Goethe and His Age, op. cit., p.13). Goethe’s thought is 
‘essentially evolutionary’ from the outset, Lukács argues, and it is ‘no accident that the laws of 
the contradictory movement of evolution, the main principles of the dialectical method became 
known in Germany precisely during the period from Lessing to Heine; that Goethe and Hegel 
raised this method to the highest level attainable within the limits of bourgeois thinking’ (ibid.; 
Georg Lukács, ‘Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe’, Goethe and His Age, op. cit., 
p.74). 
  Esther Leslie, however, emphasises the difference between Hegelian and Goethean 
dialectics, citing how Friedlieb Ferdinand Rung’s phytological writings are critical of Goethe’s 
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allegorical vision of nature presented as the legacy of baroque art which informs what 
Benjamin identifies as the modernity of the “masked penance” in Goethe’s mature output 
(GEA 328). 
 
3.4 Goethe’s “Masked Penance”: From Messianic Redemption to Allegorical 
Eschatology  
A consideration of Benjamin’s chromatic-linguistic model of experience demonstrates the 
importance of Goethe’s concept of refraction even in Benjamin’s very earliest writings, 
and shows the increasing prominence it takes on within his theory of translation. 
Benjamin’s more direct appropriation of a Goethean concept of historical judgement  
follows the recognition that the dialectical counterpart to the messianic fulfilment of 
history detected in Romanticism is an emphasis on an eschatological conception of 
petrified destruction or an elongated process of decomposition. This positive reappraisal 
of Goethe’s thought begins with the essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, where 
Benjamin detects a ‘masked penance’ over the mythologizing of nature in the novel, 
when the ‘beautiful...comes forth to the limit of what can be grasped’ and appears as the 
‘caesura, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic rupture’ in which ‘representation itself very 
soon appears’ as ‘the torso of a symbol’ (GEA 328 & 340-1). This tendency is said to 
have ‘unfolded even more powerfully in his later works’, which can be reads as that 
‘legacy of medieval and baroque drama’ that offer a ‘more concrete, more authoritative, 
and more permanent vision’ for the modern overcoming of classicism and its view of 
history than that which exhausts itself in romanticism.49  
 This theological legacy of the baroque world view understands nature as essentially 
incomplete on the basis of its expressiveness. This reflects the graphical character of the 
“book of nature”, suggested by Hamann’s own semiotics of revelation, according to which 
every ‘phenomenon of nature was a word, - the sign, symbol, and pledge of a new, secret, 
inexpressible but all the more fervent union, fellowship and communion of divine 
                                                                                                                                                     
theory of metamorphosis for its ‘insufficiently dialectical conception’ (Esther Leslie, Synthetic 
Worlds: Nature, Art and the Chemical Industry, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Reaktion Books, 
2005), p.49). ‘Goethe does not mention a backward-stepping, declining force. Or if he does 
recognize it, it is judged irregular, a part of sickness. For Goethe, while the plant is growing 
regularly and healthily all is progress, for, from the first seed-leaves to the final ripening of the 
fruit, progressive metamorphosis is at work, pushing the plant forwards. For Runge, in 
contrast, the forces at work are contradictory. There is a dialectic of progression and 
regression’. Similarly, whilst ‘Goethe too had recognized polarity in his analysis of colour, a 
quality that he insisted emerged from the conflictual interaction of light and darkness…his 
polarity led always towards a progressive enhancement or intensification’ (ibid., pp.69-70). 
This criticism of the undialectical progressivism of Goethe’s science will be considered in the 
Epilogue to this discussion. 
49 GEA p.340; OGT p.176; Walter Benjamin, ‘What is Epic Theatre [Second Version]’, 
Understanding Brecht, ed. Anna Bostock, (London, Verso, 2003), pp.17-18. 
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energies and ideas’.50 What is “meant” by language, Benjamin argues, is the spiritual 
being of things ‘insofar as it is capable of being communicated’ in language, and 
therefore ultimately this implies language itself: ‘The language of this lamp, for example, 
communicates not the lamp (for the mental being of the lamp, insofar as it is 
communicable, is by no means the lamp itself) but the language-lamp, the lamp in 
communication, the lamp in expression’ (LSLM 63). In accordance with this idea, nature 
is completed only when ‘...things receive their names from man’, a historical process of 
naming which Benjamin understands in accordance with a theory of translation 
considered previously (LSLM 65).  
 When it introduces the idea that ‘everything contained in heaven, the air, in water 
and on the earth has been produced for the sake of man’, this baroque teleology is  
therefore fundamentally different from the instrumentality of Kant’s concern with natural 
purposes, being ‘devoted neither to the earthly nor the moral happiness of creatures’ but 
indicating instead that ‘nature serves the purpose of expressing its meaning, it is the 
emblematic representation of its sense, and as an allegorical representation it remains 
irremediably different from its historical realization’ (OGT 170). This theological 
teleology of  fulfilment is absent from Kant’s system, for as a consequence of diverting 
the problem of natural purpose into reflective judgement, Kant’s discussion of life 
becomes infected with anthropocentric tropes of intentionality and instrumentality. What 
is so problematic about the appearance of organisation in nature, for example, is that for 
Kant it indicates a ‘necessity...of such a character [that it seems] as if it had intentionally 
been so arranged for our use, while yet it also seems to belong to the original nature of 
things, without any concern as to [how] we might use it’ (CJ Ak. 363). Nature is therefore 
reduced to a bare instrumentality in relation to human use, devoid of any capacity for 
expression. 
 In ‘The Concept of Criticism’ dissertation Benjamin rejects the modern conception 
of an ‘empty infinity’ of progress, defending Romanticism against this charge by 
attributing its medial and qualitative temporal infinity to the presence of a weak 
messianism (CC 168). For Benjamin, the distinction between essential being and 
phenomenal becoming refers to an intensively immanent virtual history. It is this 
virtuality which remains the touchstone of Benjamin’s overcoming of the progressive, 
linear purposiveness of Kantian (and neo-Kantian) universal history and secures the 
radical polemic of his engagement with Goethean science. The relationship between the 
paradisiacal dawn and the melancholic dusk in Benjamin’s discussion of colour (the 
                                                       
50 J. G. Hamann, ‘The Last Will and Testament of the Knight of the Rose-Cross; Concerning the 
Divine and Human Origin of Language’, Writings on Philosophy and Language, op. cit., 
pp.108-9. 
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liminal transitions in which night and day, darkness and light, overlap in such a way that 
the most spiritual and radiant colours appear) becomes articulated according to a 
dialectical semiotics of the semblance of fulfilment. Like the messianic anticipation of 
fulfilment, this gestures towards historical completion but here the sense of anticipation is 
registered  as mournful act of eschatological yearning. This is formulated in the Origin of 
German Tragic Drama according to a concept of the allegorical gaze expounded in 
relation to the baroque mourning-play [Trauerspiel]. Benjamin interprets the tendency 
towards the allegorical in Goethe’s mature thought as the overcoming of both his neo-
classicism and the quasi-romanticism of his youth, which culminates in that original 
moment of modernity exemplified in the second part of Faust. The importance attached 
to the eschatological movement of the allegorical permits Benjamin to conceptually 
develop the problematic messianic virtuality of Romanticism by inserting into it a more 
direct notion of historical fulfilment in Goethe’s work. 
 The semiotic relationship between symbolic and allegorical expression is given its 
clearest treatment in the Origin of German Tragic Drama. There Benjamin argues that 
the contemporary notion of the symbol handed down from late Romantic aesthetics is a 
comforting but undialectical one, which specifies the uniqueness of the symbolic as 
concerning the ‘“manifestation” of an “idea”...[as] a relationship between appearance and 
essence’ (OGT 160). This essential ‘circle of the “symbolic”’ is circumscribed by ‘the 
radius of the culture – of the thus perfected beautiful individual...within a progression of 
events which is, it is true, infinite but is nevertheless redemptive, even sacred’ (OGT 
160). In contrast to this mistaken concept of the symbol, the allegorical is devalued as the 
merely conventional association between a concept and its image. It is because of such a 
misunderstanding of their semiotic relationship that Goethe explicitly distances his 
concept of the primal phenomenon, as the phenomenal appearance of truth, from any 
notion of the allegorical. ‘There is a great difference,’ he writes in the context of art, 
‘whether a poet is looking for the particular that goes with the general, or sees the general 
in the particular. The former gives rise to allegory where the particular only counts as an 
example, an illustration of the general; but the latter in fact constitutes the true nature of 
poetry’ (OGT 161; MR #279). His description of the “primal leaf” as a special kind of 
generic name anticipates the discussion of the magnet as an Urphänomen in Maxims and 
Reflections, according to which ‘mere naming already serves as an explanation’ and 
‘becomes a symbol for all the rest for which we need not seek a name or words’ (MR 
#434). The Urphänomen is understood as a natural archetype in which the totality of the 
whole is condensed into the contingent particular, and tender empiricism is regarded as 
grasping the implicit potentialities of the living thing according to its ‘inner necessity and 
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truth’, discovering a law which ‘will be applicable to all other living organisms’.51 
Benjamin’s appropriation of the Urphänomen in his later writings depends upon a 
reconsideration of this identity of the original phenomenon and the symbolic, a re-
contextualisation which proceeds via the allegorical insight achieved within Goethe’s 
mature work. 
 As Benjamin himself makes clear in the footnote appended to the description of the 
infinity of the aesthetic symbol, this emphasis upon the symbolic results from a false 
contrast with the allegorical. Such a tradition has its roots (even if it does not appear in 
such a form) in the Early German Romantic understanding of the medium of reflection, 
and its moment of redemption corresponds to that ‘false, errant totality – the absolute 
totality’ which is condemned in the essay on Elective Affinities as the ‘Nazarene essence’ 
of its conclusion. This false synthesis clings to the anticipated resurrection of the lovers: 
‘And thus the lovers lie side by side. Peace hovers about their abode, smiling angelic 
figures (with whom too they have affinity) look down upon them from the vault above, 
and what a happy moment it will be when one day they awaken together’.52 Yet 
Benjamin’s essay on the Elective Affinities exposes a contrasting tendency in Goethe’s 
thought, which assumes an increasing importance in Benjamin’s understanding of his 
work. Goethe’s concept of the torso, introduced but not expanded upon in ‘The Concept 
of Criticism’, thus serves as the intellectual backdrop to The Origin of German 
Mourning-Plays, which is now elaborated according to a revitalized understanding of the 
allegorical.53 
 The genuine concept of the symbol is not an aesthetic but a theological one, 
because its concern with the paradoxical unity of the material and transcendental object 
refers not to the general but to the historically fulfilled. This unity can be understood as 
pertaining to the theological ikon, associated with a radicalised version of Kant’s 
                                                       
51 J. W. von Goethe, Italian Journey, trans. W. H. Auden & Elizabeth Mayer, (London, Penguin, 
1970), pp.310-11. 
52 J. W. von Goethe, Elective Affinities, op. cit., p.300. This reference to the Catholic affectations 
in the Romanticism of the Nazarene movement, assembled around Johann Friedrich Overbeck 
in the first quarter of the 19th century and inspired by the style and intention of mediaeval 
religious painting, charges Goethe with adopting an unconvincing Christian faith in the 
anticipated resurrection of the lovers at the end of the novel. Similarly, Benjamin criticises the 
Early German Romantics in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ for turning to religion in order to 
articulate the ‘weak messianism’ inherent in their position (CC p.168). 
53 The mourning-play [Trauerspiel] describes that ‘typical catastrophe’ which belongs ‘to the 
estate of man as creature’, hinted at in Goethe’s The Natural Daughter (1803), in which 
Goethe ‘resembled a seventeenth-century poet in his attitude to the subject’ (OGT p.89). 
Similarly, whereas ‘Schiller sought to base the drama on the spirit of history as understood by 
German idealism’, Goethe’s ‘inclination was for mediating compromises which were both 
important and quite justified by the subject matter’, and ‘in the concluding scenes of Faust, he 
consciously and coolly, and with a force surpassing even Calderón’s, did precisely the things 
towards which Schiller’ – in his later approximations towards the form of the mourning-play – 
‘might have felt himself unwilling pushed, half irresistibly drawn’ (OGT pp.122-3). 
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Aesthetic Idea in the previous chapter. According to Benjamin, the dialectical totality of 
the symbol is that of the mystical instant, ‘in which the symbol assumes the meaning into 
its hidden...interior’ and ‘destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is 
fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption’ (OGT 166). In relation to this redemption 
the phenomenon appears as a fragment. What distinguishes the allegorical is not its 
relationship to the transcendental but the temporality and materiality of this relation: ‘in 
allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica [dying face] of history as 
a petrified, primordial landscape’ (OGT 166). In the same way that translation turns the 
diachronic transformation of signifying language into the object signified, allegory 
transposes the historical fulfilment of redemptive destruction into the very setting of 
nature as it appears for art and history. The fulfilment of history is experienced instead 
according to a dialectical interplay of catastrophe and eternity. 
 The ‘now of recognizability [das Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit]’ which characterises the 
‘historical index’ of the dialectical image in the Arcades Project dictates they ‘attain to 
legibility only at a particular time’ (AP N3, 1). The mediated expressiveness of this 
“now” is anticipated in an early fragment from 1920-1, where the truth which ‘belongs in 
one sense or another to the perfected state of the world’ is also said to reside ‘in the “now 
of recognizability”’, described as a ‘medium’ or a ‘nexus between existing things and also 
with the perfected state of the world’.54 Benjamin is clear, however, that things can enter 
in such a nexus only in a disjointed and broken state as what he there calls ‘symbolic 
concepts’ or ‘primal phenomenon’. Nonetheless, the truth of the perfected state of the 
world identified with messianic fulfilment is manifested only as something ‘erratic, 
disconnected, utterly unknowable’.55 What he there calls the “logical time” of this  
medium of historical legibility is therefore articulated according to this refractive dialectic 
of incompletion and completion: the aporetic presence of fulfilment which is gestured 
towards in the shattered symbol. 
 The truth which emerges from such a dialectic takes on an existential-historical 
profundity for Benjamin. The Arcades Project distinguishes the “essence” of the 
dialectical image from any phenomenological notion according to a relation between the 
‘what-has-been’ and the ‘now of a particular recognizability’ which ‘bears to the highest 
degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded’ (AP 
N3, 1). This dialectical conjunction is one which registers the immanent possibility of its 
own disappearance, forgetting, death. Such a conception becomes emphatic, Benjamin 
argues, in Goethe’s later literary works, leading to an existential emphasis in his concept 
of experience that is recognised in Benjamin’s essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ 
                                                       
54 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theory of Knowledge’, SW1 p.277. 
55 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theory of Knowledge’, SW1 p.277. 
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(1940). Here Benjamin contrasts the “intuitionism” of Henri Bergson’s attempt to ‘grasp 
“true” experience’ in the durée with what he calls ‘Valéry’s better, Goethean 
understanding’ (OSMB 353 n.63). For Bergson, an obsession with time is overcome in the 
actualization of the durée in pure memory, as an intuition of the uninterrupted stream of 
becoming. Bergson’s immediate intuitive therefore isolates his concept of experience 
from history, excluding the tradition of development and collaboration from it.56 The 
emphasis placed upon the immediacy of intuition in Bergson’s concept of experience – 
which effectively aestheticizes the lived experience [Erlebnis] which proves so 
problematic in the first place – expresses the reification of human life for the ‘alienating, 
blinding experience of the age of large-scale industrialism’.57  
 It is not in the contemplative ease of Bergson’s durée that the true significance of 
modern experience becomes apparent, but in Paul Valéry’s recognition of the near-
impossible task confronting the poet of modernity. If, for Benjamin, Bergson’s durée 
represents a concept of experience which eliminates time and history, and suppresses the 
recognition that the task of integrating the moments of lived experience into the collective 
narrative of history is only possible in the totality which is constituted by death, it is to 
Valéry and significantly to Goethe that he turns to recover an antinomical experience 
saturated with a dialectical interplay of phenomenal incompletion and existential 
fulfilment.58 Discussing the phenomenological temporality of such experience, Benjamin 
                                                       
56 It is this feature of Bergsonian experience that is shared by Husserl’s phenomenological notion 
of essence. In Husserl’s mature work, where the fact of experience is taken as a model from 
which ‘ever new similar images’ can be ‘obtained as copies’ in the imagination, the ‘free 
arbitrariness’ introduced by the imagination provides the ‘point of departure for the production 
of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants’, “opening up” the presumptive ‘extension or 
horizon of actual and really possible particulars’ which is contingently given in experience 
(Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgement: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. 
James S. Churchill & Karl Ameriks, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp.340-1 & 
339-40). To the extent that Husserl’s eidetic variation seeks to overcome the contingent 
limitations of the object given to it, it nonetheless takes as its basis the immediacy and absolute 
immanence of the object for the transcendental consciousness and therefore shares this concept 
of experience with Bergson. In Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, based on manuscripts 
written in 1934-1937, Theodor Adorno argues that Bergson’s ‘intuitionism bears ready 
comparison to Husserl’s essential insight’, although Husserl’s attempt ‘“to come to grips” with 
“the things themselves” in “ordinary dator intuiton”, as phenomenologists like to say, remains, 
by its proper intention and in contrast to Bergson, in harmony with science...’ (Adorno, Against 
Epistemology: A Metacritique (Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies), 
trans. Willis Domingo, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp.45 & 48). Nevertheless, ‘the point 
at which the extremes of Husserl and Bergson meet’ is ‘the construction of essential insight 
(Wesenschau)’ (ibid., p.49). This “unfolding” of possibility excludes any reference to historical 
completion. 
57 OSMB 314. It is these specific historical conditions, Benjamin argues, which prevent the 
contents of our individual past [Erlebnis] combining in “commemoration” [Eingedenken] with 
material from a collective tradition to form an “experience” [Erfahrung]. The protective 
function of consciousness anticipates and intercepts the shocks of everyday life, isolating them 
as an Erlebnis and in doing so sterilizing and dissolving the integrity of their content. 
58 What Valéry discerns in the work of Charles Baudelaire is how the very impoverishment of 
genuine “occasions” for poetry in the hollowing out of the content of experience becomes the  
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remarks that ‘Bergson sees in reach before his eyes that which Valéry’s better Goethean 
insight does as the “here” in which the inadequate becomes an actuality [Bergson sieht 
das in Reichweite, was der besseren Goetheschen Einsicht von Valéry also das >hier<, in 
dem das Unzulängliche Ereignis wird, vor Augen steht]’.59  
                                                                                                                                                     
ostensible subject of The Flowers of Evil (1857-1868), and the toll that this struggle to recover 
poetic experience placed upon Baudelaire’s life and work (the same recognition is attributed to 
Goethe in ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’, who in ‘his old age…had penetrated profoundly 
enough into the essence of poetry to feel with horror the absence of every occasion for poetry 
in the world that surrounded him…’ (GEA 329)). The paradigmatic experience of the modern 
city-dweller appears in Baudelaire’s Flowers of Evil as a desire which takes this inadequacy as 
its foundation, the ‘gaze...of the object of love...as being spared, rather than denied, fulfilment’ 
(OSMB 324). The poet discovers what fascinates him in the crowd, but only according to the 
specific temporality of the shock of catastrophe and passing away: the ‘eternal farewell, which 
coincides in the poem with the moment of enchantment’ is a ‘love – not at first sight, but at last 
sight’ (ibid.). A similar moment appears in the conclusion to Goethe’s Faust I, when Goethe’s 
love Margaret comprehends her day of execution as Judgement Day, denying Faust and 
Mephistopheles’s satanic intervention and by doing so being redeemed in death by God: 
‘Lost!’ cries Mephistopheles; ‘Saved!’ responds the divine voice from the heavens. Stefan 
George misses the essence of this experience, Benjamin argues, because for him the crowd as 
that which brings forth but also carries away the beloved is absent, and it is the poet’s glances 
that have “moved away, moist with longing/ before they dared mingle with yours” (OSMB 
n.35, 348). 
59 OSMB n.63, 353, translation altered; Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit., 1, 2, 
p.639. Even in Goethe’s early account of scientific experience, the imaginative variation which 
produces a ‘higher standpoint’ has a specific temporal dimension. Experimentation aims to 
transform the phenomenon into a ‘pure phenomenon’ which ‘can never be isolated’ and 
‘appears in a continuous sequence of events’ (J. W. von Goethe, ‘Empirical Observation and 
Science’, CW12 p.25). The process through which this higher standpoint is achieved, however, 
is not via a detour into the subjective in order to grasp the essential unity of the phenomenon in 
a single moment, as Husserl’s original reduction proposed. It is rather an intensification 
through experimentation, which does not deny ‘the high and seemingly creative independent 
power found in the inner faculties through which the evidence is grasped, collected, ordered 
and developed’, but also insists upon a ‘cooperative method of working’ and the incorporation 
of collaborative and self-criticism as ‘part of his own experience’ (J. W. von Goethe, ‘The 
Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject’, CW12 p.11). The immediate 
phenomenon should never be taken in isolation, therefore, since it always bears some 
interconnected relation to a wider whole, and the ‘greatest accomplishments come from those 
who never tire in exploring and working out every possible aspect and modification of every 
bit of empirical evidence’ (ibid., p.15). When Goethe defines ‘the real task of the scientific 
researcher’ as ‘to follow every single experiment through its variations’, this does not merely 
imply the imaginative variation emphasised in Husserl’s later phenomenology, but repeated 
observation over time, in relation to wider experiences, and in critical collaboration with the 
experimentation of others (ibid., p.16). In contrast to the intuitive immediacy and absolute self-
givenness of Husserl’s eidetic experience, Goethe’s “exact sensorial imagination” plays a 
fundamental role because, Eva-Maria Simms argues, it is only ‘in the human imagination’ that 
‘the essential, protean form in time’ and ‘the fullness of time can be grasped and represented’ 
(Eva-Maria Simms, ‘Goethe, Husserl, and the Crisis of the European Sciences’, Janus-Head,  
8, 1, (2005), p.170). Goethe compares this objectivity of thinking in science to his “occasional 
poetry”, in which a ‘certain seed’ lies embedded in a particular impression or situation, which 
only comes to fruition many years later (J. W. von Goethe, ‘Significant Help Given by an 
Ingenious Turn of Phrase’, CW12 p.40). ‘I persist,’ he writes of his artistic production, ‘until I 
have discovered a pregnant point from which several things may be derived, or rather...yields 
several things, offering them up of its own accord’ (ibid.). Despite the identity of their 
scientific opponents and the similarities in their phenomenological projects, Husserl and 
Goethe therefore differ fundamentally in the theory of experience that lies at the heart of their 
understanding of scientific judgement. 
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 The reference to the final words of the Chorus Mysticus in Faust II exemplifies the 
Baroque melancholy of Goethe’s mature gaze.60 Faust’s incessant striving – premised on 
the impossibility of any moment blissful enough to satiate desire – is subverted into an 
experience saturated with decomposition and death in the conclusion of the play.61 It is 
only (and only just) in death that Faust’s immortal soul is redeemed and the Chorus 
Mysticus sing the final refrain which provides the inspiration for Benjamin’s discussion: 
“All that is ephemeral [Vergangliche]/ Is only a parable [Gleichnis];/ The inadequate 
[Unzulangliche]/ Here becomes an Actuality [Hier wird’s Ereignis]...”.62 The “here” in 
which the inadequate [Unzulangliche] becomes an actuality [Ereignis], according to 
Benjamin, is allegorically represented not in the fullness of the living present but only in 
the eternity of death (OSMB n.63, 353).63  
 Such a theme is also hinted at in the maxim from Wihelm Meister’s Wanderings 
where Goethe suggests that the ‘fundamental characteristic of the living unity’ is ‘to 
                                                       
60 This can be best understood through the dialectic tension between Idéal and Spleen in 
Baudelaire’s poetry, where a combination of ‘eternity and intimacy’ is achieved through its 
‘strange sectioning of time’. What Benjamin calls, after Joubert, the “days of completing time” 
are made to stand out against the infinite incompatibility of the present as a ‘time of hell, which 
is the province of those who are not allowed to complete anything they have started’ (AP J44, 5 
& J3, 4; OSMB 331-2). As a consequence, the city is infused with an ‘essential inhuman 
character’ and a mortuary atmosphere of catastrophe and ruination in Baudelaire’s Flowers of 
Evil, which Benjamin ties back to the allegorical gaze of the baroque. In Baudelaire’s poetry, 
the fate reserved for the solitary miner in Barbier’s poem (“And more than one who in his heart 
of hearts had dreams/ Of home, sweet home, and of his wife’s blue eyes,/ Finds, within the 
belly of the pit, an everlasting tomb [Trouve au ventre du gouffre un éternel tombeau”]’) takes 
on a historical dimension by becoming that of all city-dwellers: in this danse macabre of 
departing souls, the ‘commonplace end of big-city dwellers’ is the “common pit [le gouffre 
commun]” (OSMB n. 32, 348)). 
61 The irony of Faust’s final anticipation of the highest moment, to which he would dare to say 
‘Stay a while! You are so lovely!’, lies in the morbidity of its context: his grand plan for a 
kingdom reclaimed from the sea is unknowingly premised on the sacrifice of countless 
unnamed human lives, the murder of Philemon, Baucis and their guest, and the subsequent 
blinding and ultimate death of Faust by Care [Sorge]. 
62  J.W. Von Goethe, ‘Faust II’, CW2 lines 12104-12109. 
63 The value Fritz Heinemann (who claims to have coined the term “existentialism”, cf. Udo 
Tietz, ‘German Existence-Philosophy’, A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, 
ed. Hurbert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall, (London, Blackwell, 2006), p.162) attributes to 
Goethe’s ‘concrete phenomenology’ in preparing ‘the ground for the reformation of 
philosophical problems’ in the mid-1930s seems to lie in the shift towards an existential 
phenomenology, although this affinity has also been emphasised more recently by David 
Seamon and by Henri Bortoft. Seamon argues that ‘Goethe’s method is much closer’ to the 
existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘since his aim 
was to begin from and stay with experience’ (David Seamon, ‘Goethe, Nature, and 
Phenomenology: An Introduction’, Goethe's Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature, op. 
cit., p.9). Goethe’s approach reminds him of the Heideggerian definition of phenomenology in 
Being and Time: ‘to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it 
shows itself from itself’ (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson, (Oxford & Malden, MA., Blackwell, and Malden, 1962), p.58; quoted in David 
Seamon, ‘Goethe’s Way of Science as a Phenomenology of Nature’, Janus Head, 8, 1, 
(Summer, 2005), p.96); cf. also Henri Bortoft, ‘Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding a 
Means for Dwelling in Nature’, Janus Head, 8, 1, (Summer, 2005) & The Wholeness of 
Nature: Goethe’s Way of Science,(Edinburgh, Floris Books, 1996). 
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divide, to unite, to traverse the general, to endure in the particular; to transform and to 
specify oneself, and as the living world expresses itself in thousands of states, to emerge 
and to disappear, to crystallize and dissolve, to become rigid and to flow, to expand and 
to contract’.64 Clark S. Muenzer calls this property a paradoxical existence through self-
contradiction, which results in a concept of nature as a landscape ‘where endless 
processes of composition and decomposition transpire under countless conditions to 
constitute the sensate world as a vast region of liminality’.65 Under such circumstances 
organic forms appear as ‘arrested stages in a continuous transformation, “caught in the 
act” as it were, of becoming something else’, which also entails – as Muenzer points out – 
‘the traumatic possibility of its own destruction’.66 Such a view reaches its apotheosis in 
Goethe’s poem ‘Blessed Yearning’ from the West-Easterly Divan, in which the narrator 
takes as his subject ‘the living thing [das Lebend’ge]...that yearns for a flaming death 
[Das nach Flammentod sich sehnet], concluding that ‘as long as you lack/ This: Die and 
Become! [Dieses: Stirb und werde!]/ You will be but a dismal guest [trüber Gast]/ Upon 
the dark Earth’.67 
  
3.5 Benjamin’s Dialectical Image: Virtuality and Synthesis 
The “now of recognizability” is the ‘birth of authentic historical time, the time of truth’ 
which coincides with ‘the death of intentio’, the scholastic idea of intentionality 
recuperated in Husserlian phenomenology as mental directedness towards an object (AP 
N3, 1). Benjamin’s assertion underpins his discussion of the baroque, where the ‘heart of 
the allegorical way of seeing, of the baroque, secular explanation of history...’ is a view in 
which the ‘greater the significance, the greater the subjection to death, because death digs 
most deeply the jagged line of demarcation between physical nature and significance’ 
(OGT 166). Whereas “intentionality” describes significance as a relationship holding 
between the meaning expressed and the object towards which consciousness is directed, 
Benjamin describes a dialectical conception of history as one in which what he calls the  
‘after-history’ or tradition of reception of a particular phenomenon is integrated into its 
essence along with its ‘fore-history’ or the prototypes for its existence (EF 261). Calling 
                                                       
64 J. W. von Goethe, Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, CW10 p.308, trans. Clark S. 
Muenzer, ‘Fugitive Images and Visual Memory in Goethe’s Discourse on Colour’, The 
Enlightened Eye: Goethe and Visual Culture, eds. Evelyn K. Moore & Patricia Anne Simpson, 
(Amsterdam & New York, Rodopi, 2007), p.219, trans. altered. 
65 Ibid., pp.221-2. 
66 R. H. Brady, ‘The causal dimension of Goethe’s morphology’, Journal of Social and 
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this the Origin [Ursprung] of the existent thing in the book on baroque drama, Benjamin 
clarifies that such a concept is ‘not intended to describe the process by which the existent 
thing came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of 
becoming and disappearance’ (OGT 45).  
 In ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian’ Benjamin adds that ‘it is by virtue of 
their after-history that their fore-history is recognizable as involved in a continuous 
process of change’ (EF 261). As a consequence, the effect or significance attributed to a 
work ‘depends on an encounter not just with the work alone but with the history which 
has allowed the work to come down to our own age’ (EF 262). Importantly, it is the after-
history of the work which enables the very contingency of its fore-history to become 
recognizable. As a consequence of this dialectical view of history, the work of art 
“teaches” the historian that ‘artist’s intentions are left behind’ because ‘their function 
outlives their creator’ (EF 262), and the original phenomenon [Urpsrungsphänomen] 
becomes ‘apparent only to a dual insight’ which is recognized ‘as a process of restoration 
and reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something 
imperfect and incomplete’ (OGT 45). The overcoming of this causal intentionality and 
the beginning of a properly dialectical conception of the historical phenomenon is 
achieved by blasting ‘the epoch out of its reified “historical continuity”, and thereby the 
life out of the epoch, and the work out of the lifework’ (EF 262).  
 In a note on criticism from 1930, Benjamin writes that his account of ‘the theory of 
the survival of works’ is ‘closely linked both to the fact that works cannot be judged, and 
to the strategically judging stance of criticism’, adding that ‘the whole critique of 
materialist literary criticism turns on the argument that it lacks a “magical”, non-judging 
side – that it always (or almost always) gets to the bottom of the mystery’.68 Against this 
criticism, Benjamin attempts to develop the non-judging element of a materialist theory 
of criticism, retaining the mystery of the work’s truth content by refusing to reduce it to 
an expression of its historical genesis. To do so, Benjamin draws upon Goethe’s 
‘characteristically veiled’ comment that, ‘Nothing that has had a great effect can really be 
judged any longer’ (EF 262). He calls this ‘the beginning of any consideration of history 
worthy of being called dialectical’ (EF 262). The ‘ultimate wisdom’ of this comment is 
expanded upon in ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, where Benjamin uses it to describe 
the historical semblance of works (EF 262). That which judgement refers to ‘cannot be 
found in the work [itself]’, Benjamin argues, but gleans what earlier generations admired 
in it’ (OSMB 352, n.63). To be “moved” by this semblance, in the judgement of beauty 
for example, ‘means ad plures ire [to join the many], as the Romans called dying’ 
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(OSMB 352, n.63). The contingency of the work means this allusion is not simply a 
metaphor of the public or the masses for Benjamin, because the dialectical conception of 
the experience of the historical object includes with it a reflection upon the survival of the 
creation not only beyond that of its creator, but also beyond that of every particular 
reception of the work. At the same time, it is this reception that transforms and thereby 
destroys the very object being judged. This registers the impossibility of any judgement 
of the historical object in itself and the necessity for criticism to grasp the work’s 
contingency according to a dialectical image of its essence as a historical index. To the 
extent that Benjamin’s concept of criticism is based upon the impossibility of any 
experience of the work as complete within a historical actuality, it retains this Goethean 
emphasis upon the problematic judgement of the object and the necessity of its semblance 
character.  
 When Benjamin denigrates the contemporary reception of Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities, it is the circle of critics assembled around the poet Stefan Georg (in particular 
Friedrich Gundolf’s Goethe) that he charges with sharing the proton pseudos of ‘almost 
all modern philology’ in attempting to understand the work ‘...solely in terms of the 
author’s life’ and the ‘development of the work in the author by the cliché of an essential 
image and an empty or incomprehensible “lived experience”’.69 This results in a view of 
the work as something completed in the process of its genesis and a history of art which 
is based ‘not on precise insight into the work but on the study of the author and his 
relations’ (GEA 320-1). The work is assimilated into the life of its author, just as –  
according to the same continuity – the author is assimilated into the historical continuity 
of his age, which is presented according to an ‘eternal image of the past’ (EF 262). 
 The dialectical history which emerges from the allegorical makes apparent ‘man’s 
subjection to nature’ and ‘gives rise not only to the enigmatic question of the nature of 
human existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of the individual’ (OGT 
166). The allegorical vision which culminates in the eschatological yearning of Goethe’s 
mature writing reflects a theory of expression which liberates language from its reduction 
to human speech and regards it from the perspective of language as such, including the 
expressiveness of nature. This expansion entails a similar transformation of history, 
which is no longer restricted to the revealed history of human and organic life – yielding 
a universal history of causal progress – but comes to incorporate a virtual, inner history of 
                                                       
69 GEA 320. An earlier unpublished review of Gundolf’s Goethe from 1917, as well as a letter 
contemporaneous with the essay in which Benjamin calls the essay the ‘legally binding 
condemnation and execution of Friedrich Gundolf’, corroborates this attack; cf. Walter 
Benjamin, ‘Comments on Gundolf’s Goethe’, SW1 pp.97-99; Walter Benjamin, The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin: 1910-1940, eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. 
Adorno, (Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.196. 
89 
what might be termed life as such. This transcendental perspective upon life comes to 
include the inorganic realms of the artistic, the technological and the produced sphere of 
“second nature”.  
 Like the transitory ephemerality of organic nature, the life and afterlife of works 
reveal them to be things incomplete and imperfect according to their fore- and after-
history. Such a dialectical view of history results in the philosophical construction of a 
constellation which brings the past and present into a discordant conjunction, resulting ‘in 
the simultaneous preservation and sublation of the lifework in the work, of the epoch in 
the lifework, and of the course of history in the epoch’ (EF 262). Where historicism 
emphasises a continuity which progressively dissolves the work into life of the author and 
life of the author into the universal movement of history, the dialectical view of history 
which derives from Goethe’s non-judgement involves a disjunctive discontinuity which 
grasps, for example, the whole life of the creator in each particular work, and the whole 
of history in each particular epoch. 
 Against the philological conception of historical continuity, Benjamin’s own 
biography of Goethe – written for the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia but published in a 
shortened version in Die literarische Welt in 1928 – therefore insists that ‘Goethe could 
understand the past, history, only to the extent to which he could integrate it into his 
life’.70 In contrast to Gundolf’s neo-romantic reception of Goethe’s work, Benjamin 
characterises such a life as that of the cultural representative and eventually great critic of 
the ascent of the German bourgeoisie. Writing in his Moscow Diary about a meeting with 
a representative of the Encyclopaedia, Benjamin recalls how the orthodox materialist 
depiction sought by the editors recommended a ‘biographical portrait against a 
sociological background’.71 Contrary to this, Benjamin argues that ‘an artist’s existence 
and even his purely temporal oeuvre can offer no object whatsoever for materialist 
analysis’ if ‘abstract[ed] from its posterity’ and its ‘historical after-effects’. In tracing the 
after-history of reception and scholarship, Benjamin notes how Goethe declined to ‘enjoy 
anything like the success that his genius merited’ in his own time and that his later 
prestige only grew with the rise of German imperialism. This culminates in his 
appropriation according to the nationalistic ideology of bourgeois romanticism: forces 
which Benjamin had himself struggled against during his involvement in the ‘Free 
Student’ movement when he opposed the conservative and nationalistic duelling 
fraternities which traced their lineage back to this Romantic movement, and which would 
take on increasingly sinister forms with the unifying rhetoric of National Socialism in a 
Germany desecrated by the capitalist crisis of hyperinflation during the late 1920s.  
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 Hence, whilst Goethe ‘founded a great literature among’ the bourgeoisie, ‘he did so 
with face averted’ and his ‘whole work abounds in reservations about them’.72 Whilst 
Goethe was unable to express this reaction against other than ‘from within the framework 
of an idealized feudal state’, ‘the bourgeoisie has never been able to make more than a 
limited use of his genius, to say nothing of how far they have understood his intentions’.73  
His purpose in doing so, Benjamin writes, was precisely to give ‘the contents [Gehalte] 
that fulfilled him the form which has enabled them to resist their dissolution at the hands 
of the bourgeoisie – a resistance made possible because they remained without effect and 
not because they could be deformed or trivialized’.74 Such a perspective reiterates a 
position on the “greatness” or historical significance of writers presented to the Austrian 
playwright Bernhard Reich, and recalled in Benjamin’s Moscow Diary. Reflecting on the 
‘the specific structure of “greatness”’, Benjamin argues that whereas average authors are 
measured by their success, “great” writers are those whose effect is historical, but who, 
conversely, had no effect on history through their literary powers’.75 The paradoxically 
“historical” character of this effect is described in the essay on Fuchs, where the ‘effect 
that the work of art has on us today’ is said to depend ‘on an encounter not just with the 
work of art alone but with the history which has allowed the work to come down to our 
own age’ (EF 262). As a consequence, ‘[h]istorical “understanding” is to be grasped, in 
principle, as an afterlife of that which is understood; and what has been recognized in the 
analysis of the “afterlife of works,” in the analysis of “fame,” is therefore to be 
considered as the foundation of history in general’ (AP N2,3). 
 The view of history which emerges from such an understanding is not that of a 
human concern with life, ‘comparable to the hereditary relationships between successive 
generations’.76 Such an approach fails to recognise the essential relationship between the 
transformations of the “great” work, which are ‘timeless, yet not without historical 
dimensions’.77 This “history” is distinguished from the ‘extensively temporal’ causal 
forces of human history (‘the revealed world’) and identified with that possessed 
‘intensively’ by the aesthetic and natural worlds.78 Such intensive forces are said to be 
invisible to revealed human history, like stars that disappear in the bright daylight of 
‘revelation’, and ‘shine only into the [redeemed] night of nature’.79 The ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’ claims this ‘inward history’ has a content ‘not in the sense of a set of 
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occurrences which have befallen it’ but as ‘the past and subsequent history’ of its 
essential being, which Benjamin defines as the virtuality of its ‘natural history’ (OGT 47). 
 This radicalized concept of “natural history” is given a more specific example in 
‘The Task of the Translator’, where Benjamin is clear that because ‘the translation comes 
later than the original, and since the important works of world literature never find their 
chosen translators at the time of their origin’, the translation does not issue directly from 
the original but from its “afterlife” and represents ‘their stage of continued life’ (TT 254-
5). ‘The history of great works of art tells us about their descent from prior models, their 
realization in the age of the artist, and what in principle should be their eternal afterlife in 
succeeding generations’, argues Benjamin, the latter corresponding to a materialist 
account of their “fame”. The notion of the survival of great works leads Benjamin to 
insist that the concept of life cannot be ‘limited to organic corporeality’ but must be 
‘determined by the standpoint of history rather than that of nature’ (TT 255). ‘The 
concept of life is given its due only if everything that has a history of its own, and is not 
merely the setting for history, is credited with life’, such that this ‘idea of life and afterlife 
in works of art should be regarded with an entirely un-metaphorical objectivity’ (TT 254-
5). “Natural life” is therefore defined as the capacity of the life and the inner history of 
the work to ‘unfold clearly and unclouded by human life’ (OGT 47). The task of the 
philosopher is to grasp this life of the historical phenomenon. 
 In the first chapter, a consideration of Benjamin’s engagement with Kant and neo-
Kantianism sought to demonstrate that, motivated by a recognition of the limitations of  
Kant’s narrowly scientific concept of experience, and inspired by a Hamannian 
metacritique of pure reason, Benjamin placed the problem of aesthetics at the heart of his 
phenomenological and ontological transformation of Kant’s architectonic. His critique of 
Kantian epistemology attempted to move beyond Cohen’s specific Platonising of the 
Critique of Pure Reason by rejecting the reduction of a dialectics of judgement to the 
scientific hypothesising of Ideas. He refused to countenance a theory of Origin 
[Ursprung] that posits an apprehension of the rational Idea via a deduction from the facts 
of science, whose starting point in an empirically impoverished concept of experience 
could yield only a regulative Idea of a transcendent and infinitely futural task. ‘The 
principles of philosophical contemplation are recorded in the dialectic which is inherent 
in origin’, Benjamin says, but insists that ‘the category of origin is not...as Cohen holds, a 
purely logical one’ (OGT 46). Whilst for Cohen the dialectic of Ursprung is associated 
with the transition, exemplified in Plato’s Republic, from the scientific technai to the 
intellectual intuition of the Idea of the Good, Benjamin sought the possibility of a 
different kind of dialectic, one that has associated here with a refractive and theological 
version of the Aesthetic Idea. In the process, the concept of technai is shifted from the
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gnoseological understanding of scientific knowledge to that of science as a practical 
realm of technological, artistic, and critical production. 
 The original is ‘never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of the factual’, 
since its revelation must be capable of doing justice to the essence of truth as a secret: as 
that which is hidden out of necessity and would be destroyed by any attempt to expose it 
immediately in its nakedness (OGT 45). Here, then, Benjamin implicitly rejects Cohen’s 
specifically “scientific” Platonising of Kant by emphasising the necessarily mediated 
appearance of truth. What becomes apparent from the consideration of Benjamin’s theory 
of expression is the extent to which Benjamin articulates his radical reconceptualisation 
of Origin according a Goethean understanding of essence associated with a refractive 
aesthetic experience of truth. The importance attached to the Goethean “Ideal” as a 
literary Absolute in the afterword to the essay on Romanticism is developed in the 
Prologue in the context of Goethe’s scientific theory of the Ur-phänomen, and it is in 
relation to this that Benjamin develops his own concept of Ursprungs-phänomen in 
contrast to Cohen’s logical-scientific idealism. 
 When Benjamin explains the ‘form of the historical object’ which is sought in the 
Arcades Project as a ‘dialectical image’, he invokes Goethe’s concept of the object of a 
‘genuine synthesis’ to speak of the Urphänomen of history (AP N9a, 4). Such a synthesis 
is anticipated in the epigraph to ‘The Concept of Criticism’, which distinguishes between 
a mere aggregate and the ‘mysterious synthesis’ confirmed by the analyst (CC 116); a 
distinction which, as Andrew Benjamin points out, implicitly condemns the Romantic 
“synthesis” as ‘still only an aggregate’.80 The genuine synthesis is identified with 
Goethe’s Urphänomen, so that ‘just as the leaf unfolds from itself all the riches of the 
empirical world of plants’, the original-phenomenon of the Arcades would ‘rise to the 
whole series of the arcade’s concrete historical forms’ (AP N2a, 4). The precedents for 
this formulation are the concept of Origin first described in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ as 
that ‘determination of the form in which an idea will constantly confront the historical 
world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in the totality of its history’, and beyond this 
Schlegel’s Goethean claim that the particular history of Greek art is the natural history of 
art in general and therefore a primal history of art (OGT 45-6; CC 181). Criticism as 
tender empiricism is therefore charged with the dialectical task of synthetically grasping 
the whole within the archetypal particular: history in the epoch, the epoch in the life, the 
life in the work, and the work in the caesura. 
 For Benjamin, ‘Ideas – or, to use Goethe’s term, ideals’ become visible to the 
intellect when recognised in the conceptual act of grouping phenomena together and 
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dividing them apart into new configurations, within which ‘the unique and extreme stands 
alongside its counterpart’ (OGT 35). What distinguishes this from the usual role of 
concepts, making ‘the similar identical’ in the subsumption of particulars in judgement, is 
the outline of the Idea which emerges in the ‘synthesis between extremes’ (OGT 41). 
Naming does not seek to ‘make the similar identical’ but to ‘effect a synthesis between 
extremes’ which ‘reveals the configuration of the idea – the sum total of all possible 
meaningful juxtapositions of such opposites’ (OGT 41 & 47). ‘On the Program of the 
Coming Philosophy’ had at first sought such a dialectical relationship in its suggestion of 
a ‘certain non-synthesis of two concepts in another’ (PCP 106), which develops upon the 
thesis in an earlier fragment of an ‘a-identical’ infinity pertaining to a non-reversible 
relation of potential, metaphysical identity.81  
 As he later makes clear in the Arcades Project, this ‘synthesis of extremes’ is 
modelled on Goethe’s concept of truth and represents a dialectical relationship between 
identity and non-identity which is a very different relationship than that of Kantian 
“synthesis”. This comes to be expressed in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ through a 
concept of virtuality. An optical, medial model for such “synthesis” was earlier 
introduced in relation to Goethe’s theory of translation. Here, Benjamin interprets 
Goethe’s claim regarding the un-judgeability of great works to express a dialectical view 
of the actual object’s incompletion as medial and overlapping conjunction of the past and 
the present. What Benjamin calls the ‘strategically judging stance of the critic’ takes up 
this negative moment within judgement – the refusal to judge – and, in dialectically 
conjunction with the virtuality of the Romantic incompletion, regards the continuation of 
the work in popular and critical reception not as something which aims at the completion 
of the work by making it more complete in relation the Absolute Idea, but rather aims at 
the work’s survival as a continuation which further decomposes and annihilates the 
existent thing. The true act of criticism does not progressively complete the work, but 
permits a recognition of its incompletion by bringing it into a dialectical relationship with 
the contingency of the present, which completes it qua work. 
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 The methodological aim of the Arcades Project is the establishment of a non-
identical “synthesis” between the past and the present which is modelled on the refractive 
dialectics of Goethe’s concept of truth. As the above discussion of life as such sought to 
demonstrate, this conception of history is no longer reduced to the human history of 
revelation, but to that “inner history” of natural and technological afterlife. It is this 
context of “second nature” expressed in art and technology that Benjamin reclaims 
Goethe’s Urphänomen as the basis from which to develop his own original phenomenon, 
which is neither conflated with the actuality of history nor dissolved into an ideal 
virtuality of progressiveness. Its aporetic, refractive appearance of historical truth is 
encapsulated in Fritz Heinemann’s description of the pure experience of the Urphänomen 
as ‘the thing that appears, in so far as it cannot appear, because it is infinite, and thus 
exceeds what can be included in a single appearance’.82 As an archetypal phenomenon, 
each part must be grasped in such a way that its essence expresses the life and history of 
its broader whole: Goethe’s life within the Elective Affinities, the emergence of the  
bourgeois modernity within Goethe’s life, within the baroque mourning-play, or within 
the  decline of the Parisian Arcades, and the whole of history within this primal history of 
modernity. 
  
Coda: the Judgement of History 
The radiance of the natural and aesthetic phenomenon is said to emerge out of the 
darkness of a redeemed night which awaits ‘no day, and thus no Judgement Day’.83 This 
constellation becomes invisible in the bright daylight of the human judgement of the 
work and the divine judgement of historical revelation. They emerge only against the 
dark backdrop of eschatological nature. The concept of experience that underlies 
Benjamin’s theory of criticism is that in which the ‘“productive,” “lively,” “positive” 
part’ of any epoch ‘appear distinctly only insofar as this element is set off against the 
negative’ backdrop of the ‘abortive, retrograde, and obsolescent’ (AP Na1, 3). The 
negative moment of judgement is therefore necessary and essential to any positive 
critique, because it is only by establishing such an opposition that it can be recognized. 
‘Its is therefore of decisive importance that a new partition be applied to this initially 
excluded, negative component’, Benjamin continues, ‘so that, by a displacement of the 
angle of vision (but not of the criteria!), a positive element emerges anew in it too – 
something different from that previously signified’ (AP N1a, 3). This negative dialectic 
increases the angle of refraction in order to permit something new metaphysically to 
appear within the light of the present, so that eventually ‘the entire past is brought into the 
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present in a historical apocatastasis’ (AP N1a, 3).  
 The impossibility of judging great works takes on a theological dimension within 
Benjamin’s concept of history when it is associated with a virtual temporality that is 
differentiated from the illuminated march of human history, and for which there is 
therefore no actual Day of Judgement conceived as the end of history. In ‘The Meaning 
of Time in the Moral Universe’, Benjamin calls the heathen conception of the Last 
Judgement the date ‘when all postponements are ended and all retribution is allowed to 
free rein’ and which therefore ‘mocks all delay as vain procrastination’.84 This is echoed 
in the ‘Paralipomena’ to ‘On the Concept of History’ when he argues that ‘[t]he basic 
conception in myth is the world as punishment’, a view he associates with a mythical 
conception of Hell as an eternal recurrence. Benjamin discusses this in more detail in the 
essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, where he claims that according to such a view, it is 
only sacrifice which promises the possibility of reconciliation with God.85 In ‘Goethe’s 
Elective Affinities’, the mythic temporality implicit to sacrifice corresponds to the 
Nietzschean notion of the Eternal Return of the Same. Such repetition is ‘the sign of fate, 
whether it is self-identical in the life of many or repeats itself in the individual’, Benjamin 
argues (GEA 307). ‘The Meaning of Time in the Moral Universe’ characterised this as 
belonging to the ‘heathen’ idea of retribution, which is ‘indifferent to time’ and ‘is able 
extend its sway to succeeding, increasingly distant generations’.86 In the next chapter, this 
mythic temporality will be associated with the religious structure of capitalism. 
 To understand the genuine character of this medium of time that we refer to as 
progress, it is important to grasp the theological implications which arise from the 
equivalence Benjamin suggests between the Last Judgement and the Day of Atonement 
(Yom Kippur). Benjamin opposes the implications of this heathen vision by bringing the 
Last Judgement closer to the Judaic understanding of judgement as atonement. For 
Benjamin, the ‘immeasurable significance of the Last Judgement’ is not the idea of 
judgement and retribution, but its suspension of judgement through the idea of 
forgiveness. The Last Judgement becomes the ‘constantly postponed day which flees so 
determinately into the future after the commission of every misdeed’.87 Benjamin finds 
this contrasting notion of atonement expressed in the novella Goethe inserted into the 
heart of the Elective Affinities, in such a way that ‘the mystery of the catastrophe…the 
animating principle of the story, is conducted into its centre’ (GEA 331).  
Whereas the novel represents ‘the quiet before a storm; in the novella, however, 
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thunderstorm and peace prevail’ (GEA 343). The difference may be illustrated through 
Benjamin’s image of Ate pursuing the evildoer through history: a mythical 
personification of retribution akin to the Furies in Aeschylus’ Orestia. The mythic 
conception of the Last Judgement conceives time as the empty space through which this 
pursuit is conducted, with the cessation of time as the conclusive dead-end in which 
retribution finally catches up with the evil-doer and divine justice is served. The 
intensive, virtuality of messianic time is to be distinguished from the idea of human 
‘progress’, because it is the very suspension or deferral of progress which Benjamin 
associates with divine forgiveness. This does not delay or defer, but completes time. Time 
is, then, ‘not the lonely calm of fear but the tempestuous storm of forgiveness which 
precedes the onrush of the Last Judgement and against which [Ate] cannot advance’. It is 
not the empty daylight which we identify with human history, but the dense, darkness of 
a storm: a messianic time of things. 
 The temporal structure of the Elective Affinities corresponds to the quiet before 
the storm in which retribution steadily advances towards its victims, whereas that of the 
novella is the peace of forgiveness which emerges within the furious commotion of the 
storm. For Benjamin, this ‘storm of forgiveness’ is also the ‘purifying hurricane [which] 
speeds ahead of the thunder and lightning’, is ‘the voice in which the evildoer’s cry of 
terror is drowned’ and ‘the hand that obliterates the traces of his misdeeds’. In doing so, 
forgiveness extinguishes that which is about to face the retribution of ‘God’s fury’ and be 
‘consumed forever in the lightning bolts of divine wrath’. This conception of the Last 
Judgement therefore integrates both the positive and negative theological structures of 
forgiveness and retribution: judgement is not a retribution at the end of history but the 
interruption which extinguishes the crime and postpones the retribution. Benjamin calls 
this conception of time ‘the powerful ally’ of forgiveness.88 It is a time which endures 
‘beyond all remembering and forgetting’, helping to complete the process of 
forgiveness.89  
 In the theses ‘On the Concept of History’, the storm which blows from Paradise is 
the truly messianic time that we mistakenly think of as progress. What has been called the 
Angel’s ‘melancholy version of the Faustian Verweile doch’ codifies into the figures a 
series of subtle inversions of Faust’s Mephistophelian pact. The angel’s lament represents 
an ironic reversal of Faust’s original deal with the devil: ‘If I should ever say to any 
moment [Augenblicke]:/ “But stay! – you are so beautiful [Verweile doch! Du bist so 
schön]”/ then you may lay your fetters on me,/ then I will gladly decompose! [zugrunde 
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gehn]!’.90 Here, in contrast, the angel ‘would like to stay [verweilen]’, not because the 
moment is so beautiful but because he is transfixed by the unfolding catastrophe.91 
Conversely, what drives [treibt] the angel onwards is not a voluntary striving, for, as 
Irving Wolfharth comments, ‘he is torn away only by the force of destruction itself’.92 Yet 
this destruction is also time itself, the time that prevents the Angel from judging humanity 
and completing history. This recognition is reflected in Scholem’s poem, which inspired 
Benjamin’s reading of the Angelus and provides a preface for Theses IX. Unlike Faust, 
the Angel would like to stay, but he would ‘have little luck’ if he ‘remains in living time 
[lebendige Zeit]’.93 This living time is the transitory time of dissolution and destruction, 
which Marx speaks of as ‘transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by 
living time [lebenidge Zeit]’. 94 This experience of time saturated with the transitoriness 
of decay has been associated with Benjamin’s Goethean understanding in the preceding 
discussion. The Angel cannot remain, then, because time itself – as a power, or force, or 
drive – prevents any Faustian lingering in the moment.   
This language is reinforced in the Thesis X, which presents Benjamin’s theses as 
meditations designed to strengthen our resolve to turn away from political or worldly 
striving [der Welt und ihrem Treiben] and liberate us ‘political Worldlings [das politische 
Weltkind]’ to give up our spurious Enlightenment faith in the political programme of 
progressivism, historical determinism and economic reductionism in which we have 
become entrapped.95 The addressee of Benjamin’s theses is, then, this Worldling or 
Worldchild of history. The term first appears in Goethe’s autobiographical poem ‘Dinner 
at Coblenz’, where it describes the poet caught between the Spirit and the Fire of the 
religious and the Enlightenment prophets either side of him [mit Geist- und 
Feuerschritten,/ Prophete rechts, Prophete links/ das Weltkind in der Mitten].96 This 
subject makes a brief appearance to denounce the moral hypocrisy of the age in the 
Classical Walpurgnis Night of Faust I, before being surrounded by a crowd of first 
philosophical and then political allegorical figures.97 
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 Again, Benjamin plays upon Goethean imagery here and the Wordling is exhorted 
to relinquish its political faith in a ceaseless march into the future, to remain in the 
moment long enough to assume a little of the eschatological insight (if not the religious 
certainty) which informs the Angel’s catastrophic vision. Just as the “fashionable” 
constantly digresses from its obsession with the present to make new reconnections with 
the past, the historian is encouraged to make a similar leap, only this time ‘not in the 
[political] arena, where the ruling class gives the commands’, but in the ‘free heaven 
[freien Himmel] of history’.98 In accordance with the dialectical insight into the 
redemptive interior of the allegorical, the storm that prevents completion is also 
Paradisiacal time itself. Benjamin’s use of the term Himmel recalls that dramatized 
eternity which enfolds the narrative of Goethe’s Faust: the Prologue in Heaven and the 
heavenly ascension of Margaret which occurs offstage at the end of Faust I (‘Lost! 
Saved!’) and which serves as the deus ex machina of Faust II. 
 Historical materialism must therefore recover a dialectical concept of the present 
not as endless transition but a Stillstand, a momentary pause in which the past and present 
constellate. Benjamin calls this messianic conception of time one that regards the present 
not as a transition but as ‘the sign of a messianic arrest of happening’ which allows ‘a 
moment of humanity’.99 The theological idea of forgiveness therefore intersects with the 
messianic model of nature which awaits no Judgement Day, as an eternal passing away. 
To forgive is to pass beyond all judgement of good and evil: not to forget, but to place 
beyond all remembering and forgetting. Max Horkheimer’s comment that past injustice 
must be completed for the ‘slain are really slain’ makes it evident that to construct 
virtuality as some alternate history in which the dead have not died is to abandon not only 
the problematic continuity between past and present but even a philosophical relationship 
of discontinuity so important for Benjamin.100 Nonetheless, historical remembrance can, 
as Benjamin remarks, ‘make the complete (suffering) into something incomplete’ (AP 
N8,1). 
 In his discussion of Weltkind in the book Fire Alarm, Michael Löwy quickly 
excavates Benjamin’s ‘somewhat odd expression’ from its Goethean context and 
associates it with Benjamin’s French translation, ‘les enfants du siècle’, which he glosses 
as Benjamin’s own generation.101 But in identifying the subject of Benjamin’s theses with 
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a historically specific addressee, he fails to make the connection between this humanist 
(as opposed to merely political, in the sense that Marx speaks of in his early writings) 
Weltkind and his own reading of the “proletariat” as the subject of history in Benjamin’s 
later thought. What interests Benjamin in his evocation of Marx’s term, as the ‘last 
enslaved class’, Löwy writes, is ‘not the essential themes of Marx’s own work – but the 
life and death struggle between oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited, 
dominators and dominated’.102 Löwy describes this as ‘essentially a wager, in the 
Pascalian sense, on the possibility of a struggle for emancipation’.103 But the Goethean 
motifs of Benjamin’s writing suggest this should be understood not so much as a 
Pascalian wager but as a Faustian pact, one in which all the terms – Faust and 
Mephistopheles, striving and lingering, beauty and catastrophe – have been inverted. The 
implications of this reversal are explored in the following chapter in relation to 
Benjamin’s account of conjuration and the dialectical aspect of phantasmagorical 
semblance.  
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4. Expressive Materialism and Phantasmagorical Semblance: 
Benjamin’s Goethean Critique of Marxism 
 
Fate shows itself, therefore, in the view of life, as condemned, as having essentially first been 
condemned and then become guilty. Goethe summarizes both phases in the words “the poor man 
you let become guilty”...It corresponds to the natural condition of the living – that semblance, not 
yet wholly dispelled, from which humanity is so far removed that, under its rule, it was never 
wholly immersed in it but only invisible in its best part. 
      – Walter Benjamin, ‘Fate and Character’ 
 
4.1 Capitalism as Religion: the Critique of a Reflective Conception of Ideology 
It is the semblance of the progressive continuity of history that is problematic for 
philosophy but not semblance itself, which is necessary for the appearance of truth. The 
former was associated in the preceding chapter with an inadequate and undialectical 
concept of modernity emerging within scientific positivism. In an early essay on politics 
from 1921, however, Benjamin attributes this semblance to what he calls the religious 
structure of capitalism, identifying it with a myth of the continuity of historical progress. 
Capitalism is not simply an economic structure, Benjamin writes, but a ‘purely cultic 
religion’ which, because it has ‘no specific body of dogma, no theology’, can only 
produce guilt with no possibility of atonement or reconciliation with God.1 Because it 
‘serves essentially to allay the same anxieties, torments, and disturbances to which the so-
called religions offered answers’, it should be conceived as a religious system, but is also 
‘the first instance of a cult that creates guilt, not atonement’.2 The characteristic structure 
of myth, Benjamin claims in his essay on Elective Affinities, is that of isolation from 
one’s own bodily sensuality and the wider community, experienced as an impotence 
which appears as fate. Benjamin describes the novel as ‘giving a critical view’ of the 
European nobility’s ‘mode of life’, tracing the disintegration of the family within the 
aristocracy as ‘a feudal society...restored to its primordial state’ by the ‘magical forces of 
fate’.3 Transposed onto the socio-political realm, this holds that capitalism should be 
understood as mythic, within which apotheosis from guilt is achieved only through 
recurring acts of sacrifice.  
 The nature of this religious structure is examined in more detail through a 
comparison with psychoanalysis, which Benjamin accuses of possessing the same mythic 
structure. ‘By virtue of a profound analogy, which has still to be illuminated,’ Benjamin 
says, ‘what has been repressed, the idea of sin, is capital itself, which pays interest on the 
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hell of the unconscious’.4 This “profound analogy” is that of the underlying identity 
between the religious concept of sin and the economic concept of capital, revealed in the 
ambiguity of the German word Schuld, meaning both the guilt and the interest that 
accrues upon the original sin of capital. Werner Hamacher compares this accumulation of 
interest to the public debt that turns money into capital in Marx’s chapter on ‘So-Called 
Primitive [Ursprünglich] Accumulation’. ‘The mechanics of debt – of “advanced” or 
“credited” money – composes the processes by which value transforms itself into surplus 
value – which is what defines value as value to begin with’, Hamacher glosses, implying 
that money (‘pre-eminently in the form of capital’) is ‘a god’ – generating value out of 
capital’s faith in capital itself – and specifically ‘a god that makes guilty, but also a guilty 
god’ because it does so through the mechanics of guilt.5 The idea of sin (in Kirk Wetter’s 
translation, the ‘sinful imagination’) does not disappear but, according to Benjamin’s 
account, is repressed and in doing so becomes structurally analogous to capital itself, 
accumulating interest/debt/guilt in the mythical hell that is Freud’s unconscious. In 
Hamacher’s reading, Benjamin’s indictment of psychoanalysis indicates that God/capital 
is unconscious: ‘the first and most deeply repressed idea consisting in nothing but guilt 
and failure, in nothing but absence and nothing but nothingness – and would therefore 
offer no possible object for consciousness’.6  
 It might be added to this that Freud’s unconscious is always guilty; as Hamacher 
notes, Benjamin ‘recognised in the Freudian “unconscious”...one of the signatures of the 
era of the zenith of guilt’.7 Hamacher supports this by alluding to ‘the Freudian theorem 
of originary repression’, as well as the ‘myth of the murder of the primal father’ whose 
repression ‘leads to an unconscious sense of guilt that motivates subsequent cultural 
accomplishments’ becoming ‘consolidated as the indissoluble fundament of all social and 
religious relations’. This belief is therefore essential to the surplus by which money turns 
into capital. But this belief is itself an effect of the cyclical dependence originally 
generated by the idea of guilt/debt. What is repressive about the structure of capitalism is, 
ultimately, the idea of the repressed itself, which is used to justify the merely apparent 
“absence” of any precipitating cause. The ‘nexus of meaning’ which attaches itself to fate 
‘can never be founded causally’, Benjamin says, because these concepts ‘signify a 
relationship...that is never accessible except through signs, because it is situated above the 
immediately visible level’.8 Yet the supposedly original and inherited debt of sin inserts 
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the individual in a cycle of accumulation whose continuity stretches before and after each 
generation.  
 Benjamin’s description of the mythical structure of social relations under 
capitalism has a number of affinities with Marx’s own early writings on capitalism and 
religion, where he points out the continuing religious structure implicit in modern states 
on the basis of the isolation and alienation experienced within secular capitalist society. 
The secular emancipation from traditional religion only removes the appearance of a 
contradiction between religion and state, Marx suggests, whilst failing to resolve the real 
social contradictions. Hence, in the ‘Christian-Germanic state religion is an “economic 
matter” just as “economic matters” are religion...’.9 The structure of alienation found in 
religion is common to civil society, for as a consequence of the worker’s estrangement 
from the products and the character of his labour, and simultaneously from their own 
humanity and from a human community, the abstract concept of the universal citizen 
takes on the humanity absent from real social relations.10 
 It is against this mythic structure of capitalism as a “religion without theology” that 
Benjamin conceives of the necessity of a dialectical conception of history which opposes 
the false semblance of the continuity of guilt upon which capitalist modernity is 
predicated. In the preceding chapters, the development of a speculative concept of 
historical experience was examined through Benjamin’s critique of the narrowly 
scientific and Newtonian “experience” of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, his turn 
to Goethe’s tender empiricism to give a more complex account of the semblance of truth, 
and his transposition of this Goethean Urphänomen from the pagan domain of nature to 
the dialectical and messianic context of history. The theological motifs of his later 
writings should therefore be conceived in this respect as the construction of a counter-
image for modernity as a “theology without religion”.  
 Benjamin’s dialectical concept of history is based upon an understanding of the 
expressive teleology of nature, which finds fulfilment in human expression. Expanding 
the content of the historical beyond an anthropocentric concern with human life, historical 
revelation comes to be reconceived as the expressive mediation between nature and 
humanity, whose messianic intensity is now registered as an allegorical eschatology of 
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decomposition. As a consequence of this rethinking of historical significance, it is the 
technological realm of second nature – the made, the created, the produced – which 
comes to express as Urphänomen the true appearance of the pure content of nature. ‘To 
each truly new configuration of nature – and, at bottom, technology is just such a 
configuration – there corresponds new “images”’ whose ‘symbolic character’ is met with 
in our childhood (AP K1a, 3). The section entitled ‘To the Planetarium’ from One-Way 
Street explains this expressive conception of technology through analogy with the 
eroticism of the pedagogical gaze. The purpose of the father’s gaze is not that ‘mastery of 
children’ violently proclaimed by cane-wielders, Benjamin argues, but the ‘the 
indispensable ordering of the relationship between generations and therefore mastery (if 
we are to use this term) of that relationship and not of children’.11 By analogy, the 
purpose of technology is not the mastery of nature but the mastery of the relationship 
between nature and humanity, and therefore the ordering or organisation of that 
relationship.  
 In a discussion of technology in the second version of ‘The Work of Art in the Age 
of Its Mechanical Reproducibility’ from the mid-1930s (passages which are expunged 
from the last version of the essay), Benjamin articulates these differing conceptions of an 
expressive versus an instrumental and repressive concept of technology according to a 
contrast between “first” and “second” technology. When art and technology exists in 
fusion with ritual, the resulting ‘first technology” is orientated towards the maximum 
possible use of the human: an ideological vision which culminates in ‘the irreparable 
lapse or sacrificial death, which holds good for eternity’.12 Simultaneous with this 
exploitation of the human, first technology also seeks to ‘master nature’. Against this 
mythic conception of instrumentality, Benjamin distinguishes a ‘second technology’ 
which arises at ‘the point where by an unconscious ruse, human beings first began to 
distance themselves from nature’. In contrast to the concept of instrumentality involved in 
first technology, this second technology reduces the use of the human and the mastery of 
nature to a minimum, aiming instead at ‘an interplay between nature and humanity’.  
 A footnote to the second version of the ‘Work of Art’ essay suggests that a new 
collective body of humankind has ‘its organs in the new technology’.13 It is by virtue of 
this technological organisation, Benjamin argues in the ‘Outline of the Psychophysical 
Problem’, that ‘humanity is able partly to draw nature, the nonliving, plant, and animal, 
into this life of the body of mankind’.14 When One-Way Street proclaims that currently in 
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‘technology, a physis is being organised through which mankind’s contact with the 
cosmos takes a new and different form’ – characterised as an ‘immense wooing of the 
cosmos...on a planetary scale’ – a decision must therefore be faced concerning the erotic 
character that this mastery will take.15 Whilst the religious structure of capitalism seeks to 
formulate this relationship according to the brutality and instrumentality of first 
technology (the mastery of natural and social relations in primitive accumulation and 
subsequent exploitation), an alternative is postulated in the expressive and therefore 
theologically redemptive understanding of second technology. This conception of a 
second technology that reorganizes the relationship between humanity and nature – and 
therefore between human beings – takes on the character that Marx anticipates for 
industry in the early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: ‘Industry is the real 
historical relationship of nature, and hence of natural science, to man’, because where 
‘natural science has intervened and transformed human life all the more practically 
through industry’ it has ‘prepared the conditions for human emancipation, however much 
its immediate effect was to complete the process of dehumanization’.16 Here then, what 
Marx calls the merely ‘fantastic illusion’ of a ‘momentary union’ between a theoretically 
abstract philosophy and an instrumentally practical natural science is achieved for real, 
transforming them both in this erotico-technological fusion. Marx explains this 
unalienated organisation of technology as communism.  
 The structural opposition established in Benjamin’s thought is not so much 
between capitalism and communism, as between capitalism as a “religion without 
theology” (and therefore a belief which lacks any conception of human reconciliation) 
and an opposed conception of a “theology without religion” which is articulated as a 
communist organisation of technology. Capitalism and communism are not structurally 
equivalent concepts: the former produces a mythic conception of history, whereas it is an 
opposing messianic conception of history which introduces communism as the idea of a 
humanity reconciled with itself and with nature. Where the young Marx argues that ‘the 
criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism’, and claims that the ‘criticism of 
religion has been essentially completed’, Benjamin’s philosophy rejects this latter claim 
by adding that the critical emancipation from religion cannot be achieved through a 
rational demystification – which fails to root out the mythical kernel of capitalism – but 
must take on an essential theological form; that is, it must concern itself with 
redemption.17  
 It is the failure to grasp the different positions of capitalism and communism that 
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results in the undialectical version of socialism that Benjamin castigates in ‘Capitalism as 
Religion’. Benjamin accuses what he calls the “Marxist” version of the progression to 
socialism of sharing the same religious structure as capitalism, since the ‘capitalism that 
refuses to change course becomes socialism by means of the simple and compound 
interest that are functions of debt [Schuld]’.18 The crude “Marxism” Benjamin opposes 
here is implicated in the logic of sacrifice endemic to the mythic structure of capitalism 
which it intends to overcome. It is present, for example, in The Development of the 
Monist View of History (1895) which encapsulates the Marxist philosophy of Georgi 
Plekhanov, the founder of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. Because 
Plekhanov’s universalist mode of representation remains undialectical, Benjamin writes, 
it is always without an object and therefore idealistic and ‘nonmaterialist’.19 Similarly, 
Nikolai Bukharin’s Historical Materialism (1921) utilises an ‘unmethodological 
universality and immediacy that characterizes the totally idealistic, metaphysical 
questions’ raised in his work.20  
 ‘Marx lays bare the causal connection between economy and culture,’ Benjamin 
writes, and ‘[i]t seems, at first sight, that Marx wanted to establish here only a causal 
relation between superstructure and infrastructure’ (AP N1a, 6; K2, 5; emphases added). 
According to Marx’s German Ideology, the ideological apparatus of the superstructure – 
the cultural range of a society’s politics, morality, religion, metaphysics, and art – is the 
inverted reflection caused by its material relations of production, such that ‘men and their 
[economic] circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura’.21 These forms of 
consciousness, the ideological “phantoms” constructed, imagined, and conceived in the 
human brain, are, despite their semblance of independence, actually sublimates of 
material life-processes. Whilst the defining feature of capitalism is commodity 
production, central to the reproduction of the capitalist organisation of labour is the 
peculiar fetish character of commodities, according to which ‘the definite social relation 
between people themselves’ that is responsible for the creation of surplus value is 
inverted and appears as a relationship between things.22 The relation between human 
labour and its product is turned upside down, so that it is the commodity which appears 
capable of entering into relations with other commodities, and ‘evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it was beginning to dance of its own 
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free will’.23 Marx compares this inversion to the Enlightenment concept of religious 
fetishism, the ‘primitive, natural and irrational African practice of attributing material 
things with supernatural powers and therefore a special social value, or animism’.24  
 ‘But already the observation that ideologies of the superstructure reflect conditions 
falsely and invidiously goes beyond this [causal relation]’, Benjamin argues, because it 
implies that ‘such determination is not reducible to simple reflection’ (AP K2, 5). When 
Benjamin claims that the ‘economic conditions under which society exists are expressed 
in the superstructure’, just as an ‘overfull stomach finds not its reflection but its 
expression in the contents of dreams’, his correction of the camera obscura’s metaphor of 
reflection and his introduction of his own theory of expression serves as a condensation 
of his specific critique of this undialectical concept of ideology (AP K2, 5). It is Marx’s 
description of the ‘phantasmagorical form’ which the commodity assumes that Benjamin 
thinks harbours a more complex account of the ideological workings of capitalism, and he 
develops his own materialist account of expressive semblance by drawing on a concept of 
the phantasmagoria which is contrasted to the simply inversion of the camera obscura. It 
is the model underlying this concept of the phantasmagoria which will now be examined. 
 
4.2 The Interpretation of Collective Dreams 
Benjamin claims that his own research into ‘the expressive character of the earliest 
industrial products’ of capitalism ‘becomes important for Marxism’ because ‘it will 
demonstrate how the milieu in which Marx’s doctrine arose affected that doctrine through 
its expressive character (which is to say, not only through causal connections)’ and ‘it 
will also show in what respects Marxism, too, shares the expressive character of the 
material products contemporary with it’ (AP N1a,7). In its opposition to Marx’s causal 
metaphor of reflection, Benjamin’s own model of economic expression suggests a more 
complex relationship between the superstructure and its ideological component, and the 
forces and relations of production. This can be seen in ‘Eduard Fuchs’, for example, 
when Benjamin chastises materialist theory for failing to ‘entail even the semblance of an 
advance in the realm of dialectics’, arguing that the previous research undertaken by 
cultural materialism lacked the dialectical rigour of Marxian economics (EF 268). He 
demands a recognition, on the one hand, that not only do ‘the products of art and science 
owe their existence not merely to the effort of the great geniuses who created them, but 
also, in one degree or another, to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries’ – and 
therefore the economic division of labour – but also, on the other, the dialectical 
overcoming of the view that such creations are ‘independent, if not of the production 
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process in which they originate, then of a production process in which they continue to 
survive’ (EF 267, emphasis added). It is therefore ‘an illusion of vulgar Marxism’, 
Benjamin says in ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire’ from 1938, ‘that one 
can determine the social function of a material or intellectual product without reference to 
the circumstances and the bearers of tradition’.25  
 Whilst the German Ideology of 1845 establishes the basic principles of historical 
materialism by exposing the independence of forms of consciousness from their 
materialist conditions as a semblance, Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
offers a more complex account of the socio-political workings of ideology and the role of 
tradition, a development necessitated the events leading up to the 1851 coup d’état in 
France. Benjamin’s own overlapping interest with Paris as ‘capital of the nineteenth 
century’ in the Arcades Project eclectically charts this historical epoch through the rise 
and decline of the arcades. The material collected plots their emergence in the 
Restoration, follows their development under Louis-Philippe (punctuated by the 
revolutions of 1830 and that of 1848 with which the Eighteenth Brumaire begins), their 
apotheosis with the World Exhibition of 1867, and their decline with the emergence of 
electric street lighting and the events leading up to the Commune of 1871.26 It is a period, 
Benjamin argues, which coincides with the ‘most radiant unfolding’ of ‘the 
phantasmagoria of capitalist culture’.27 The Arcades Project therefore offers a 
supplementary cultural history to the political events depicted so traumatically in the 
Eighteenth Brumaire, radically elongating and expanding Marx’s historical perspective 
and sociological scope in order to better depict the functioning of capitalist ideology. 
 Benjamin’s suggestion in the Arcades Project that the ideological superstructure of 
capitalist culture has the phantasmagorical appearance of a collective dream may have 
been provoked by Marx’s own description of the period between 1848 and 1851, in 
which the French nation behaved ‘like the mad Englishman in Bedlam who thinks he is 
living in the time of the pharaohs and complains every day how hard it is to work in the 
Ethiopian gold mines...’.28 For just as the ‘Englishman, so long as his mind was working, 
could not rid himself of his obsession with gold mining’, so ‘the French, so long as they 
made revolutions could not rid themselves of the memory of Napoleon...’. Hence, whilst 
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the February revolution of 1848 heralded a violent and popular rejection of the existing 
order, at the decisive moment of transformation the ‘feeble found refuge in a belief in 
miracles, believing that the enemy has been vanquished when they have only conjured it 
away in a fantasy, sacrificing any understanding of the present to an ineffectual 
glorification of the future in store for them, and of deeds that they had in their hearts but 
did not want to bring to fruition just yet’.29 
 For Marx, then, the tradition of the past ‘weighs like a nightmare on the brain of 
the living’ and annuls not only the reality of class interest but all interest in reality, to 
such an extent that not only the ‘scum of bourgeois’ society but even significant sections 
of the working class end up indirectly promoting the values of ‘property, family, religion, 
order’.30 It is clear that Marx’s initial model of the camera obscura is redundant here, 
because what is signified in tradition is no longer merely the inverted appearance of the 
workings of the real, material relations and force of production. Benjamin, under the 
influence of Surrealism, initially identifies this concept of the dream with Freud’s work 
on psychoanalysis, and Freud’s account of pathological and dream symbolism certainly 
suggests an important initial model for what was to become the expressive character of 
cultural products. In his notes for the 1935 exposé of the Arcades Project, Benjamin 
presents one of the “dialectical stages” of his project as plotting the transformation of the 
arcades ‘from an unconscious experience to something consciously penetrated’; that is as 
a form of remembering that involves an awakening.31 Benjamin compares this theory of 
the dream as a ‘historical phenomenon’ to ‘Freud’s doctrine of the dream as a 
phenomenon of nature’.32  
 Transposing Freud’s psychoanalytical account of the conflicted psyche upon the 
collective social sphere provides one model for explaining the withdrawal of the reality 
principle and the subsequent replacement of the traumatic conflict with a dream or 
fantasy, as suggested by Marx’s work. According to Freud, the breakdown of the reality 
function is explained by the regression of libido from the real world to some earlier, 
unresolved fixation which has been repressed into the unconscious.33 This corresponds 
                                                       
29 Ibid., p.23. 
30 Ibid., pp.19 & 27. The editors of the latest English edition of Marx’s text refer to it more 
specifically as “politics”, that supposedly neglected area of the Marxist thought, which ensures 
‘not a triumphant march through history but a more complex process of advance and retreat in 
which economic classes are not always the principle agents’ (Mark Cowling & James Martin, 
‘Introduction’ to Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, op. cit., p.7). 
31 Walter Benjamin, ‘Addenda’, AP p.907. 
32 Walter Benjamin, ‘Addenda’, AP p.908. 
33 ‘The patient has withdrawn from the people in his environment and from the external world 
generally the libidinal cathexis which he has hitherto directed on to them’, Freud argues, and 
the ‘end of the world is the projection of this internal catastrophe; his subjective world has 
come to an end since his withdrawal of his love from it’ (Sigmund Freud, ‘Psycho-Analytical 
Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’ (1911), 
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structurally to the moment of conflicted crisis described in the Eighteenth Brumaire and 
the subsequent regression to a nationalist and proto-fascist fixation with Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Freud’s model remains problematic, however, because it must explain how 
the withdrawal of specific material interest (i.e. individual sexual desire or collective 
economic interest) leads to the collapse of the reality-function in general, which involves 
a loss of all interest in the reality (i.e. the replacement of reality with the madman’s 
phantasy of the Ethiopian gold mines or the French nation’s reenactment of 
republicanism). Freud’s solution is to hypothesise the ‘possibility that a very widespread 
disturbance in the distribution of libido may bring about a corresponding disturbance in 
the ego-cathexes’.34 In this way, the universality of the pleasure principle is maintained by 
explaining the breakdown in the reality function as being initiated by a sexual crisis 
which stimulates the regression of libido back to what Freud deduces is an original 
narcissistic stage of sexual development. This primary narcissism explains the original 
transformation of sexual libido into the social drives of the ego as the sublimation of 
homosexual (because tinged with narcissistic self-love) object-love. The subsequent 
regression of libido to this unresolved homosexual fixation and the advent of secondary 
narcissism precipitates the collapse of the ego’s reality function in psychoses.35  
 There are a number of psychological reasons to question Freud’s assumption of 
primary narcissism as an explanation for the problem schizophrenic psychosis, and 
therefore to question its deployment in sociological explanations.36 Benjamin’s own 
description of the collective dream-world of the nineteenth century, however, already 
makes it apparent that a different concept of the unconscious is operating in his 
discussion of ideology. The new images which appear in the collective consciousness of 
the ideological superstructure appear, Benjamin argues, as a ‘dream in which each epoch 
entertains images of its successor’.37 Because the collective seek to ‘overcome and to 
transfigure the immaturity of the social product and the inadequacies in the social 
organization of production’, these images are ‘deflected...back upon the primal past’, 
wedding the content of the dream with ‘elements of primal history [Urgeschischte]’ 
which are ‘stored in the unconscious of the collective’. 
                                                                                                                                                     
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. [hereafter SE], 
Volume 12, pp.69-70). 
34 Ibid., p.74. 
35 Cf. Sigmund Freud, ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’, SE14. Freud describes the regression of 
material interest from external objects back onto the ego within a general narrative of sexual 
development, and explains this by positing an original narcissistic stage of development, 
responsible for a transformation in the original aims of the sexual libido. 
36 Freud argues that the ‘strongest of reasons’ for adopting this hypothesis lies in its ability to 
account for ‘people whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, such as 
perverts and homosexuals’, since in ‘their later choice of love-objects they have taken as a 
model not their mother but their own selves [i.e., a narcissistic object-choice]’ (ibid., p.88). 
37 Walter Benjamin, ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century’, SW3 p.33. 
110 
 Thus, in Fourier’s phalanstery the advent of industrial machinery and iron 
construction is wedded to a vision of the co-operative organisation of habitation, in the 
panoramas and panoramic literature the anticipation of photographic technology brings 
the obscured and excluded landscape back into the urban city, and in the World 
Exhibition the global exchange-value of the commodity is embroiled with the utopian 
accessibility of its exhibition. Although these “wish-symbols” of the nineteenth century 
would be shattered in the development of capitalist production, they still linger on the 
threshold of the commodity-market in the mid-nineteenth century and therefore retain 
residues of their utopian elements.38 Only with the destabilization of the market economy 
in the great depression and hyperinflation of Benjamin’s own era is it possible to 
recognize them as ‘ruins before they have even crumbled’.  By bringing the past-future of 
fantasy and future-past of catastrophe into conjunction it is possible, therefore, to enact a 
dialectical synthesis which recognises the elements of the dream as a dream and triggers 
the revolutionary act of awakening.  
 In a letter to Theodor Adorno written shortly after the 1935 exposé of the Arcades 
Project, Benjamin contrasts this practice of dialectical representation with his earliest 
versions from the late 1920s, in which he was ‘philosophizing in a blindly archaic way, 
still ensnared in nature’.39 Nonetheless, Adorno criticises Benjamin for the problematic 
‘complex delineated by the keywords “primal history of the nineteenth century,” 
“dialectical image,” “configuration of myth and modernity”’, and suggests that 
Benjamin’s concept of the collective dream ‘cannot be distinguished from Jung’s 
concept’.40 The ‘disenchantment of the dialectical image’ in the concept of the dream 
leads ‘straight to unrefracted mythical thinking,’ Adorno argues, and ‘here Klages sounds 
the alarm as Jung did earlier’. If the Arcades ‘could only be wrung from the sphere of 
madness’, as Benjamin claimed, it has here ‘moved away from madness instead of 
subjugating it’, leaving the archaic image intact instead of rescuing it as a dialectical 
one.41 Adorno therefore encourages Benjamin to conduct an immanent critique of Jung, 
comparable to that performed upon Goethe in the 1920s, in order to rescue ‘the decisive 
distinction between archaic and dialectical images’ for a ‘materialist doctrine of ideas’.42 
This immanent critique would have proved invaluable for explaining the psychological 
model operating within Benjamin’s theologically grounded materialism, but whilst 
Benjamin agrees with Adorno concerning the need for a critique of Jung and concurs with 
                                                       
38 Ibid., p.43. 
39 Walter Benjamin, Letter to Adorno (dated May 31st, 1935), SW3 p.51. 
40 Theodor W. Adorno, Letter to Benjamin (dated August 2-4th, 1935), SW3 p.56. 
41 Ibid., p.59; cf. Walter Benjamin, Letter to Adorno (dated May 31st, 1935), SW3 p.51. 
42 Theodor W. Adorno, Letter to Benjamin (dated December 5th, 1934), The Complete 
Correspondence: 1928-1940, op. cit., pp.61-2. 
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the general criticism concerning his ‘inadequate mastery of the archaic’, such an 
engagement was never completed.43 
 One consequences of this missing work is that Benjamin’s complex relationship to 
an alternative tradition of the unconscious, which stretches from Goethe and 
Romanticism to Jungian psychology and onwards, tends to be occluded in favour of more 
overtly psychoanalytical readings of his work.44 In her discussion of the Surrealist 
influence upon Benjamin’s thought in Profane Illumination, for example, Margaret 
Cohen makes the claim that Benjamin’s project ‘to import psychoanalytical concepts into 
a discussion of base-superstructure relations’ represents a divergence from the Frankfurt 
                                                       
43 Walter Benjamin, Letter to Adorno (dated January 7th, 1935), The Correspondence of Walter 
Benjamin, 1910-1940, op. cit., p.471. Richard Wolin discusses the history of this missing 
critique in his introduction to the revised edition of Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetics of 
Redemption (cf. Richard Wolin, An Aesthetics of Redemption, 2nd Edition, (Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, CA., University of California Press, 1994), pp.xxxvii-viii). A consideration of this 
history reveals the extent ands limitations of Benjamin’s engagement with Jung’s writings and 
the political pressures which contributed to its incompletion. In May 1937 Benjamin writes to 
Adorno that Horkheimer had ‘certain reservations about the idea of writing my next pieces on 
Jung and Klages, and that the reasons for this are connected with internal debates within the 
New York circle itself’ (Letter to Adorno (dated May 1st, 1937), The Complete 
Correspondences 1928-1940, op. cit., pp.182-3). Writing in 1935, Benjamin concedes the 
necessity of undertaking further study of Jung’s work, by March 1937 he had completed a 
bibliography (Letter to Adorno (dated March 1st, 1937), ibid., p.169), and the summer of that 
year was set aside for such research (Letter to Scholem (dated July 2nd, 1937), The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p.540). But the depth or extent of this research 
remains unclear. Benjamin had difficulty getting hold of copies of Jung’s writing (Letter to 
Adorno (dated May 17th, 1937), The Complete Correspondences, op. cit., p.192), and it is 
likely that the majority of the published material he had access to dates back only to the start of 
the 1930s. In July 1937 Benjamin writes that he is studying essays from the beginning of the 
decade – and some dating back to the previous one (Letter to Scholem (dated July 2nd, 1937), 
The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p.540) – and he makes separate reference to 
the “Eranos-Jahrbücher”, in which Jung published much of his work and which only dates back 
to 1933 (Letter to Adorno (dated July 10th, 1937), The Complete Correspondences, op. cit., 
p.201).  
In the meantime, political exigencies and external publishing pressures lead to the 
postponement of the planned essay and, eventually, the abandonment of further research. 
Jung’s infamous presidency of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy in 1933, along 
with his editorship of the society’s journal Zentralblatt, placed him in disturbing proximity to 
the Nazi party, and for all the complexities of Jung’s “anti-semitism” the charge most probably 
sticks, as post-Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels demonstrates (cf. Andrew Samuels, ‘National 
Psychology, National Socialism, and Analytical Psychology: Reflections on Jung and anti-
Semitism (Parts I & II)’, Journal of Analytical Psychology, 37, 1, pp.3–28 & 37, 2, (1992), 
pp.127-148). Benjamin notes that Jung ‘recently leaped to the rescue of the Ayran soul with a 
therapy reserved for it alone’, and that ‘these auxiliary services to National Socialism have 
been in the works for some time’ (Letter to Scholem (dated July 2nd, 1937), The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p.540), that he had promised to expose the 
‘Fascist armature’ of Jungian psychology (Letter to Fritz Lieb (dated July 19th, 1937), ibid., 
p.542), and that it is ‘the devil’s work through and through, which should be attacked with 
white magic’ (Letter to Scholem (dated August 5th, 1937), ibid., p.544). Benjamin seemed to 
retain hopes of writing the criticism of Jung until the end of 1937. Under these circumstances, 
the last compositions which are constructed out of the materials of the Arcades Project are 
forced to reject any discussion of Jung entirely, in favour of Freud. 
44 This alternative tradition of the unconscious is recuperated in the work of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari; cf. Christian Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconscious, op. cit. 
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School that, rather than rejecting Marxist thought, orientates his position towards one 
now recognizable as Althusserian.45 However, whilst it is certainly clear that Benjamin 
along with the Frankfurt School in general did not seek to reject but to ‘correct precisely 
the vulgar ways in which much Marxism links superstructure and base’, it is also the case 
that the problematic presence of Jungian concepts in his drafts for the Arcades Project 
renders any attempt to understand Benjamin’s concept of ideological expression solely 
through ‘psychoanalytical vocabulary’ – not least that later employed by Louis Althusser 
– a misrepresentation of his position.46 Benjamin’s genuine divergence from the Frankfurt 
School therefore relates not to his use of Freudian psychoanalysis, but precisely his 
readiness to draw upon an alternative and critical tradition of psychological thought 
regarding the unconscious, represented in the first half of the twentieth century by 
Jungian depth psychology. To the extent that Benjamin’s increasing dependence upon 
Max Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School during his years in exile prevented the 
completion of his planned critique of Jung – itself a necessary prelude to any reference to 
Jung following his involvement in anti-Semitic politics from 1933 onwards – the 
ostensibly “Freudian” motifs of his later works indicate not a divergence from them but 
the practical exigencies of his position. 
 More substantially, Andrew Benjamin argues that the Arcades Project articulates a 
specific ontology of the present, one whose concern with ‘the way both the process and 
the content of presencing are thought’ may be understood in relation to Freud’s concept 
of deferred action [Nachträglichkeit], and as specifically opposed to Jung’s deployment 
of the archaic image within a narrative of curative completion.47 He argues that Freud’s 
abandoning of the seduction theory for an account of the ‘the sexualisation of events via 
deferred action’ allows a psychological semantics to emerge which ‘involves co-
extensivity between the signifier and the signified’ and, because repression entails that 
the sign can never be completed, a temporality for which ‘the time of the cure has an 
infinitely deferrable end’.48 Freud’s ontology of the present therefore implies that the 
‘relationship between what is actual (i.e. present) and that which while not itself actual 
plays a constitutive role in the mode of presence or the actual, can no longer be thought in 
                                                       
45 Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist 
Revolution, (Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993), pp.54 & 30. 
46 Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination, op. cit., p.33. 
47 Andrew Benjamin, ‘Hope as the Present’, Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism, 
(London & New York, Routledge, 1997), p.1; Andrew Benjamin, ‘Time and Task: Benjamin 
and Heidegger showing the present’, Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism, op. 
cit., pp.31-2. 
48 Andrew Benjamin, ‘Psychoanalysis and Translation’, Translation and the Nature of 
Philosophy: A New Theory of Words, (London & New York, Routledge, 1989), p.114; ibid., 
pp.115-6; ibid., p.122. 
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terms of either recovery or retrieval’.49 This stands in contrast to a Jungian concept of the 
unconscious, Andrew Benjamin argues, which represents a reactionary re-assertion of the 
continuity of ‘human nature, eternal values, myths of origin, the naturalization of 
chronological time’, a continuity criticised in the Arcades Project for its ‘attempt to rid 
the historical and experiential of that form of repetition identified by the term 
Nachträglichkeit’.50 
 It is the afterlife of this concept (initially in the work of Jacques Lacan in the 1950s 
and significantly in that of Jean Laplanche in the 1960s) that concerns Andrew Benjamin 
here, for Laplanche himself has emphasised how Freud’s own use of the term 
Nachträglichkeit indicates a temporal movement from the past into the future which he 
‘never thought...could be reversed’.51 ‘[W]henever Freud has a choice between a 
deterministic account proceeding from the past towards the future and a retrospective or 
hermeneutic conception proceeding from the present in the direction of the past,’ 
Laplanche writes, ‘he almost invariably opted for the former’, and in ‘defending his view 
of the reality of the “real” primal scene’ from Jung’s criticisms, Freud ‘never wavered in 
his conviction that what comes before determines what comes after’.52 To the extent that 
the radical semiotic conception of the psychological sign which is deployed in the 
material for the Arcades Project from the late 1920s onwards (prior to the radicalization 
of psychoanalysis in the second half of the twentieth century) draws upon a psychological 
tradition, it therefore stands in closer proximity to a theory of the unconscious arising 
from Jung’s early critique of Freudianism then psychoanalysis itself, especially in its 
rejection of the empirical realism and causal-determinism of the psychoanalytical model. 
 Moreover, this proximity to Jung is prepared for in Benjamin’s early writings by a 
concept of criticism which emerges from the Goethean transformation of the Early 
German Romantic concept of the reflective medium. Just as the speculative overcoming 
of the Newtonian model of experience involves a transformation of the object, so it 
entails a similar re-conceptualisation of the subject of experience. ‘These two problems 
are closely interconnected,’ Benjamin writes in ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’, and ‘even to the extent that Kant and the neo-Kantians have overcome the 
                                                       
49 Ibid., p.126. 
50 Andrew Benjamin, ‘Hope as the Present’ op. cit., p.3; Andrew Benjamin, ‘Time and Task: 
Benjamin and Heidegger showing the present’, op. cit., p.54. 
51 Jean Laplanche, Entry on ‘Deferred Action’, International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. In a 
letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud comments that a ‘severe critic might say of all this that it was 
retrogressively phantasied and not progressively determined. Experimenta cruces would have 
to decide against him’ (Sigmund Freud, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess (dated October 3rd, 1897), 
SE3 p.263). 
52 ‘As much as we might wish to find in Freud a dual—perhaps even a contradictory—
application of the concept of Nachträglichkeit, what we actually find is a highly deterministic 
one (Jean Laplanche, Entry on ‘Deferred Action’, International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis). 
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object nature of the thing-in-itself as the cause of sensations, there remains the subject 
nature of the cognizing consciousness to be eliminated’ (PCP 103). “Cognizing man”, the 
‘cognizing empirical consciousness’ of scientific rationalism is merely one ‘type of 
insane consciousness’, Benjamin concludes (PCP 104). That Benjamin draws upon the 
speculative experiences of the primitive, insane, psychic, dreamlike and childlike here as 
models for ideological experience demonstrates the continuing importance of his early 
work in his later metacritique of Marx’s “Enlightenment” rationalism. 
 When Benjamin criticises Jena Romanticism for inheriting the Fichtean concept of 
reflection in his essay on ‘The Concept of Criticism’, he notes how the ‘Fichtean “I”... 
signifies for Schlegel and Novalis only an inferior form among an infinite number of 
forms of the self’ (CC 145). The beginning of the “I” – the point in which reflection 
arises from nothing – was for Novalis ‘merely ideal...[and] arises later than the “I”; 
therefore the “I” cannot have begun. We see from this that we are here in the domain of 
art’.53 The Romantic roots of Freudian narcissism, whose paradoxical structure is only 
properly endorsed in the Lacanian mirror-stage, are therefore exposed in Benjamin’s 
discussion. The ‘complete positivity’ of their resulting concept of criticism – criticised by 
Benjamin for occluding the ‘necessary moment of all judgement, the negative...’ – results 
in Schlegel’s concept of the “symbolic form” or the ‘imprint of the pure poetic absolute 
in the form itself’, the indestructible aspect which endures in this infinite process of 
completion (CC 152 & 171). It is in this sense that Schlegel speaks of the way in which 
‘the show of the finite is set in relation to the truth of the eternal and thereby dissolved 
into it...through symbols, through which meaning takes the place of illusion – meaning, 
the one real thing in existence’.54 Benjamin’s criticism of the positivity of Romantic 
reflection and the virtuality this entails (discussed in the previous chapter) and his 
correction of the subsequent “meaning” or “significance” assigned by the Romantics to 
symbolic form needs to be considered here in relation to the psychological concept of the 
symbol in dream interpretation. From the standpoint of the Absolute of Art, Benjamin 
argues, the elimination of the moment of negativity represented by the Fichtean check 
[Anstoß] means there is no “not-I”: ‘no Nature in the sense of a being that does not 
become itself [keine Natur im Sinne eines Wesens, das nicht selbst wird]’ (CC 145). The 
Romantic medium of reflection excludes any concept of Nature as a principle of 
difference, resulting in a pure virtuality of self-identity.55  
                                                       
53 Novalis, Schriften: Kritische Neuausgabe auf Grund des handschriftlichen Nachlasses von 
Ernst Heilborn, ed. Ernst Heilborn, (Berlin, Reimer, 1901), p.496, quoted in CC 150. 
54 Friedrich Schlegel, Seine prosaischen Jugendschriften, Vol. 2, p.427, quoted in CC 171. 
55 Marcus Paul Bullock and Winfried Menninghaus have both criticised the partiality and 
generality of Benjamin’s reading of the specific Early German Romantic philosophers, a 
criticism which will be discussed in the Epilogue. 
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 When Benjamin attempts to retain a dialectical concept of judgement which 
incorporates the necessary moment of negativity, he does so by turning to Goethe and 
specifically to a notion of uncriticizability which reasserts the “mortuary” aspect of 
Nature excluded by Romanticism. This allegorical understanding of death as a moment of 
completion and therefore hermeneutical significance continues to operate in his 1935 
review of Johann Jakob Bachofen, for example, where Benjamin speaks of how ‘death in 
no way suggests a violent destruction’ for antiquity but, as ‘something greater than life or 
less than life’, implies ‘the key to all knowledge, reconciling antithetical principles in a 
dialectical movement’.56 Death is therefore the ‘prudent mediator between nature and 
history’, he remarks, rehearsing the Baroque understanding of significance introduced in 
the discussion of German mourning-plays:  
 
...what has become historical through death reverts ultimately to the domain of nature; 
and what has been made natural by death reverts ultimately to history. It is no surprise, 
therefore, to see Bachofen evoking them together in this Goethean profession of faith: 
“The natural science of what has become is the great principle on which rests all true 
knowledge and all progress”.57  
  
This Goethean understanding resonates strongly not only in the chthonic aspects of 
Bachofen’s discussion of antiquity, but also in the primordial nature of Jung’s archetypal 
conception of the unconscious.  
 It is the contention here that Benjamin’s allusions in the early drafts for the 
Arcades Project to a concept of the unconscious broader in scope than that of Freudian 
psychoanalysis involves an important recognition of the critical limitations of Freud’s 
own theory of repression and its usefulness as a psychic model for the social structure of 
ideology, one that arises from the shared Goethean influences of Jung and Benjamin’s 
positions. The discussion that follows therefore seeks to defend Jung’s early criticisms of 
Freud as part of an important and neglected philosophical tradition of the unconscious. 
Jung’s rejection of Freud’s sexual theory of the libido will be interpreted here not in 
terms of bourgeois prudishness or New Age spiritualism, but as a recognition that the 
psychoanalytical account of the psychotic collapse of the reality function leads to a 
genuine devaluation of the significance of dream symbolism in schizophrenia. 
 An understanding of the critical validity of Jung’s semiotic critique of the 
psychoanalytical explanation of the psychotic “end of the world” and his introduction of a 
hermeneutical principle of psychosynthesis for the interpretation of catastrophic 
symbolism therefore helps to explain Benjamin’s problematic proximity to Jungian 
psychology in the early drafts of the Arcades Project, and the importance of this concept 
                                                       
56 Walter Benjamin, ‘Johann Jakob Bachofen’ (1934-5), SW3 p.14. 
57 Ibid. 
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of the unconscious for his own critique of Marxism. Jung plays a structurally equivalent 
role in Benjamin’s appropriation of psychoanalytical theory as Goethe does for 
Romanticism, it will be suggested, and the presence of Jungian motifs in Benjamin’s 
work should not be expunged but subjected to an immanent and dialectical critique 
comparable to that performed on Goethe.  
 
4.3 Psychosynthesis: Jung’s Semiotic Critique of the Freudian Unconscious 
Sarah Kofman, in Camera Obscura: Of Ideology, critically compares Marx’s 
technological model for the functioning of ideology with that utilised to describe the 
apparatus of the psyche in Freud’s writings, where a ‘system in the very front of the 
apparatus receives the perceptual stimuli,’ like the mirror of a reflecting telescope or the 
screen of the camera obscura.58 Freud himself admits the limitations of this scheme when 
he hypothesises the need for a second system behind it, which ‘transforms the memory 
excitations of the first system into permanent traces’, like a chemical reaction on a 
photographic plate or the artist’s tracing of the image onto paper.59 However, the problem 
of adopting it for Benjamin’s materialism also lies in its reduplication of what Kofman 
continues to describe in Marxian terms as its feature of ‘ideological inversion’.60 To 
situate the importance of commodity fetishism within an expanded concept of ideological 
phantasmagoria requires a movement beyond the inversion shared by both the Marxist 
and psychoanalytical model, and it is here that Jung’s critique of the Freudian theory of 
dream symbolism and the significance of his own account of unconscious phantasy 
provides a perhaps surprisingly useful resource. 
 In the Preface to the third, 1911 edition of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud 
admits that his ‘theory of dream-interpretation has itself developed further in a direction 
on which insufficient stress had been laid in the first edition’, concerning ‘the extent and 
importance of symbolism in dreams (or rather in unconscious thinking)’.61 Freud’s 
recognition of the importance of an expanded account of symbolism in dreams arises out 
of Jung’s criticisms of psychoanalysis and in particular its tendency to reduce the 
                                                       
58 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, SE5 p.536; Sarah Kofman, Camera Obscura: 
Of Ideology, trans. Will Straw, (London, Athlone Press, 1998), pp.25-6. 
59 This is exemplified in the permanence of the Architect’s sketches enjoyed by Ottilie and 
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61 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, SE5 p.xxvii. It is the theory of sexual 
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explanation of symbolic repression he sought, and the 1909 edition of The Interpretation of 
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masturbation’, before a decisive footnote in the third edition of 1914 associates such dreams 
symbols with the theory of infantile sexuality, such that a ‘tooth being pulled out by someone 
else in a dream is as a rule to be interpreted as castration’ (ibid., p.387 &  n.1). 
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capacity for expression to the neurotic functioning of the unconscious in cases of hysteria. 
This ‘analytical-deductive procedure did not, however, furnish such enlightening results 
in regard to the rich and surprising symbolism’ in cases of paranoid dementia and 
dementia praecox [schizophrenia], Jung argues and concludes that Freud’s ‘reductive 
method seems to suit hysteria better than dementia praecox’.62 
 The Freudian hypothesis of a period of narcissistic transformation of libido 
considered earlier preserves the essential psychoanalytical principle of sexual repression 
but in doing so leaves analysis with no resources to examine the specific content of 
psychotic fantasy. In ‘The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis’ (1924), for 
example, Freud argues that whilst in neurosis ‘there is no lack of attempts to replace a 
disagreeable reality by one which is more in keeping with the subject’s wishes’, this wish 
attaches itself to a special and meaningful piece of external reality, lending it ‘a secret 
meaning which we (not always quite appropriately) call a symbolic one’. In psychosis, on 
the other hand, the constructed phantasy is put entirely in the place of external reality and 
is therefore not symbolic.63 According to Freud, there is no meaningful connection 
between the repressed reality and the substituted phantasy in cases of psychosis, 
rendering interpretation, and therefore cure, virtually impossible. 
 Throughout the course of his work, Jung suggests that there are a number of 
reasons to take Freud’s own neglected explanation for the withdrawal of the reality 
function – that, ‘what we call libidinal cathexis (that is, interest emanating from erotic 
sources) coincides with interest in general’ – seriously’.64 The productive role of the 
unconscious in psychic automatism, the problem of explaining the schizophrenic “end of 
the world”, the difficulties of interpreting psychotic dreams symbolism and the 
destructive compulsion to repeat exhibited by victims of trauma would all suggest to Jung 
that Freud’s ‘exclusively sexual definition of libido’ was an ‘untenable prejudice’ which 
had been ‘historically conditioned’ by the ‘scientific materialism of the nineteenth 
                                                       
62 C. G. Jung, ‘On Psychological Understanding’, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Collected Works [hereafter 
CW], eds. Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler, (London & Henley, Routledge & 
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63 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis’ (1924), SE19 p.187. 
64 Sigmund Freud, ‘Psycho-Analytical Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of 
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century’.65   
 This prejudice is compounded by Freud’s attempt to model the functioning of the 
unconscious in dream symbolism upon the cases of neurotic hysteria that he was more 
familiar with. In a very early description of hysteria, for example, Freud compares how an 
incidental circumstance is able to stand in for the repressed sexual event with how a flag 
or a glove symbolises a soldier’s fatherland or a knight’s lover.66 A decade later Freud 
would utilise the same structure to describe the fetishistic solution to the castration 
complex, explaining how the incidental fetish serves as a substitute for the repressed 
memory of the mother’s “castrated” phallus, becoming invested as a result with 
fantastical sexual power.67 This neurotic concept of the symbol is, therefore, fetishistic 
and essentially metaphoric, in the classical sense of metaphora or “transference” 
[metaphero], meaning to carry [phero] between [meta]: here between the thought 
necessarily repressed by the ego into the unconscious and its subsequently censored 
appearance for consciousness.68 The Freudian concept of the symbol is dependent upon a 
specifically repressive theory of the unconscious, such that the analyst Sándor Ferenczi is 
able to offer a definition in which ‘[o]nly such things (or ideas) are symbols in the sense 
of psycho-analysis...in which the one member of the equation is repressed into the 
unconscious’.69 
 Transformation and Symbols of the Libido proposes an alternative interpretation of 
psychotic dreams in order to demonstrate that psychological symbolism need not be 
reduced to either fetishistic substitution or meaningless fantasy. Emphasising how the 
subject in question is conscious of the conflicting nature of her situation, he argues that 
her transformation of libido into projected religious symbols therefore cannot be 
exclusively explained according to the mechanism of repression, so that ‘we are 
confronted with an entirely natural and automatic process of transformation’ (TSL p.59). 
The hermeneutical principle of repression according to which Freud interprets dreams and 
pathological symptoms would in such cases be inadequate and for this reason unable to 
                                                       
65 C. G. Jung, ‘Transformations and Symbols of the Libido’ [hereafter TSL], CW5 pp.129-130; C. 
G. Jung, ‘Depth Psychology’ (1948)’, CW18 p.479. 
66 Sigmund Freud, ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ (1895), SE1 p.349. 
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believes that their gods are embodied’ (Sigmund Freud, ‘Three Essays on Sexuality’ (1905), 
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68 Henry Liddell & George Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), 
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69 Sándor Ferenczi, ‘The Ontogenesis of Symbols’ (1913), Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 
trans. Ernest Jones, (London, Stanley Phillips, 1916), p.234. In a footnote to this argument, 
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find meaning to their content and with this the possibility of resolution. This “censorship” 
explanation is itself a ruse typical of neurosis, Jung argues, in which ‘one makes oneself 
and others believe that the problem is purely sexual, that the trouble started long ago and 
that its causes lies in the remote past’.70 ‘This provides a heaven-sent way out of the 
problem of the present,’ he insists, ‘by shifting the whole question on to another and less 
dangerous plane’ (TSL 329). 
 If introversion concerns a withdrawal of interest from the external reality of people 
and things not arising from a repressed sexual conflict, then we can no longer assume that 
the libido withdrawn is of an exclusively sexual nature. Jung therefore explains the 
psychotic “end of the world” which proved so problematic for Freudian psychoanalysis 
by retaining the notion of a reversal of libido, but redefining libido as desire in general. 
The withdrawal of specific sexual interest from the world does not necessarily constitute 
a psychotic breakdown because the subject retains a material interest in reality as such; on 
the other hand, the withdrawal of material interest directly accounts for the loss of reality. 
Although this problem of schizophrenic introversion raised by Jung in 1911 challenged 
the sexual theory of libido, Freud only conceded the inadequacy of his existing concept of 
the unconscious in his 1920 essay ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’. Here, he admits that if 
no other drives are visible to explain the traumatic compulsion to repeat experienced by 
soldiers returning from the First World War, ‘we shall after all be driven to agree 
with...innovators like Jung who, making a hasty judgement, have used the word “libido” 
to mean ‘drive’ [Triebkraft] in general’.71 The hypothesis of a death drive, ‘more 
primitive...and independent of’ the libidinal pleasure principle permits him to avoid this 
conclusion, although he admits that ‘we are without a term analogous to “libido” for 
describing the energy of [this] destructive drive’.72 
                                                       
70 TSL 329. Jung’s own familiarity with schizophrenic rather than neurotic patients led him to 
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 Freud distinguishes his revised concept of the unconscious by emphasising his own 
‘dualistic’ theory of drives in contrast to Jung’s ‘monistic’ one.73 However, Jung argues 
that this dualism is merely a ‘concession to intellectual logic’ which, as a result of 
Freud’s unrevised concept of libido, ends up undialectically reifying the pleasure 
principle and its opposite.74 Since Freud begins from the mistaken assumption that Eros is 
equivalent to the organic sphere of reproductive life, he takes its opposite to be a 
biological, rather than philosophical, concept of death. Consequently, even when 
psychoanalytical theory accedes to this more complex and necessary account of the 
drives, it nonetheless retains an essentially conservative concept of the unconscious. For 
Freud a ‘drive is an urge inherent to organic life to restore to an earlier state of things...an 
expression of the conservative nature [konservativen Natur] of living substance’.75 It is 
‘sufficiently obvious’ for Jung, in contrast, ‘that life, like any other process, has a 
beginning and an end and that every beginning is also the beginning of the end’, implying 
that ‘every process is a phenomenon of energy, and that all energy can proceed only from 
the tension of opposites’.76  
 Jung therefore describes this dialectical opposition as implying ‘not so much a 
question of a death drive as of that “other” drive (Goethe) which signifies spiritual life’ 
(TSL 328, n.28, trans. altered). The meaning of this destructive, Goethean aspect of the 
unconscious is clarified in Jung’s discussion of the dialectical aspect of images such as 
the Mother imago. Whilst the ‘primordial image of the setting sun’ represents a ‘deadly 
longing for the abyss, a longing to drown in his own source, to be sucked down into the 
realm of the [Faustian] Mothers’, this destructive descent also holds out the potential for 
ascent, psychic rebirth and the subsequent after-life of the transformed subject (TSL 355 
& 357). In a letter to Freud from June 1911, Jung writes that the ‘unconscious fantasies 
contain a whole lot of relevant material, and bring the inside to the outside as nothing else 
can, so that I see a faint hope of getting at even the “inaccessible” cases by this means’.77 
He goes on to call this destructive/productive realm of the unconscious an ‘amazing 
witches’ cauldron’, citing Goethe’s description of the Faustian realm of the Mothers as 
‘Formation, transformation,/ Eternal Mind’s eternal recreation./ Thronged round with 
images of things to be,/ They see you not, shadows are all they see’.78 Similarly, 
Transformation and Symbols of the Libido insists that the ‘the vanishing shapes are 
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shaped anew, and a truth is valid in the end only if it suffers change and bears new 
witness in new images...’ (TSL 357).  
 Contrary to Freud’s theory of sexual development, this fantastical character of the 
Jung’s productive unconscious implies it is always essentially “narcissistic”, in that it 
creatively seeks to adapt the world it encounters to subjective fantasies and expectations 
(TSL 21). The dropping away of the latest stage of directed thinking does not require the 
hypothesis of a historically repressed conflict, but only what he calls an introversion to 
this non-directed or fantasy form of thinking as the destructive but also potentially 
productive response of the unconscious to the precipitating problem. Freud characterises 
such a delusional effort as the “magical thinking” found in children, madmen and 
‘primitive peoples’: ‘In the latter we find characteristics which, if they occurred singly, 
might be put down to megalomania: an over-estimation of the power of their wishes and 
mental acts, the “omnipotence of thoughts”, a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, 
and a technique for dealing with the external world - “magic” - which appears to a logical 
application of these grandiose premises’.79 Whereas Freud’s destructive drive ultimately 
betrays itself as a regressive primitivism manifested in the impression of ‘being pursued 
by a malignant fate or possessed by some “daemonic” power’, that autonomy of the 
psyche which is experienced as daemonic or magical for Jung stems precisely from our 
‘fantastical denial of the existence of fragmentary autonomous systems’ in the human 
psyche’, specifically our denial ‘that these systems are experienceable’.80 What Freud 
calls the death drive represents that tendency to dissociation which Jung regards as 
inherent to the human psyche, and whose denial itself ‘entails a great psychic danger, 
because the autonomous systems then become like any other repressed contents’.81 
 The Freudian theory of repression itself serves to repress and deny the experience 
and activity of the non-human, non-biographical, and therefore non-historical “Nature” at 
the heart of the human psyche, which manifests itself as a consequence in the violent, 
irrational and daemonic. Freud’s ‘negative and reductive attitude towards cultural 
values...towards myth and religion’ and towards ‘complex psychic phenomenon like art, 
philosophy, and religion’ is inherently dangerous, Jung argues, because it regards them as 
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‘...“nothing but” the outcome of sexual repression’.82 What Freud excludes from the 
sphere of the psychological significant and therefore treatable corresponds to the 
productive sphere of the psyche which Jung comes to define as the collective 
unconscious. This psychotic symbolism is at times brought into the orbit of Kant’s 
expanded sense of the imagination in its productive capacity as fantasy.83 Kant’s account 
of symbolic exhibition, associated in the previous chapters with the productive power of 
the imagination, offers a philosophical resource for developing this alternative concept of 
the unconscious. For Kant the Aesthetic Idea is an unexpoundable ‘intuition (of the 
imagination)’ for which the understanding can find no adequate concept (CJ Ak. 342). 
Similarly, Jung argues that phantasy production in psychopathology and in dreams 
involves symbols as ‘indefinite expression[s] with many meanings, pointing to something 
not easily defined and therefore not fully known’ (TSL 124). He goes on, in The Role of 
the Unconscious (1919), to associate this productivity with a theory of archetypes as, in 
the Kantian sense, ‘innate possibilities of ideas, a priori conditions for fantasy 
production’. 84 
 As a consequence of this philosophical theory of the unconscious, Jung demands 
that psychoanalysis adopts an expanded concept of the symbol. ‘Symbols are not 
allegories and not signs’, Jung argues, ‘they are images of contents which for the most 
part transcend consciousness’ (TSL 77-8). The true symbol should therefore be 
‘understood as an expression of an intuitive idea that cannot yet be formulated in any 
other or better way’.85 The Jungian symbol is not fetishistic in character (a fixed 
substitute for the repressed whole), but magical or phantastical: a transformer of libido, 
‘an idea that can give equivalent expression to the libido and canalize it into a form 
different from original one’.86 It is for this reason that Christian Kerslake describes the 
psychotic introversion to a non-directed thinking in terms of the “world as symbol”.87 
This Jungian concept of expression stands in contrast to the Freudian semiotics of 
repression because it insists that the content of dreams and fantasies may take on 
symbolic form not because of censorship but because they are constitutively unable to be 
fully expressed.  
 Finally, Jung’s critique of Freud’s account of psychological significance demands a 
shift in the interpretative perspective, from a realism which ‘equates the dream images 
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with real-objects’ to a theory of unconscious expression which ‘refers every part of the 
dream and all the actors in it back to the dreamer’.88 When Freud’s ‘analytical or causal-
reductive interpretation ceases to bring to light anything new, but only the same thing in 
different variations,’ Jung argues, then a constructive approach is required to grasp the 
fantastical or phantasmagorical significance of the symbols of unconscious expression. 
Jung contrasts this constructive approach, or “amplification”, with psychoanalysis by 
deeming it a process of psychosynthesis: ‘From the comparative analysis of many 
systems the typical formations can be discovered. If one can speak of a reduction at all, it 
is simply a reduction to general types, but not to some general principle arrived at 
inductively or deductively, such as “sexuality” [Freud] or “striving for power” [Adler]’. 89 
Whereas Freudian analysis is rooted in an empirical realism which reasserts the bourgeois 
semiotics of communication (the fantasy-content expresses a repressed thought which 
stands in for a traumatic event), Jung’s insistence on the necessity of psychological 
synthesis follows from an alternative conception of expression, which takes the material 
substrate itself to be striving for articulation.  
 As Paul Bishop remarks, Jung’s ‘“constructive standpoint” distinguishes itself 
by...elaborating [things] to a more complicated and – in a Goethean sense – “higher level” 
(elaboriert Komplizierteres und Höheres), and, in this sense, it is “speculative” 
(spekulativ)’.90 Jung’s introduction of the archetype should be understood as a 
psychological counterpart to the Goethean Urphänomen, the consequence of a speculative 
concept of psychological experience which proceeds from the standpoint not of an 
empirical realism but a transcendental empiricism. Jung claims that such speculative 
construction should not be confused with ‘scholastic speculation’, for it ‘never asserts 
that something has universal validity, but merely subjective value’ and that this value is 
concerned with what he calls “redemption” (Erlösung).91  
 The affinity between the psychosynthesis that develops out of Jung’s critique of 
Freudian psychoanalysis and the concept of criticism that emerges from the early 
Benjamin’s Goethean critique of Romanticism therefore help to explain the “Jungian” 
motifs which appear in the psychological model of ideology he employs from the late 
1920s onwards, and which continue to linger in his work from the 1930s (to Adorno’s 
evident concern). In his discussion of the Arcades Project’s criticism of Jungian 
psychology, Andrew Benjamin emphasises how Jung’s concept of the unconscious is a 
reactionary ‘naturalization of chronological time’ which reasserts the eternal values of 
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some original human nature.92 To the extent that Jung comes to shift his theory of the 
archetypes of the collective unconscious away from their philosophical and critical 
relationship to the Freudian interpretation of dream symbolism and towards a biological 
notion of innate residual traces of habitual experience this objection is certainly true. 
However, the temporal ‘co-extensivity between the signifier and the signified’ which 
Andrew Benjamin seeks to rescue from his criticism remains closer to Jung’s critique of 
psychoanalytical realism than to orthodox Freudianism, and the critique of Jung which 
occurs in the Arcades Project should therefore be understood as a dialectical “rescuing” 
of the concept of the primal image in Jung’s work, rather than its rejection.93 The 
problems that arise from the elimination of Jung are apparent when Andrew Benjamin 
speaks of the linguistic medium of interpretation as an ‘infinitely deferrable end’, a 
description which recuperates a neo-Romantic Lacanianism of virtuality which once 
again excludes any conception of death and therefore semblance of completion from its 
idea of becoming.94 
 In a letter to Benjamin from 1935, Adorno offers a critical reformulation for the 
concept of the dialectical image as it appears in ‘Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth 
Century’. ‘Dialectical images...are instantiated in the moment of indifference between 
death and meaning’, he writes, for whilst ‘things in appearance are awakened to what is 
newest, death transforms the meanings to what is most ancient’.95 Adorno offered this 
formulation as a critique of Jung’s archaic concept of the constellation, which he argues 
Benjamin had uncritically adopted. The original, theological power of the concept – its 
eschatological dimension – is sacrificed by becoming immanent and disenchanted in this 
way, and as a consequence the dialectical character of the fetish – the commodified world 
as hell – is also lost. Adorno proposes as an alternative principle: ‘Each epoch dreams of 
itself as annihilated by catastrophes’.96 When Benjamin incorporates a version of 
Adorno’s dictum – quoted from an earlier letter of June 5th 1935 – into Convolute K of 
the Arcades Project (‘The recent past always presents itself as though annihilated by 
catastrophes’ (AP K4, 3)), he immediately precedes it with a lengthy citation from the 
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Surrealist anthropologist Pierre Mabille. The passage, published in the Winter 1935 
edition of the Surrealist journal Minotaure edited by Mabille and therefore inserted into 
the material after Adorno’s intervention, concerns the ‘predominantly collective’ 
“unconscious of oblivion”, in which ‘the mass of things learned in the course of the 
centuries and in the course of a life, things which were once conscious and which, by 
diffusion, have entered oblivion’, an ‘enormous labour undertaken in the shadows 
[which] comes to light in dreams, thoughts, decisions, and above all at moments of crisis 
or of social upheaval...’.97  
 The catastrophic should not be conceived as the conservative regression of Freud’s 
death drive, therefore, but the immanently dialectical yearning of the psychotic phantasy. 
Jung’s early writing grasps the dialectical aspect of this desire with its concept of an 
expressive libidinal Nature bubbling away beneath the conscious surface of human 
History, and its Goethean recognition of the incessant but impossibly mortuary aspect of 
this vitality. Whereas Freud isolates and separates the pleasure principle and the death 
drive as essentially conservative forces towards de-animation, for Jung the utopian wish 
and the catastrophic impulse are aspects of one and the same movement. The relation 
between this catastrophic aspect of psychotic phantasy and the dialectical image of 
history is reinforced by the correspondences between Benjamin’s theses On the Concept 
of History and Gérard de Nerval’s 1855 novel Aurélia. Whilst the inspiration of Paul 
Klee’s Angelus Novus and Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘backward looking prophet’ upon 
Benjamin’s famous image of the angel of history has received much attention, the vision 
of history as catastrophe which is crucial to Benjamin’s allegorical figure echoes the 
psychotic tropes of the dreams of Aurélia’s semi-autobiographical narrator. The angel’s 
vision of history as ‘one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage 
and hurls it at his feet...[so that] the pile of debris before him grows towards the sky’ 
appears like an afterimage of Nerval’s cadaverous dreams, which signal the onset of 
psychotic breakdown in Aurélia.98 ‘Then I thought I had found myself in the middle of an 
enormous slaughterhouse where world history was written in letters of blood,’ Nerval 
writes: ‘The body of a gigantic woman was painted opposite me; only, her various parts 
were sliced off as if by a sabre, other women of various races and whose bodies piled up 
higher and higher, formed a bloody, tangled heap of limbs and heads on the other walls. It 
was the history of all crime’.99 
                                                       
97 Pierre Mabille, ‘Préface à L’Eloge des préjugés populaires’, Minotaure, 2, 6, (Winter, 1935), 
p.2, quoted in AP K4, 2. 
98 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, SW4 p.392. 
99 Gérard de Nerval, ‘Aurélia’, Oeuvres, ed. Henri Lemaître, (Paris, Garnier, 1958), ), p.815, 
trans. Laurence M. Porter, ‘Real Dreams, Literary Dreams, and the Fantastic in Literature’, The 
Dream and the Text: Essays on Literature and Language, ed. Carole Schreier Rupprecht, 
126 
4.4 The Phantasmagoria of Ideology 
Whilst the immanent critique of Jung that Adorno encouraged was never written, the 
Arcades Project – and in particular Convolutes N and K, which represent the equivalent 
‘epistemo-critical’ moments of the work – permit an insight into the form that critique 
would have taken. What Andrew Benjamin describes as a concern with ‘the way both the 
process and the content of presencing are thought’ forms part of a specific criticism of 
Jung in the work, which will be discussed here in relation to a broader critique of Jung’s 
own misunderstanding of the Goethean symbol.100 Importantly, Benjamin’s most explicit 
rejection of Jung concerns not the theory of primal images per se, but Jung’s description 
of their artistic function in his essay ‘On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry’ 
(1931). Benjamin’s comment that this work brings to light the ‘unequivocally regressive 
function which the doctrine of archaic images’ has for Jung situates this critique within 
the context of his own development of an ‘esoteric theory of art’, which has been 
discussed in relation to the expressiveness of the  Urphänomen in the previous chapters 
(AP N8, 2). Jung’s concern in this essay is with how ‘a poet who has gone out of fashion 
is suddenly rediscovered’ when ‘something new’ is discovered in the work which ‘was 
always present...but was hidden in a symbol, and only a renewal of the spirit of the time 
permits us to read its meaning’ (RAPP 77). Ostensibly, Jung’s concern overlaps with 
Benjamin’s own interest in the after-life of works. For Jung, the ‘symbol remains a 
perpetual challenge to our thought and feelings’, whose “meaning” needs to be 
understood in terms of Gerhard Hauptmann’s “resonances of the primordial world” 
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managed, even in death, to remain “forever lucid”. Marcel Proust ranks him as among the three 
or four greatest writers of the nineteenth century’ (ibid., p.vii). Andre Breton also declared him 
a precursor of Surrealism, and the name for this movement itself derives from Guillaume 
Apollinaire’s shortening of Nerval’s neologism “supernaturaliste”, which first appeared in his 
translation of Faust and was adopted by Nerval (as well as Nerval’s friend Baudelaire) to 
describe the dream states in which he composed his poetry (ibid., pp.vii & 181). 
100 Andrew Benjamin, ‘Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger showing the present’, op. cit., 
p.32. 
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(ibid.). Whereas the influence of the personal unconscious, as those contents which in 
Freudian terms ‘are capable of becoming conscious and often do, but are the suppressed’, 
appear in the work as symptoms, the symbolic signifies the contents of the collective 
unconscious, which show ‘no tendency to become conscious under normal conditions’ 
and cannot be ‘brought back to recollection by any analytical technique, since it was 
never repressed or forgotten’ (RAPP 80).  
Where Jung’s description evokes the speculative experience of a transcendental 
realm, one which cannot be expressed directly in the consciousness but does appear in 
symbolic form in the mediated realm of art, it is coherent with the interpretation of 
Benjamin’s transcendental empiricism presented in the preceding chapters and expounded 
here as an expressive materialism. But Jung quickly goes on to hypostatize this 
transcendental realm in biological terms, as ‘inborn possibilities of ideas...inherited in the 
anatomical structure of the brain’, and with a ‘primitive original’ [primitive Vorlage]’ 
preserved in ‘the psychic residua of innumerable experiences of the same type’ (RAPP 
81-1). As a consequence of this shift, the effects of Jung’s collective unconscious 
uncomfortably appear as an apologia in advance for German fascism.101 
 This effect is achieved in great art, Jung argues, through ‘the unconscious 
activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping [Entwicklung und Au 
sgestaltung] this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it 
into the language of the present [eine Übersetzung in die Sprache der Gegenwart], and so 
makes it possible for us to find out way back to the deepest springs of life’ (RAPP 77). 
The ‘social significance of art’ is therefore defined as ‘conjuring up the forms in which 
the age is most lacking...compensat[ing] the inadequacy and one-sidedness of the present’ 
(RAPP 82). In Convolute N of the Arcades Project Benjamin ridicules this description for 
reducing the ‘esoteric theory of art’ to the function of ‘making  archetypes “accessible” to 
the “Zeitgeist”’ (AP N8, 2). It is not the archetypes or primal images that Benjamin 
ironizes here, but their conjunction with a notion of “accessibility” which reduces 
translation to conjuration and the ‘language of the present’ to a “Zeitgeist”. It is this 
understanding of conjunction or actualization of the archetype which renders Jung’s 
primal image an undialectical and therefore archaic one, and which – according to 
Benjamin’s criticism of  historical materialism considered above – turns the crudely 
materialist element of Jung’s theory of ideas into a reactionary idealism.  
                                                       
101 ‘[W]hoever speaks in the primordial images speaks with a thousand voices; he enthrals and 
overpowers, while at the same time he lifts the idea he is seeking to express out of the 
occasional and the transitory into the realm the ever-enduring’; this archetypal situation is felt 
as being ‘caught up by an overwhelming power’ in which ‘we are no longer individuals, but 
the race’; the stirring ideal of the “fatherland” derives from ‘the symbolical value of our 
native land’, which activates the archetype of ‘the participation mystique of primitive man 
with the soil on which he dwells, and which contains the spirits of his ancestors’ (RAPP 82). 
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 Of central importance to Jung’s concept of the symbol is the significance of Faust’s 
descent to the Mothers as the realm of primal images. Jung certainly grasped the 
dialectical aspect of Faust’s descent, understanding this constellation as a confirmation of 
his own theory of the libido as at once both erotically life-enhancing and destructively 
catastrophic. Hence, the chthonic descent to the realm of the Mothers must be properly 
situated within the context of its dialectical antipode in Faust’s vital pursuit of the 
feminine ideal of Helen, the classical archetype of beauty.102 But Jung misunderstands the 
significance of this scene and of the conjuration or translation into the present that it 
enacts. Whilst Faust follows Mephistopheles instructions to ‘conjure [Helen and Paris] 
up’ by descending to the Mothers, where ‘hover images of all that’s been created’, and 
bringing back the tripod which summons them forth, he clumsily intervenes upon the 
phantom scene and, crying ‘[t]his is reality...[s]he was so far away, but now could not be 
nearer’, causes the figures to dissolve in his attempt to rescue Helen from Paris.103 
Scholars have pointed to the phantasmagoric reference of this conjuration, arguing that 
the image of Helen is a metatheatrical act of conjuration: the product of a literal 
phantasmagoria show. Goethe was not only familiar with Etienene-Gaspard Robertson’s 
Parisian “Phantasmagoria” when he came to write the second part of Faust, but, 
according to Albrecht Schöne, the whole ‘dumb-show of Paris and Helen’ represents ‘an 
illusionist spectacle devised by Mephistopheles with the help of a magic lantern that 
projects images onto a screen or smoke (or incense)’.104 As Mephistopheles directs the 
                                                       
102 Helen is first referred to in the “Witch’s Kitchen” scene of Faust I, when Faust sees ‘a form 
whose beauty is divine...A picture of a woman of surpassing beauty...the essence of all 
paradises’ in the magic mirror, a form which Mephistopheles refers to at the close of the 
scene as ‘the paragon of womankind...Helen of Troy’. (J. W. von Goethe, ‘Faust I’, CW2 
lines 2430-2440 & 2601-2603). It is only much later however, in the second part of the play, 
that Faust attempts to actualise Helen – as the essence of beauty – in some kind of particular 
or phenomenal form. He does so under the instruction of the Emperor, who ‘wants to 
see...Helen of Troy and Paris here before him, and gaze upon clear counterfeits of those two 
paragons of male and female beauty’ (J. W. von Goethe, ‘Faust II’, CW2 lines 6183-6). 
103 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Faust II’, CW2 lines 6553-6563. 
104 Albrecht Schöne specially emphasises its technical aspect in his Frankfurter Ausgabe 1994 
edition of Faust, a theme taken up in Neil Flax’s discussion (cf. Neil Flax, ‘Goethe’s Faust II 
and the Experimental Theatre of His Time’, Comparative Literature, 31, 2, (Spring, 1979), 
pp.154-166). ‘The “Fantasmagoria” is discussed in an article on Robertson in a German 
scientific journal in 1804, an article which Goethe demonstrably read, since he discusses it in 
detail in his Farbenlehre. But beyond this one direct reference, it is hard to imagine, given 
the fame of Robertson’s theatre at the time, that Goethe could have been unaware of it’ (ibid., 
p.157). Stuart Atkins was one of the first modern critics to see ‘the whole construct of the 
Mothers, its attendant motifs, and the subsequent development of the action in the Rittersaal 
scene’ as ‘a “brilliant improvisation” on the part of Mephistopheles’ (cf. Stuart Atkins, 
Goethe’s Faust: A Literary Analysis, (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1958), 
pp.133-4); also John R. Williams, ‘The Problem of the Mothers’, A Companion to Goethe’s 
Faust: Parts I and II, ed. Paul Bishop, (Rochester, NY & Woodbridge, Suffolk, Camden 
House, 2001), p.132). Marina Warner also draws upon Goethe’s fascination with the 
phantasmagoria, noting how in a letter he describes an ‘artistic illusion...conjured with a kind 
of Lanterna Magica’ and adds ‘Could you please find out, as soon as possible, who constructs 
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performance from the prompter’s box, from where the remarked artificiality of the 
spectres are projected onto the ‘smoke-like haze’ which engulfs the stage within the 
stage, he is required to repeatedly remind Faust that ‘you’re the author of this spectral 
masque!’.105 For Schöne, Goethe’s use of the phantasmagoria echoes the motif of the 
‘artificial, false semblance-like, [and] fictitious’ that runs through the whole of the first 
act.106 
 Despite the implicit theatricality and artificiality of this scene, Jung clearly attaches 
some importance to the conjuration of Paris and Helen through Faust’s descent to the 
archetypal realm of the Mothers, a mistake which indicates his tendency to conflate the 
origin of primal images with some primitive historical realm of the unconscious. Jung 
argues that out of the ‘regressive movement of libido towards the primordial, a diving 
down into the source of the first beginnings...there rises, as an image of the incipient 
progressive movement’: hence, he adds, ‘Goethe makes the divine images of Paris and 
Helena float up from the tripod of the Mothers...’.107 It is for this reason that Jung 
associates Helen with ‘the symbol, which is a condensation of all the operative 
unconscious factors – “living form”, as Schiller says’, and the ‘rejuvenated pair’ as ‘the 
symbol of a process of inner union, which is precisely what Faust passionately craves for 
himself as the supreme inner atonement’.108 ‘The raw material shaped by thesis and 
antithesis, and in the shaping of which the opposites are united, is the living symbol,’ 
Jung claims, and its ‘profundity of meaning is inherent in the raw material itself, the very 
                                                                                                                                                     
such an apparatus, how could WE obtain it, and what preparations must be made for it?’. 
Goethe’s drawings suggest that the ‘vision of Helen of Troy should also be patterned on 
optical illusions, with two-way mirrors and changing lighting bringing her image suddenly 
into focus in the glass’ (Marina Warner, Phantasmagoria: Spirit Visions, Metaphors, and 
Media in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p.154). 
105 J. W. von Goethe, ‘Faust II’, CW2 lines 6546; cf. Neil M. Flax, “Goethe’s Faust II and the 
Experimental Theatre of his Time”, op. cit. 
106 “[D]as Grundmotiv des Künstlichen, trügerisch Scheinhaften, Fiktiven, das diesen ganzen 1. 
Akt durchzieht” (Albrecht Schöne, Faust: Kommentare, (Frankfurt am Main, Deutscher 
Klassiker Verlag, 1994), p.465, quoted in John R. Williams,  op. cit., p.132). This parallels 
the promissory illusion of paper money introduced by Mephistopheles to stave of the 
financial ruin of the Empire. 
107 C. G. Jung, ‘Psychological Types’ (1921), CW6 p.125. 
108 Ibid. Jung develops this concept of the symbol through an interpretation of Schiller’s Letters 
on the Aesthetic Education of Man in particular, and in agreement with Goethe’s account of 
symbolism in general. Hence, Jung agrees that the ‘mediating position’ in the conflict 
between rational judgement and sensuous desire – the problem which concerns Schiller in the 
Aesthetic Education – ‘can be reached only by the symbols’ (ibid., p.111). But for Jung, the 
site where ‘all psychic functions are indistinguishably merged in the original and 
fundamental activity of the psyche’ is not the imagination, but the ‘fantastical activity’ of the 
unconscious. If the ideal of Helen in the Imperial Palace is an archetypal image for Jung, she 
corresponds to his doctrine of the psychological symbol as a Schillerian “living form”, which 
represents ‘something that is not wholly understandable...[and] hints intuitively at its possible 
meaning’ (ibid., p.105). 
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stuff of the psyche, transcending time and dissolution...’.109 This process of shaping is 
reminiscent of Jung’s Schillerian description of the ‘social significance of art’ in ‘On the 
Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry’ (RAPP 77).  
The problem that Jung overlooks in his appropriation of Faust’s supposed descent 
to the Mothers and the act of conjuration that archetypal extroversion entails is that this 
image of Helen is produced not directly and magically through the profundity of 
psychological symbolisation, but is mediated via the technological reproduction and 
projection of the magic lantern and the other technical apparatus of the phantasmagoria 
show.110 Although the magic produced by the tripod Faust retrieves from the Mothers has 
been variously associated with necromantic ritual, artistic genius and female procreation, 
this interpretation suggests its necessity is related to its literal projection of the 
phantastical theatrical slide show that follows.111 This form of presencing is therefore 
phantasmagorical in the sense of superficial and magical, serving to distract and entertain, 
to compensate for nothing nobler than the boredom of the age rather than generating any 
critical potential. It leaves the ontological conditions of the present untouched, and 
conjures up the past as an artificially flattened and rigid semblance of the living present.  
 Faust’s schizophrenic introversion to the realm of the Mothers and projection of 
Helen and Paris as the ideals of beauty is provoked by the crisis of signification, which 
follows from Mephistopheles’ introduction of paper money based on the illusory promise 
of buried gold and which induces a carnivalesque interchangeability of signs.112 Marx’s 
                                                       
109 Ibid., p.480 
110 Jung repeats Faust’s own misrecognition, for whereas the audience express a disappointment 
with Goethe’s phantasmagorical images (‘He might be a bit less stiff’, ‘Although I see her 
clearly, I’ll point out that there may be some doubt if she’s authentic’), Mephistopheles is 
continually forced to interject when Faust takes them for reality (‘Control yourself, and don’t 
forget your part’, ‘Don’t interfere in what the phantom’s doing’, ‘But you’re the author of 
this spectral masque!’) (Goethe, ‘Faust II’, CW2 lines 6458-6546). 
111 Ursula Reidel-Schrewe argues that ‘the key and the tripod are presented as ritual objects 
complementing each other and symbolizing the ultimate power of genius’ (Ursula Reidel-
Schrewe, ‘Key and tripod in Mikhail Bulgakov's Master and Margarita’, Neophilologus, 79, 
2, (April, 1995), p.273). John Aloysius McCarthy, however, rejects this classical association 
and focuses, in rather excited detail, on its sexual imagery: ‘Traditionally, the burning tripod 
is interpreted to be the common feature in ancient sanctuaries, suggestive of oracular and 
spirit-summoning powers. We can see it, however, as related to the fundamental significance 
for Goethe of flame and light as symbolic of divine and life-giving qualities. Given the 
clearly phallic symbolism of the key that naturally seeks out the “right place,” the argument 
for viewing the burning tripod as the aroused female genitals is more compelling. The 
triangular form of the tripod supporting the flaming bowl is reminiscent of the triangular 
shape of the gateway to the female reproductive organs’ (John Aloysius McCarthy, 
Remapping Reality: Chaos and Creativity in Science and Literature, (Amsterdam & New 
York, Rodopi, 2006), p.210). 
112 ‘Money’s symbolic excess slips into Marx’s delineation of money’s powers. It is not only 
able to maintain its value while losing its substance. It can transform those who possess 
it…Marx cites Goethe’s Faust: “money is now pregnant,” or money has love in its belly: 
“Geld hat Lieb im Leib”. Money begets money, so it would seem, when it turns into interest-
bearing capital’ (Esther Leslie, Synthetic Worlds: Nature, Art and the Chemical Industry, 
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reflections on the ‘inverting power’ of money in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts evokes the sorcery associated with this sudden transformation and 
confusion. There he describes the capacity of money to ‘to turn imagination into reality 
and reality into mere imagination’ and ‘real human and natural powers 
into...imperfections and tormenting phantoms, just as it turns real imperfections and 
phantoms...into real essential powers and abilities’.113 But the symbolic capacity of 
money is not restricted merely to turning unreal desire into real existence, and therefore 
ideologically inverting the foundational relationship between the ideal and the real. 
Money also has a ‘symbolic excess’, Esther Leslie suggests, which transforms and 
transfigures the human personality, whilst assuming an excessive procreative fecundity of 
its own.114 It also has the capacity to transform the structure of the real and therefore of 
the ideal, no longer simply reflecting reality but, as Jung emphasised, of actively 
producing and transforming it.  
 In the discussion of Goethe’s quasi-materialism in Chapter 2, the specific 
photographic ontology of what was referred to as the ikon or theological image was 
introduced in order to explain the material continuity between the signifier and the 
signified. A mistaken concept of the symbol occludes this relationship, reinforcing the 
division between the ideal and the real even as it inverts their relationship. In the 
metamorphic development from the camera obscura to the Lumière cinematographe this 
inversion is merely deepened: now the apparently moving, seemingly singular image 
projected into the darkened space of the theatre is more real than the reality itself.115 But 
                                                                                                                                                     
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Reaktion, 2005), p.91) 
113 ‘“What, man! confound it, hands and feet/ And head and backside, all are yours!/ And what 
we take while life is sweet,/ Is that to be declared not ours?/ Six stallions, say, I can afford,/ 
Is not their strength my property?/ I tear along, a sporting lord, As if their legs belonged to 
me” (Goethe, Faust – Mephistopheles)...let us begin, first of all, by expounding the passage 
from Goethe...Through money I can have anything that the human heart desires. Do not I 
therefore possess all human abilities? Does not my money therefore transform all my 
incapacities into their contrary? If money is the bond which ties me to human life and 
society, which links me to nature and to man, is money not the bond of all bonds? Can it not 
bind and loose all bonds? Is it therefore not the universal means of separation? It is the true 
agent of separation and the true cementing power, it is the chemical power of society’ (Karl 
Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, op. cit., pp.376-7). 
114 ‘“What, man! confound it, hands and feet/ And head and backside, all are yours!/ And what 
we take while life is sweet,/ Is that to be declared not ours?/ Six stallions, say, I can afford,/ 
Is not their strength my property?/ I tear along, a sporting lord, As if their legs belonged to 
me” (Goethe, Faust – Mephistopheles)...let us begin, first of all, by expounding the passage 
from Goethe...Through money I can have anything that the human heart desires. Do not I 
therefore possess all human abilities? Does not my money therefore transform all my 
incapacities into their contrary? If money is the bond which ties me to human life and 
society, which links me to nature and to man, is money not the bond of all bonds? Can it not 
bind and loose all bonds? Is it therefore not the universal means of separation? It is the true 
agent of separation and the true cementing power, it is the chemical power of society’ (Karl 
Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, op. cit., pp.376-7). 
115 Of the Lumière film L’Arrivée d’un Train (1895), Maxim Gorky writes: ‘It darts like an arrow 
132 
reality is left untroubled by the semblance of the real in this spectacle; if anything, the 
objective experience of space and time attributed to the detached observer is reinforced, 
and the truth of the construction of this moving image out of the juxtaposition of multiple 
static frames is suppressed. So, the ideological function at work in money in general and 
capital in particular is not merely, as the young Marx supposes, the repression of the 
difference between ‘a representation which merely exists within me and one which exists 
outside me as a real object’ – that is, between “thinking” and “being” or ‘effective 
demand based on money and ineffective demand based on my need’  – but of the reality 
of the underlying independence and autonomy which effectively cancels the absolute 
separation of being and thinking in Marx’s description.116 
 
 
4.5 ‘Pale and Fleeting Clearings in History’: Dialectical Image, Phantasmagorical 
Presencing 
Margaret Cohen argues that, ‘[t]ransforming the 1935 opposition between dream image 
and dialectical image into the difference between mystifying and (critically) illuminating 
phantasmagorias, Benjamin suggests the last phantasmagoria [Auguste Blanqui’s Eternité 
par les Astres] as the form by which phantasmagorical delusion may be undone’.117 This 
dialectical role for the concept of phantasmagoria entails a fore-grounding of its 
technological manifestation through magic lantern shows, aspects ‘not found in the term’s 
usage in 1935’, Cohen argues, but which permits Benjamin to correct Marx’s falsely 
mimetic representation.118 Such phantasmagorical performances were enacted in late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe, relying upon a sophisticated deployment 
of the older magic lantern device, which projected the images from painted slides 
(although later using advances in photographic technology to project the performance of 
real, hidden actors) onto a secretly deployed gauze screen or literal smoke screen. The 
spectral effect was enhanced through technological and theatrical means.119  
                                                                                                                                                     
straight towards you – watch out! It seems as though it is about to rush into the darkness 
where you are sitting and reduce you to a mangled sack of skin, full of crumpled flesh and 
splintering bones, and destroy this hall and this building, so full of wine, women, music and 
vice, and transform it into fragments and into dust. But this, too, is merely a train of shadows’ 
(Maxim Gorky, ‘The Lumière Cinematographe’, The Film Factory: Russian and Soviet 
Cinema in Documents 1896-1939, eds. Richard Taylor & Ian Christie, (London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1988), p.26. 
116 Karl Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, op. cit., p.378. 
117 Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination, op. cit., p.231. 
118 Margaret Cohen, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Phantasmagoria’, New German Critique, 48, (Autumn, 
1989), pp.87 & 93. 
119 Such as twin projection, the shortening and enlargement of the image through the movement 
of the projector, the suggestion of movement through rapid juxtaposition of images, and the 
use of music and sound effects, stage setting, planted stooges, and atmospheric suggestion. 
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 Whilst the use of Jung’s theory of the symbolic activity of the unconscious permits 
a psychological way of thinking Benjamin’s replacement of the camera obscura’s 
simulacra of realism with the phantasmagoria show’s material projection, the critique of 
Jung’s concept of the symbol is required for a consideration of the specific temporality of 
such “spectral” projection. Projection, in both its technological and psychological sense 
[Projektion], suggests a displacement from inside to outside, an act of throwing or 
leaping forward, which also implies a temporal aspect, and it is this aspect that harbours a 
more radical potential for illuminating the ideological semblance of capitalist history. The 
relationship previously established between the conjuration of the past and the present 
into which it is conjured must be reformulated if Benjamin’s more critical form of 
“presencing” is to be clarified and the dialectical image rescued. What Benjamin means 
here might be introduced by considering the success he associates with the literary 
technique of “making present” [Vergegenwärtigung] in the works of the French novelist  
Julien Green. In a review of Green’s work from 1930, Benjamin distinguishes this 
“making present” from the depiction practiced by Naturalism by referring to its ‘magical 
side’ as well as its ‘temporal aspect’.120 Making present involves an act of conjuration, a 
bringing into presence of that which is absent, achieved through the specific character of 
its temporal index: by imagining people and the conditions of their existence ‘in a way 
that they would never have appeared to a contemporary’, Green represents a ‘second 
present’ which ‘immortalizes what exists’. This effect is in part achieved through Green’s 
stylized use of the simple past tense [passé simple], an outmoded literary form which 
refers to the past action as something finished and completed.121 The characters conjured 
in this way appear as if ‘apparitions...compelled to relieve these moments anew’, and it is 
this very temporal representation, Benjamin argues, which renders it a ‘magical act’.122 
 But Benjamin also approves of how Green’s ‘visionary aura’ remains distanced 
from that of dreams by retaining the authentic seal of the here and now of the present 
(‘the here and now is the seal of authenticity that clings to every vision’).123 As a result of 
this double aspect of presencing, Green’s characters and the conditions of their existence 
‘stand in the twofold darkness of what has only just happened and the unthinkably remote 
past’, housed within a ‘temporal space, which is alien to them and which encloses them in 
a vault of hollow years that echoes back their whispered words and screams...’.124 Thus 
Green’s Mont-Cinère reveals ‘a meteorological compromise between a climate of primal 
                                                       
120 Walter Benjamin, ‘Julien Green’, SW2 p.333. 
121 Cf. Annie Brudo, Rêve et fantastique chez Julien Green, (Paris, Presses universitaires de 
France, 1995), p.237; Entry on ‘Julien Green’, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, accessed 
17/09/09, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/244888/Julien-Green. 
122 Walter Benjamin, ‘Julien Green’, SW2 p.333. 
123 Ibid., p.334. 
124 Ibid., pp.335 & 333. 
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history and that of the present day’, just as the landscape of Adrienne Mesurat ‘appears 
timeless, from the elemental forces at work in its characters to the no less primeval nature 
of their world...’.125 Benjamin describes this as the ‘primal history of the nineteenth 
century’, a glimpse of ‘pale and fleeting clearings in history’ which occurs ‘only as the 
result of catastrophe’.126 This primordial anamnesis anticipates his later description of the 
mémoire involontaire, whose images are those ‘we have never seen before we remember 
them’: ‘This is most clearly the case in those images in which – like in some dreams – we 
see ourselves. We stand in front of ourselves, the way we might have stood somewhere in 
a prehistoric past, but never before our waking gaze’.127 In what might be understood as 
the primal history of his own theories of Ideas, he goes on to unfold these primal images 
from a psycho-philosophical context to the techno-theological one of the photographic 
and then cinematographic image: 
 
 Yet these images, developed in the darkroom of the lived moment, are the most 
important we will ever see. One might say that our most profound moments have been 
equipped – like those cigarette packs – with a little image, a photograph of ourselves. 
And that “whole life” which, as they say, passes through people’s minds when they are 
dying or in mortal danger is composed of such little images. They flash by in as rapid a 
sequence as the booklets of our childhood, precursors of cinema, in which we admired a 
boxer, a swimmer or a tennis player. 
 
If the literary techniques of Green’s novels provide Benjamin with a model for 
his practice of historical montage in the Arcades Project, it is clear from his reviews that 
they do so by already fulfilling the demands which Adorno later imposes upon 
Benjamin’s concept of “primal history”. What also becomes apparent from Benjamin’s 
discussion is the extent to which the reworking of the past necessarily implies a 
reworking of the present. It is, however, the present which becomes spectral or ghostly in 
this diachronic conjunction, and the past which, in contrast, endures as substantial, 
earthly, and chthonic. The emphasis placed upon repetition by Benjamin here therefore 
falls not so much upon the past as upon the historically actual present which appears as a 
“second present” through being magically conjured somewhere else in Green’s work. 
When Benjamin criticises Jung in the Arcades Project for wanting to ‘distance awakening 
from dream’ (a charge he also directs at Aragon and the Surrealists), this should be 
contrasted with the dialectical rhythm of Green’s ‘phased submerging and awakening’.128  
                                                       
125 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Fireside Saga’ (1928), SW2 p.151; Walter Benjamin, ‘Review of 
Green’s Adrienne Mesurat’ (1928), SW2 p.160. 
126 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Fireside Saga’, SW2 pp.151-2. 
127 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Short Speech on Proust’ (1932), quoted in Miriam Hansen, ‘Benjamin, 
Cinema and Experience: “The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology”’, Walter Benjamin: 
Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. Peter Osborne, (London & New York, 
Routledge, 2005), Volume 2, p.253. 
128  AP N18, 4; ‘...whereas Aragon persists within the realm of dream, here the concern is to find 
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 Benjamin’s rejection of the Jungian “presencing” of primal images, and their 
consequently archaic and undialectical form, may be represented in terms of a critique of 
Jung’s reading of the signification operating in Goethe’s Faust II. Whilst Jung takes the 
“neo-classical” conjuration of the ideal of beauty at face value, a broader, Benjaminian 
consideration of this scene suggests Goethe offers it as a baroque self-critique of the 
classicism of Faust I. As part of this critique, the action of the play also subtly subverts 
Goethe’s own theoretical reflections on the symbolic and the allegorical. The subsequent 
two Acts of Goethe’s play dramatise Faust’s further quest to recover Helen, searching for 
her in the mythical pageant of the Classical Walpurgisnight and, with Mephistopheles’s 
help, being reunited with her in the baroque setting of the castle of Mistra, near Sparta.129 
Here, Goethe dramatises an alternative form of Helenic/Hellenic presencing, which 
subverts the neo-classical tropes of the play and undermines the classical concept of the 
symbol discussed above.  
 As John Williams makes clear, the ‘a spectral image of the Greek heroine, 
inaccessible to Faust except as a phantom form’ is ‘not remotely the Helen of Act 3’, who 
is historically actualised and physically embodied, capable of moving and interacting 
with the other characters, to the extent that she is capable of producing an offspring 
through her union with Faust.130 Williams argues that this difference is the result of 
Faust’s ‘experience, vicariously and at first hand, [of] the whole primitive pre-classical 
spectrum of archaic Greek religious myth, the pre-history of Helen herself, as it 
were...’.131 Whilst this might imply that Goethe sought to contrast the merely 
phantasmagorical first act with the “authentic” reality of Helen in Act 3, it is the latter 
scene which Goethe entitles “Helen: Classico-Romantic Phantasmagoria”.132 Writing to 
Wilhelm von Humboldt after the completion of Act 3 in 1826, it is the striking 
temporality of the scene that Goethe singles out: it ‘embraces 3,000 years, from the 
collapse of Troy to the capture of Missolonghi’, he says, which ‘can be considered an age 
in the highest sense of the word; the unity of place and action are, however, most 
punctiliously observed in the usual way’.133 In another letter, Goethe cites this as the 
‘most remarkable thing’ about a play he already describes as ‘as strange and problematic 
                                                                                                                                                     
the constellation of awakening...that, of course, can only happen through the awakening of a 
non-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been’ (AP <Hº, 17>); Walter Benjamin, ‘Julien 
Green’, SW2 p.33. 
129 Paul Bishop follows the critics in identifying the location of the Helen scene in ‘Mistra, a 
fortress city not far from Sparta’ (Paul Bishop, ‘Introduction: Reading Faust Today’, A 
Companion to Goethe’s Faust Parts I and II, (Rochester, NY & Woodbridge, Suffolk, 
Camden House, 2001), p.xvii). 
130 John R. Williams, op. cit., p.140. 
131 Ibid., p.141. 
132 Siegfried Unseld, Goethe and His Publishers, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott, (Chicago & 
London, University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.325. 
133 Ibid. 
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a piece as I have ever written’, for ‘without changing its locus it covers exactly three 
thousand years, it observes meticulously the unity of action and place, but allows the third 
(time) to pass as in a phantasmagoria’.134 
  It is this phantasmagoric temporality of Act 3, Anthony Phelan argues, which 
renders the position of Helen deeply ambiguous, for ‘the return of some element of 
antiquity from the past and its reinstatement in the present...gives new meaning to the 
term representation, which is now a restoration to presence’, but one which ‘destabilizes 
the personal identity of its central figure by insisting on her allusive character’.135 This 
phantasmagoric “presencing” of Act 3 provides a more radical and dialectical concept of 
the phantasmagorical semblance which can be seen operating in Benjamin’s Arcades 
Project. The difference between the two Helen scenes in Act 1 and Act 3 concerns the 
temporality of their presences, not any essentialism concerning their ontological status. 
Neither of the Helen figures is fully “authentic”, but the varying forms of their temporal 
presences does grant them a different existential status. The second Helen is granted 
embodiment through the performance of her pre-history, the staged return to her Hellenic 
past-present, her flight into the future of Faust’s mediaeval past-present, and the 
anticipation of Goethe’s future-present. All this occurs internal to the momentary present 
in which the two phantasmagorical acts are encompassed: it splits open the continuity 
between the end of Act 1 and the beginning of Act 4.  
 Critics typically refer to this phantasmagorical temporality as “symbolic”, 
disregarding Benjamin’s critique of the Romantic misunderstanding of the symbol and 
the emergence of an allegorical sensibility within Goethe’s mature writings.136 Both 
Goethe and Jung’s theoretical definitions of the symbol share this devaluation of the 
allegorical.137 But despite Goethe and Jung’s own theories of allegory, the 
                                                       
134 Ibid., p.324. 
135 Anthony Phelan, ‘The Classical and the Medieval in Faust II’, A Companion to Goethe’s 
Faust Parts I and II, op. cit., p.162. 
136 Although J. Lamport observes how ‘at the centre of the whole work, in the loftiest and in 
some ways most significant episode of the triple tragedy, time is turned inside out’, he refers 
to this as an ‘appropriately symbolic...time-scale’ (F. J. Lamport, ‘Synchrony and Diachrony 
in Faust’, Oxford German Studies, 15, (1984), pp.125-126). Similarly, Neil Flax argues that 
there is a ‘revelatory quality in Faust’s encounter with Helena’ which demonstrates that 
‘symbols do work’, although he adds that the ‘effect of the manifestation is merely to reassert 
the impossibility of the transcendence that was promised by the antecedent symbols’ (Neil 
Flax, ‘The Presence of the Sign in Goethe’s Faust’, PMLA, 98, 2, (March, 1983), p.195). For 
Flax this confirms the proper paradoxical structure of the Romantic symbol, which by 
revealing itself as a sign and declaring its fictitiousness thereby affirms the primacy and 
verity of the semiotic condition’; a truth Flax associates with “literary absolute” of early 
German Romanticism, as well as holding affinities with aspects of deconstruction (ibid., 
pp.192 & 200, n.15). 
137 As Paul Bishop points out, Jung’s understanding of the ‘essence of the symbol’ as 
‘represent[ing] in itself something that is not wholly understandable, and hint[ing] only 
intuitively at its possible meaning’, is reminiscent of Goethe’s  definition: ‘Symbolism 
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phantasmagorical temporality of Faust II suggests that Goethe may have been more 
attentive to the nuances of the allegorical than his own polemical position allows for. As 
Neil Flax points out, the relation between Goethe’s theory of symbol and allegory and his 
theatrical practice should not be presumed to be unproblematically identical and Mary 
Desaulniers, noting how Goethe ‘doubles the apparent significations’ of his signs, writes 
that in Faust II ‘the allegory resists being a mere allegory and achieves the manifold, 
obscure, and irreconcilable “phantasmagory” of Coleridge’s symbol’.138 
 Benjamin explains the different temporal signification of the Idea in symbol and 
allegory by developing Creuzer’s suggestion, that ‘[t]he distinction between the two 
modes is therefore to be sought in the momentariness which allegory lacks’ (OGT 165). 
In the symbol ‘we have momentary totality’, in the allegory ‘progression in a series of 
moments’. In his discussion of Jung’s schizophrenic transformation of reality into the 
‘world as a symbol’, Christian Kerslake points out how for Schelling ‘symbols functioned 
in a different way to allegorical images or scenes – which required knowledge of an 
actual esoteric “key” which relates the elements to a historical or mythical narrative’, 
concluding that the ‘power of religious and mythical images did not come from their 
allegorical function’.139 But because Schelling misconstrued the concept of allegory in 
contrast to the promise held out by the symbol, he failed to grasp what Creuzer and 
Görres, who perceived the important temporality of allegory, saw: ‘it is allegory, and not 
the symbol, which embraces myth..., the essence of which is most adequately expressed 
in the progression of the epic poem’.140 Whilst Jung read Görres in his youth and Creuzer 
in preparation for Transformation and Symbols of the Libido, he appears not to have 
heeded their reservations: they ‘have no use for the view that the symbol is being, and 
                                                                                                                                                     
transforms the phenomenon into an idea, the idea into an image [die Erscheinung in Idee, die 
Idee in ein Bild], and does it in such a way that the idea-in-the-image [Idee im Bild] remains 
infinitely effective and unattainable – and though it may be expressed in every language, it 
will remain inexpressible [unaussprechlich]’ (C. G. Jung, ‘Psychological Types’, CW6 p.480; 
MR #1113, trans. Paul Bishop, Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: 
Goethe, Schiller and Jung, op. cit., p.135). For both, allegory merely designates the relation 
between a concept and a phenomenon, so that according to Goethe ‘the concept continues to 
remain circumscribed and completely available and expressible within the image’ (MR 
#1112). Similarly, when Jung argues that Freud’s concept of the dream symbol is flawed 
because it has ‘merely the role of signs and symptoms of the subliminal process’, he is 
invoking a definition of the symbol in contrast to a devalued concept of allegory as the 
conventional sign (RAPP 70; quoted in Christian Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconscious, op. 
cit., p.106). ‘Symbols are not allegories and not signs’, Jung argues, because the ‘sign always 
has a fixed meaning, because it is a conventional abbreviation for, or a commonly accepted 
indication of, something known’ (TSL 124). 
138 Neil Flax, ‘The Presence of the Sign in Goethe’s Faust’, op. cit., p.184; Mary Desaulniers, 
Carlyle and the Economics of Terror: A Study of Revisionary Gothicism in the French 
Revolution, (Montreal, Quebec & Kingston, Ontario, McGill-Queens University Press, 1995), 
p.46. 
139 Christian Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconscious, op. cit., p.108. 
140  Friedrich Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen, 1. 
Theil. 2., (Leipzig, Darmstadt, völlig umgearb Ausgabe, 1819), pp.70-1; quoted in OGT 165. 
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allegory is sign...We can be perfectly satisfied with the explanation that takes the one as a 
sign for ideas, which is self-contained, concentrated, and which steadfastly remains itself, 
while recognising the other as a successively progressing, dramatically mobile, dynamic 
representation of ideas which has acquired the very fluidity of time’.141 
 The phantasmagorical presencing of Helen in Act 3 is staged as a primal history of 
her semblance, revealed in the baroque juxtaposition of her classical past and Faust’s 
modern present, which provides an ironic critique of Faust’s own conjuration in Act 1. 
Goethe’s use of the term “phantasmagoria” to describe the “presencing” of Helen in this 
scene makes it evident that he grasps the concept as more than either the making real of 
an illusion or the illusion of a reality, but as being implicated in the revelation of the 
dialectical truth of semblance. Benjamin’s original subtitle for his work on the Paris 
arcades was ‘a dialectical fairy tale [féerie]’, and in Convolute Y of the Arcades Project 
this form is exemplified by ‘bevy of naked beauties’ illustrating English industry in 
Parisiens a Londres (1866) – ‘who naturally owe their appearance to allegory and poetic 
invention’ – amd as with ‘the most fantastic creations of fairyland [la féerie]...wonders as 
great as those produced by Doctor Faustus with his book of magic’ are turned out each 
day by the industrial factories of London and Paris.142 
 Margaret Cohen explains how this term was adopted in ‘1823 Paris to designate a 
theatrical spectacle “where supernatural characters appear... and which requires 
considerable theatrical means,” notably mechanical ones...’, and how it is this meaning 
which, invested with critical resonance, leads Benjamin to develop his own technological  
model for the phantasmagoria.143 It is in this sense that the pioneering film-maker George 
Méliès describes his first sketches as a ‘genre féerique et fantasmagorique’, inspired by 
his earlier stage performances involving ‘magic lantern shows where the féerie met the 
phantasmagoria’.144 Méliès’s films, characterised as the antithesis of Lumiére’s realist 
                                                       
141 C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ed. Aniela Jaffe, (New York, Fontana Press, 
1995), pp.120-186; Johann Joseph von Görres, quoted in Friedrich Creuzer, Symbolik und 
Mythologie der alten Völker, op. cit., pp.147-8 & OGT 165. 
142 Cf. ‘Fairy plays [Feenstücke]: “Thus, for example, in Parisiens a Londres (1866), the English 
industrial exhibition is brought to the stage and illustrated by a bevy of naked beauties, who 
naturally owe their appearance to allegory and poetic invention alone” Rudolf Gottschall, 
“Das Theatre und Drama des Second Empire”, Unsere Zeit: Deutsche Revue – Montasschrift 
zum Konversationslexixon, (Leipzig, 1867), p.932 [Advertising]’ (AP Y1a,1); “The most 
fantastic creations of fairyland are near to being realized before our very eyes...Each day our 
factories turn out wonders as great as those produced by Doctor Faustus with his book of 
magic” Eugene Buret, De la Misere des classes laborieuses en France et en Angeleterre 
(Paris, 1840), vol. 2, pp.161-2’ (AP Y2,1). 
143 Walter Benjamin, Briefe, eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. Adorno, (Frankfurt am 
Maine, Suhrkamp, 1978), Volume 1, p.455, trans. Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination, op. 
cit., pp.253-4. 
144 Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination, op cit., pp.253-4. Ezra Elizabeth notes how Méliès’ 
‘féeries or fantasy films have helped classify him as the pioneer of early cinema’ (Ezra 
Elizabeth, Georges Méliès: The Birth of the Auteur, (Manchester, Manchester University 
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tendency in Siegfried Kraucauer’s Theory of Film, ‘explored new frontiers within fantasy 
fiction, trick film, and elaborate mise-en-scène’, leading him to be nicknamed the 
“magician of Montreuil”.145 Méliès’s short film The Magic Lantern (1903), for example, 
uses multiple exposure to create the metatheatrical illusion of a giant magic lantern 
projector, out of which are then conjured – through stop-editing – a chorus of dancing 
girls.146 Whereas Lumière refused to sell Méliès a camera for his theatre, on the basis that 
film offered nothing more than a “scientific curiosity”, the latter exploited the capacity 
for the fantastical opened up through the technical specificities of cinematography.147 
Méliès, perhaps more than anyone, grasped the metatheatrical themes of conjuration 
present in Goethe’s version of the legend, and he produced four films in the space of 8 
years which are taken from the Faust legend.148 It is in this context that Goethe’s 
phantasmagoria may be considered the Urform of modern cinema itself: the play 
dramatizes  its own temporality in a procession of  images conjured as a carnival of the 
allegorical, and prophesizes its own demise as a performance whose technical demands 
anticipate its true realization only in film. 
 In his illustration of the redemptive ‘historical apocatastasis’ involved in the 
critical ‘cultural-historical dialectic’ of Convolute N (considered in the previous chapter 
during the discussion of the refractive medium of historical expression), Benjamin’s 
reference to the dialectical contrasts embodied in a film of Faust probably has in mind 
not Méliès’ versions, however, but F. W. Murnau’s  more recent Expressionist production 
of Faust: A German Folk Legend [Volkssage], which received its official 1926 premiere 
in Berlin.149 The process of synthetic refraction by which the past is brought into the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Press, 2000), p.3), and Alec Worley says this ‘distinctive aesthetic’ was ‘inspired by a form 
of popular French theatre...[k]nown as the féeries (Alec Worley, Empires of the Imagination: 
A Critical Survey of Fantasy Cinema from Georges Méliès to The Lord of the Rings, 
(Jefferson, North Carolina & London, McFarland and Company, Inc., 2005), p.21). 
145 Siegfried Kraucauer, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1960), pp.32 & 36. 
146 ‘The show within a show reminds us that Méliès had included lantern slide projections of his 
caricatures as part of the regular program at the Robert-Houdin [theatre]. The Magic Lantern 
also has a particular appeal to contemporary students of film by the way it makes explicit 
references to the process by which the filmic illusion is created, philosophically engaging in a 
dialectic between the machinery of illusion, the medium which records those illusory images, 
the creators of illusion, and the viewer in whose mind the several aspects are synthesized and 
given meaning’ (John Frazer, Artificially Arranged Scenes: The Films of Georges Méliès, 
(Boston, Mass., G. K. Hall & Co., 1979), p.130). 
147 Siegfried Kraucauer, Theory of Film, op. cit., p.32. 
148 ‘This [The Damnation of Faust - 1903] was the third of four films that Méliès extracted from 
the Faust legend. He had made his Damnation of Faust in 1898 and his first Faust and 
Marguerite in 1897...[In Faust and Maguerite – 1904] Faust goes to the Walpurgnis night 
with Mephistopheles, where they are entertained by history’s famous courtesans’ (John 
Frazer, Artificially Arranged Scenes: The Films of Georges Méliès, op. cit., pp.131-2 & 140). 
149 ‘Isn’t it an affront to Goethe to make a film of Faust, and isn’t there a world of difference 
between the poem Faust and the film Faust? Yes, certainly. But, again, isn’t there a whole 
world of difference between a bad film of Faust and a good one? (AP N1a, 4). In this respect, 
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present in Benjamin’s description concerns what he calls ‘the indestructibility of the 
highest life in all things’, the afterlife of cultural works paradoxically predicated on the 
very possibility of the “death” of the “original” (AP N1a, 4 & <Oº, 1>). The previous 
chapter considered the Goethean resonances of this eschatological tendency, and it is 
fitting that Benjamin exemplifies his dialectical methodology with reference to the 
afterlife of Faust itself. 
 Adorno’s criticism of Benjamin’s deployment of the concept of the phantasmagoria 
is that its presence in the essay on Baudelaire and the Arcades Project itself assumes a 
phantasmagorical character: ‘I approached the satanic scene must as Faust approached the 
phantasmagoria of the Brocken on the mountain, when he thought that many a riddle 
would now be solved. May I be excused for having to give myself Mephistopheles’ reply 
that many a riddle poses itself anew?’150 But Benjamin replies that the concept had been 
‘integrated into the construction’ of his study rather than theoretical articulated.151 What 
Benjamin calls the ‘pedagogical side’ of the project therefore involves the theological 
“education” of the “image-making medium within us”, rather than the impossible task of 
the rational demystification of this religious aspect of the commodity phantasmagoria (cf. 
AP N1, 8 & <Oº, 2>). He goes on to associate both the model for and the historical object 
of this image-making education as film: ‘Method of the project: literary montage. I need 
say nothing. Only show’; ‘The refuse- and decay-phenomenon as precursors...of the great 
syntheses to follow. These worlds of static realities are to be looked for everywhere. 
Film, their centre’ (AP N1a, 8 & Y1, 4 & <Oº, 2>). In the practice of montage Benjamin 
discovers a process of photographic, allegorical conjuration that expresses its own 
principle of construction: the juxtaposition of images in such a way that their synthetic 
continuity in the mind of the engaged subject provokes a critical perception of the static 
temporality, finitude and multitude of the images employed in the underlying medium. In 
the theses ‘On the Concept of History’, Benjamin evokes the ‘constructive principle 
[konstruktives Prinzip]’ which the dialectical materialist must employ as one  comparable 
to a ‘time lapse camera’ [Zeitraffer], which permits the completing ‘days of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Matt Erlin points out that whilst contemporary historians tend, like film historian Georges 
Sadoul, to regard Murnau’s work as ‘a great film that equals for the first time the great Fausts 
of literature...audiences and critics in Weimar Germany, however, were less impressed’ (Matt 
Erlin, ‘Tradition as Intellectual Montage: F. W. Murnau’s Faust (1926)’, Weimar Cinema: An 
Essential Guide to Classic Films of the Era, ed. Noah Isenberg, (New York & Chichester, 
West Sussex, Columbia University Press, 2009), p.155). Benjamin’s return to Berlin in 
October 1926 coincides with Faust’s official premiere on 14th October 1926 (cf. Walter 
Benjamin, Letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal (dated Berlin, October 30th, 1926), The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin 1910-1940, op. cit., p.307). 
150 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetics and Politics, (London, New Left Books, 1979), pp.126-7. 
151 Ibid., p.138. 
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remembrance’ to become visible.152 
 What is apparent from the proceeding analysis is that this critical version of 
phantasmagoric presencing and dialectical understanding of semblance historically 
depicted in the fantasy of film expresses the underlying Goetheanism of Benjamin’s 
tender empiricism. Despite Adorno’s sympathetic awareness of the literary resonances in 
Benjamin’s deployment of the concept, he failed to grasp how the dialectical aspect of 
Goethean semblance is methodologically tied to the construction of Urphänomen. The 
struggle waged between Benjamin and Adorno over the problematic presence of Jung in 
the Arcades Project testifies to Adorno’s Freudian (and perhaps ultimately  
Enlightenment) rejection of mystical experience. When he castigates democratic versions 
of socialism for lacking a dialectical conception of history, Benjamin attributes this 
failure to the profound mark left by Darwinian science, whose ‘evolutionary view of 
history burdened the concept of “development” more and more as the party became less 
willing to risk what it had gained in the struggle against capitalism’ (EF 273). Such 
“Darwinism” encapsulates as scientific doctrine the religious structure of capitalism, 
which is unreflectively adopted by the Social Democratic Party when it seeks to attribute 
deterministic traits to history by tracing back political principles to supposedly natural 
laws, putting its new scientific faith in a ‘stalwart optimism’ with regard to progress. 
 Benjamin returns to this theme in the ‘Paralipomena’ to ‘On the Concept of 
History’, where he follows Emile Meyerson in designating the ‘quintessence of the 
positivistic “scientific” character as ‘the substitution of homogeneous configurations for 
changes in the physical world’.153 Historicism betrays the same viewpoint when it regards 
historical understanding as the emphathetic projection of the past into the present, a 
‘false-aliveness of the past-made-present’ which eliminates ‘every echo of “lament” from 
history’ and ‘marks history’s final subjection to the modern concept of science’.154 
Benjamin invokes the figure of Meyerson here to oppose this dogmatic, “modern” 
conception of science, although the previous chapters have sought to demonstrate the 
extent to which Goethe’s tender empiricism is not only pitted against the Newtonianism 
of this scientific positivism, but that Benjamin’s philosophy utilises the Urphänomen to 
construct a dialectical and messianic concept of history in opposition to it. 
 Benjamin’s attempt to reconcile the philosophical strands of his materialist theory 
of ideas and his dialectical conception of history results in a dialectical version of 
historical materialism that distances itself from its orthodox formulation through a 
critique of Marxism. Writing of his experience of socialist Russian in the late 1920s, 
                                                       
152 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, SW4 p.395. 
153 Walter Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena to On the Concept of History’, SW4 p.401. 
154 Walter Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena to On the Concept of History’, SW4 p.402. 
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Benjamin emphasises the utter contingency of the political situation, claiming that ‘in 
schematic form, Moscow...reveals the full range of possibilities: above all, the possibility 
of the revolution’s utter failure and of its success’, and noting that it is ‘impossible to 
predict what the upshot of all this will be...Perhaps a true socialist community, perhaps 
something entirely different’.155 His article for the German journal The Creature [Die 
Kreatur] therefore sought to represent this experience by depicting the moment of 
historical contingency through an image of Moscow. Whereas Kant sought to grasp the 
French Revolution as a historical sign of inexorable moral progress, Benjamin presents 
the contingency of Russian Revolution through a dialectical image of the city and its 
people. To do so he must “seize” and “comprehend” the ‘very new and disorientating 
language that loudly echoes through the acoustic mask of an entirely transformed 
environment’.156 This “creatural” language must be allowed to ‘speak for itself’, 
Benjamin explains in a letter to Martin Buber, it cannot be theoretically articulated. The 
article would therefore be ‘a picture of the city of Moscow as it is at this very moment. In 
this picture “all factuality is already theory” and therefore it refrains from any deductive 
abstraction, any prognostication, and, within certain bounds, even any judgement...’. This 
formulation takes up Goethe’s description of a tender empiricism which seeks a higher 
standpoint through the synthetic construction of the Urphänomen, echoing Benjamin’s 
description of a dialectical judgement exemplified in the phantasmagoric practice of 
montage.(cf. MR #430). 
 Following his acquaintance in the mid-1920s with the Bolshevist pedagogy of Asja 
Lacis and the dialectical materialism of Georg Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, 
Benjamin speaks of his desire, evinced as ‘Communist signals’, to no longer ‘mask the 
actual and political elements of my ideas’.157 He therefore speaks in a more explicitly 
materialist way of the methodology for his article on Moscow being formulated ‘only on 
the basis of economic facts, and not at all on the basis of “spiritual” data’.158 In Convolute 
N of the Arcades Project this identity between the methodology of tender empiricism and 
a dialectical version of historical materialism is explicit: the ‘origin [Ursprung] of the 
forms and mutations of the Paris arcades from their beginning to their decline’ are to be 
located in ‘economic facts’, which are to be constructed as the ‘primal phenomenon 
[Urphänomen]’ of history ‘insofar as in their own individual development – “unfolding” 
might be a better term – they give rise to the whole series of the arcade’s concrete 
                                                       
155 Walter Benjamin, Letter to Martin Buber (dated February 23rd, 1927), The Correspondence 
of Walter Benjamin: 1910-1940, op. cit., p.313; Walter Benjamin, Letter to Jula Radt (dated 
December 25th, 1926), ibid., p.311. 
156 Walter Benjamin, Letter to Martin Buber (dated February 23rd, 1927), ibid., p.313. 
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historical forms, just as the leaf unfolds from itself all the riches of the empirical world of 
plants’ (AP N2a, 4). The presentation of such an Urphänomen is defined as the dialectical 
image (AP N9a, 4). Benjamin is clear, however, that these economic facts do not exhibit 
such a synthesis ‘from the standpoint of causality...and that means considered as causes’ 
(AP N2a, 4). This deployment of the Goethean figure of the Urphänomen reiterates the 
critique of the causal, rather than expressive, relation between base and superstructure 
presented in the orthodox Marxist materialism considered above, and the critical 
necessity for an imagistic rather than conceptual synthesis which follows from this. 
 
Epilogue: Walter Benjamin in Goethe’s Dream House 
 
In a dream I saw myself in Goethe’s study. It bore no resemblance to the one in Weimar...I sat 
down beside Goethe. When the meal was over, he rose with difficulty, and by gesturing I sought 
leave to support him. Touching his elbow, I began to weep with emotion.  
– Walter Benjamin, ‘Number 113’, One-Way Street  
 
The opening vignettes of One-Way Street traverse a backward course from the modern 
Berlin Filling Station to the Paris arcades of the nineteenth century; from the praxis of 
writing to the interior dream-house of Number 113, in the arcades of the Palais Royale.1 
If the passage from present to past proceeds via the more familiar route of the Surrealist 
interstices of the dream – the Breakfast Room in which Benjamin ‘avoids a rupture 
between the nocturnal and daytime worlds’ – the destination is nonetheless surprising. 
The cellar in ‘the house of dream’ at Number 113 leads up into the vestibule of Goethe’s 
home in Weimar. Benjamin has been here before, however, and he will return here again: 
on reaching the visitor’s book, he finds his name ‘already entered in big, unruly, childish 
scrawl’ and in sitting for dinner he finds the table prepared for his relatives and ancestors, 
past and future. Yet, as Benjamin himself exclaims, when the ‘house of our life…is under 
assault and enemy bombs are taking their toll, what enervated, perverse antiquities do 
they not lay bare in the foundations!’.2 The preceding discussion has intended to expose 
an important, perhaps perverse, Goethean stratum at the foundations of Benjamin’s 
philosophy. It remains here to briefly respond to some of the problems raised in this 
exposition and to gesture towards the contemporary relevance or philosophical value of 
Benjamin’s Goetheanism.      
 In The Concept of Criticism and the Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin 
introduces Goethe’s thought as dialectical counterpart to Early German Romanticism, 
which permits a critical development of the concept of experience inherent to their theory 
of criticism. As we have seen, Goethe’s thought provides an objective account of ideas, a 
negative principle of judgement, and a refractive medium of experience which provides 
the counterpoise to the subjectivity and positivity of Romantic reflection. A number of 
recent commentators, however, have questioned Benjamin’s exposition of Early German 
Romanticism in these early works and criticised the one-sidedness of his account. ‘It is 
ironic indeed that this work of Benjamin’s should have become so widely influential in 
                                                       
1 ‘Filling Station’ concerns ‘significant literary effectiveness’ under the present ‘construction of 
life’ as a ‘strict alternation between action and writing’, in which the writer applies a little oil 
of opinion to the ‘hidden spindles and joints’ in the ‘vast apparatus of social existence’ (Walter 
Benjamin, ‘One-Way Street’, SW1 p.444). ‘Number 113’, as Margaret Cohen points out, refers 
to the ‘notorious gambling den at No. 113, in the arcades of the Palais-Royale – immortalized 
in Georg Emanuel Opiz’s 1815 watercolour, “La Sortie du Numéro 113”’ (Margaret Cohen, 
op. cit., p.174).   
2 Walter Benjamin, ‘One-Way Street’, SW1 p.445. 
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recent years,’ writes Marcus Paul Bullock, ‘because it represents an attempt to overcome 
gaps in Schlegel’s oeuvre which no longer exist’.3 The emphasis placed upon the 
Romantic concept of reflection – both in Benjamin’s essay and in the interpretation of 
Benjamin’s philosophy which is offered in the chapters above – is flatly rejected by 
Bullock, who argues that ‘the concept of Reflexion does not have such a high priority in 
Schlegel’s thinking as Benjamin assumes’, and is ‘distinctly secondary to produktive 
Fantasie (“productive imagination”)’.4 Indeed, it is this aspect of the productive phantasy 
that I have counterpoised to Romantic reflection by drawing upon Goethe and Jung’s 
theory of Ideas. Winfried Menninghaus similarly claims that ‘Benjamin’s “deduction” of 
the immediacy of reflection is too simplistic by far, and that the level it works on…is 
more apt to draw out contradictory conclusions’.5 She argues that in Fichte’s later 
account, ‘the act of “self-grasping” in reflection at the same time is an act of “self-
destruction”’ and that Benjamin circumvents the unconscious capacity of the productive 
imagination which the Romantics valued so highly as a ‘hovering between being and not-
being’.6 
 This project has concerned itself with the way in which Benjamin interprets and 
appropriates Romanticism, and one of its faults lies in skirting over the issue of the 
accuracy of his reading. If Romanticism already contains this dialectical antithesis, it does 
indeed seem perverse to make a digression into Goethe’s unsystematic philosophical 
opinions. Nonetheless, one of the arguments which underpins the preceding discussion is 
that Benjamin’s later materialism is the prepared for by the objective content of Goethe’s 
concept of experience and that his concern with the formalism of Romantic criticism 
arises from a recognition of the limitations of their idealism. Hence, Marcus Bullock 
claims that Schlegel is ‘much more radical an idealist that Fichte’ and concludes that the 
‘religious function of artistic productivity [Fantasie] should be a major contradiction of 
the Messianic order which Benjamin attempts to ground in Reflexion’.7 ‘Indeed it can 
shown that there is an immediate contradiction of the Messianic idea necessitated by 
Schlegel’s position here’, Bullock continues, because the ‘never-ending progressivity of 
imaginative production precludes any image of redemption in finality or completion’.8 
Yet it is precisely for this reason, I have argued, that Benjamin turns not to a Romantic 
but to a Goethean account of phantasy and genius to develop, to borrow Joanna Hodge’s  
                                                       
3 Marcus Paul Bullock, op. cit., p.78. 
4 Ibid., p.91. 
5 Winnfried Menninghaus, op. cit., p.29. 
6 Ibid., p.44. 
7 Marcus Paul Bullock, op. cit., p.92. 
8 Ibid., p.93. 
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phrase, a ‘strong aesthetics’.9  
It would be interesting, in this context, to investigate Menninghaus’s claim that 
‘Schelling’s absence’ from the essay on Romanticism is a ‘logical function of the 
dissertation’s content, with Benjamin foregoing any explicit discussion of Schelling so as 
not to compromise his exposition’.10 Despite the similarities between Goethe’s and 
Schelling’s philosophies of nature, Goethe distinguishes his position from Schelling on 
the basis that Schelling ‘is seldom capable of recognizing law in an individual case’ (MR 
#1374). But this recognition is the very basis of Goethe’s concept of the Urphänomen – 
and therefore of their differing conceptions of the symbolic – and its absence from 
Schelling’s philosophy would seem to seriously undermine its possibility as a conceptual 
resource for Benjamin’s dialectical image. Again, Benjamin’s use of Goethe seems to 
have provided him with the precise elements he required to ferment the unorthodox 
materialism of his later philosophy. 
 This fortuitousness raises a related issue in Benjamin’s practice of interpretation: 
his appropriation of Goethe. Esther Leslie’s discussion of the “intensification” of 
Goethe’s dialectic calls into question the mortuary aspect of Goethean refraction which 
has been emphasised in this work. As Leslie points out, the principle of polarity that is 
present in Goethe’s theory of chromatic and biological metamorphosis ‘led always 
towards a progressive enhancement or intensification’, which omits the contradictory 
element of regression.11 I disagree with Runge’s formulation of Goethean metamorphosis 
which Leslie draws upon in her discussion, since it is equally the aberrant and strange that 
Goethe is interested in.12 Furthermore, Goethe distances his notion of dialectic from that 
of Hegel on precisely this point of actuality. When Hegel writes in the Preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit that, ‘The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and 
we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit 
comes the blossom may be explained to be a false form of this plant’s existence, for the 
fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom’, Goethe angrily responds that, ‘It 
is scarcely possible to say anything more monstrous’. 13 Paul Lauxtermann points out that 
this ‘typical sample of “dialectics”…was repugnant to a man like Goethe who…saw the 
plant as a living force that reveals itself with equal truthfulness at each stage of its 
growth’.14 As I have tried to suggest in the preceding discussion, Benjamin valued 
                                                       
9 Joanna Hodge, op. cit., p.16. 
10 Winnfried Menninghaus, op. cit., p.45. 
11 Esther Leslie, Synthetic Worlds, op. cit., pp.69-70. 
12 ‘For Goethe, while the plant is growing regularly and healthily all is progress, for, from the 
first seed-leaves to the final ripening of the fruit, progressive metamorphosis is at work, 
pushing the plant forward’ (Esther Leslie, Synthetic Worlds, op. cit., pp.69-70). 
13 Lauxtermann, Schopenhauer’s Broken World-View, pp.117-8. 
14 Ibid. 
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Goethe’s concept of synthesis precisely because it preserved something of the 
antinomical character of Kant’s philosophy, appearing as a tense interruption or pregnant 
pause in the movement of nature, in which the outmoded and strange lingers in 
conjunction with the anticipated and the new as a virtuality distinct from present 
actuality.    
 Nonetheless, this concept of intensification remains a primary feature of Goethe’s 
scientific writings. To the extent that I have thematized Benjamin’s Goetheanism as a 
rejection of the trope of Enlightenment reflection which runs through Kantian, neo-
Kantian, vular Marxist, Freudian, and – in a distinct way – Romantic thought, I have 
concurred with Habermas’ characterisation – if not his evaluation – of Benjamin’s 
philosophical practice as “rescuing” rather than “consciousness-raising” critique.15 
Indeed, I have drawn upon Hamann, Goethe and Jung as figures in a tradition of 
metacritique in order to defend the experiential, empirical, expressive, imagistic and 
refractive aspects of Benjamin’s thought. When Benjamin claims that Goethe’s Faust is 
‘a screen on which he projects a magnified image of the world of the statesman in all its 
ramifications’, he adds that this image ‘at the same time shows all its defects intensified 
to the point of grotesqueness…’.16 Richard Lane goes as far as to describe this as a 
Deleuzian folding of the Enlightenment into the Baroque.17 I think there is a case to be 
made for examining the “progressiveness” of Goethean intensification upon lines closer 
to a Jungian or Deleuzian account of individuation and have hinted at suggestions for this 
approach in my discussion of Goethe. But this perspective remains, at best, latent in 
Benjamin’s appropriation and it is fairer to say that he omitted any discussion of 
intensification and laid immediate claim to the destructive, mortuary and literary aspect of 
Goethe’s thought in order to distance the poet from those that would seek to utilise him 
for purposes of political unification. Benjamin constructs a “secret Goethe”, like he 
reveals the ‘lineaments of a “secret Germany”.18 But what is buried deep in the 
foundations of Benjamin’s appropriation is what he elsewhere describes as the rescuing 
of the ‘humanity’ of great writers. Benjamin had to bury Goethe in order to preserve 
him.19  
The Preface to this work suggested that the metacritique of the purism of historical 
                                                       
15 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Walter Benjamin: Consciousness-raising or rescuing critique’, Walter 
Benjamin: Critical Evaluation in Cultural Theory, op. cit., Volume 1, p.131. 
16 Richard J. Lane, Reading Walter Benjamin: Writing through the Catastrophe, (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2005), p.88. 
17 Ibid., p.88. 
18 Walter Benjamin, ‘German Letters’, SW2 p.466. 
19 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Trail of Old Letters’, SW2 p.557. 
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reason, required to negotiate a path between “neo-Kantian” and “neo-Hegelian” 
tendencies, would entail the radicalization of the idea of historical significance via a 
recognition of the negative and mortuary aspect of the relationship between criticism and 
the living thing. Benjamin’s well-known description of his thought being saturated with 
theology like a blotting paper is with ink figuratively expresses this destructive dialectic. 
If ‘the blotting paper had its way,’ Benjamin concludes, ‘nothing of what is written would 
remain’ (AP N7, a7). The preceding chapters have sought to make out a similar, murky 
relationship to an implicit and underlying Goetheanism, of which only isolated, partial 
maxims emerge as legible out of the inky darkness. Benjamin’s appropriation of Goethe 
puts his literary, aesthetic, and scientific thoughts into the service of philosophy to 
interpose into the speculative concept of experience an existential element of completion. 
In doing so he recovers a metaphysics of history. To the extent this is missing from the 
poststructuralist play of signifiers, elevated to a regulative and futural ideal in neo-
Kantianism, or an eternalization of the present in neo-Hegelianism, the necessary image 
of catastrophic completion is omitted from experience. Benjamin’s concept of experience 
is a Faustian wager on history itself. 
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